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PREFACE
The delegates to the 1971-1972 Montana Constitutional Convention will need historical, legal and comparative information
about the Montana Constitution.
Recognizing this need, the
1971 Legislative Assembly created the Constitutional Convention Commission and directed it to assemble and prepare
essential information for the Convention. This series of
reports by the Commission is in fulfillment of that responsibility.
This study on the legislature in Montana was written by
Richard F. Bechtel, research analyst on the Commission staff.
The Commissio n has authorized publ ication of the report as
approved by the Research Subcommittee on the Legislature
consisting of Commission members Clyde L. Hawks, St. Xavier,
chairman; Dr. Ellis Waldron, Missoula; Charles A. Bovey,
Great Falls; Jack E. Brenner, Grant, and Eugene H. Mahoney,
Thompson Falls. This report concerns not only what the
present Montana Constitution says about the legislature,
but how those provisions are working in practice.
In
addition, constitutional provisions and trends from other
states are used for comparative purposes. The question
of legislative reapportionment is discussed in a separate
Commission publication.
The Commission extends its appreciation to state officials
who cooperated in the preparation of this study. This
report is respectfully submitted to the people of Montana
and their delegates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional
Convention.
ALEXANDER BLEWETT
CHAIRMAN
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As arenas for the orderiy r e soiution of confiict, iegisiatures
offer the oniy reai hope of reversing the trend toward sociai
disintegration in this country.
Larry Margolis, Executive Director
Citizens Conference on State Legislatures
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SUMMARY
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A determination of whether the legislature is to be trusted
or held suspect will be important in deciding what a constitution should say about the legislature. Both approaches
toward the legislature have historical precedent; in fact,
they ~g_ear cyclical. Montana's 1~83 Constitution wa?
written during a period in which legislatures were distrusted;
as a result, it and other constitutions written during the
same era are said to offer strong evidence of the belief that
state officials cannot be trusted.
Constitutional restrictions on the legislature--such as
those in the Montana document~-are cited as one of the greatest reasons for the decreasing role states play in the
federal system. And recent state constitutions, perhaps
in recognition of this, have reduced the amount of legislative prohibitions and statutory materials in their basic
documents.
CHAPTER II
LEGISLATIVE POWER
A state constitution is a limiting document while the federal
Constitution is a grant of power. The powers of the states
are reserved and inherent, so there is no need to enumerate
them in the constitution.
Most states grant the legislature complete legislative power
in the first section of the legislative articles of their
constitutions. This power is immediately limited by the
constitution's bill of rights, and its doctrines of the
separation and the check and balance of powers.
In addition,
the Montana Constitution, like others of its era, contains
many specific prohibitions, grants and mandates and statutory
material--all of which serve to limit legislative power.
Most constitutional authorities agree that a constitution
should deal only with fundamentals.
This is often hard to
accomplish, but the process can be helped by development of
criteria with which to judge each proposed provision.
In the
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end, it is for those who propose a provision to show that its
inclusion is necessary.
One common limit on legislative power--prohibitions of local
and special legislation--developed as a result of the confusion
and corruption which spread through state legislatures during
the nineteenth century. Montana's Article V, Section 26
specifically forbids special legislation in more than eighty
areas. Most modern constitutions simply require that, whereever possible, a general law be passed rather than a special
law.
Montana has two forms of direct legislation--the initiative
and referendum. Twenty-one state constitutions provide for
the initiative; twenty-three provide for the referendum. The
Montana provision raises two major issues: whether the requirement that referendum and initiative petitions be signed by
a specified percentage of voters in each of two-fifths of
the total number of counties should be retained and whether the
initiative power should be expanded to allow the people to
call a constitutional convention.
Forty-nine of the fifty states provide for the executive veto.
In Montana the governor has the "item veto" in appropriation
bills and the "pocket veto." Two steps in the veto procedure
are of crucial importance to legislative power:
the legislative vote required to overturn a veto and the ability of
the legislature to reconvene after adjournment to reconsider
measures vetoed after the end of the last session.
In the
first question, there are several alternative answers:
Montana and thirteen other states require two-thirds of the
members present in both houses to overturn a veto; twentytwo states require two-thirds of the members elected to both
houses; one demands three-fourths of the members elected; six
require three-fifths of those elected or present, and six
demand only a majority of the elected members of both houses.
Concerning bills vetoed after adjournment, there are three
major alternatives:
the legislature could remain powerless
(as it now is in Montana) to overturn the veto; provision
could be made for a post-veto session at which such vetoes
could be considered, or the legislature could be made a continuous body with power to reconvene whenever it needs to.
All state constitutions grant legislatures the power to
judge the elections, returns and qualifications of their own
members--a "power necessary to the existence and independence
of each house as an instrumentality of goverIUT'ent." Every
state constitution except Montana's mentions the filling of
legislative vacancies. Montana's provision on this matter
was repealed in 1966 and legislative vacancies now are filled
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as provided by statute. The other forty-nine constitutions
provide for vacancies to be filled in numerous ways, including
by election, appointment by the governor or county commissioners or simply as provided by law.
CHAPTER III

LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE
Bicameralism or Unicameralism. A central issue in legislative stru cture is whether the legislature should be composed of one or two chambers. Originally, a major argument
for two houses was that each should represent different interests; thus, when the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Reynolds v. Sims that both houses must be apportioned on a
population basis, the unicameral-bicameral issue again came
into prominence.
Bicameralism developed in America to meet the common people's
demand that government be more responsive to their will. For
the most part, when the colonies became states they retained
the bicamer al system with which they were familiar; Vermont,
however, entered the Union with a unicameral legislature.
During the formation of the states and the national government,
a political philosophy developed to insure that the new
state and federal constitutions incorporated bicameralism.
John Adams was the major architect of this philosophy, of
which class representation was a major tenet. What had developed to make government more responsive to the people became
a device to check the popular will. By 1836 every state in
the Union had bicameral legislatures.
There are few arguments asserted for bicameralism because
few people since John Adams believed it needed defense. The
major arguments for bicameralism, which could more accurately
be termed arguments against unicameralism, are:
--Bicameralism protects the propertied classes and
conservatism.
--Bicameralism permits representation of different
interests.
--Bicameralism acts as a check on popular passion.
--Bicameralism guarantees critical review of legislation and, therefore, prevents passage of hasty and ill-considered legislation.
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--B icameralism preve nts corrupt i on .
--The mode of di s c ussion in a bicameral legislature
produces b et t er legi s l ation.
--Bicameralism is the t r aditional form of government in
the United States and i s, th e refore, familiar to the people.
The majo r arguments aga inst b icameralism are:
--Bicameralism d0e s not provide better representation
of rural a r eas.
--Bicameralism d oes not protect the propertied classes
and does no t represent different interests because no such
legislative distinct ions exist today.
--A second hou se is not a check on popular passions.
--The re is no n e e d for a second house.
--Bicameralism do es not guarantee critical review and
does not pr event hasty and ill-considered legislation.
--Bic ameralism doe s not prevent corruption or make
lobbyists mo r e respo nsible.
--The mod e of di scussion in a bicameral legislature does
not provid e adequate c onsideration of legislation.
--Ju st because bi cameralism is the traditional form of
governmen t does not mea n it is a good form of government.
--Bicameralism ob scures responsibility.
Arguments f or unicamer alism are:
--A u nicameral legi slature is more accountable.
--U nicameralism i s more efficient than bicameralism, and
i t s effic iency improve s the q uality of legislation.
- -Unicameralism is more economical than bicameralism.
Legislative sessions.
Fr om i ts v e ry begi n nings as a territory,
Monta n a has restricted t h e frequ e ncy and duration of its
legislative sessions. Th e 1889 Montana Constitution provides
for sixty-day biennial se ssi o ns. Th e re ar e tvro interrelated
constitutional issues cr ucia l to the discussion of legislative
s es s ions:
their freque ncy and their duration.
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Our forefathers placed great faith in their legislatures
and believed they should meet often. All but one of the
original thirteen states began with annual sessions.
However, during the 1800s the state legislatures fell into
disrepute and many states reacted by limiting their legislatures to meeting once every other year and by specifying
the number of days they could meet. The recent trend, however,
has been in the opposite direction:
in 1948, six states
held annual sessions; this increased to twenty-six in 1970
and to thirty-three in 1971.
The major issue in the frequency of legislative sessions is
biennial versus annual sessions.
However, several other alternatives have been tried, including unlimited biennial
sessions, alternating budget sessions and split sessions.
Most states that have tried these other forms have rejected
them in favor of annual sessions.
In the same period that the states reduced the legislatures
to meeting every other year, they limited the number of days
the legislature could meet, believing that the shorter the
session, the less harm the legislature could do.
However,
it was discovered that chaotic sessions and ill-considered
legislation were merely symptoms of insufficient time in
constitutionally limited sessions. The states which have
tried budget sessions and split sessions in an effort to
prevent chaotic sessions and ill-considered legislation seem
to have concluded that the most satisfactory reform is simply
to remove restrictions on legislative sessions. An excellent
example is California, which invented the split session,
tried budget sessions and replaced both with annual unlimited
sessions in 1966.
Special sessions. All states give the gov e rnor the power to
call the legislature into special session. The wisdom of
granting this power to the governor is not questioned; however,
many contend that the legislature also should have the power.
The legislature can be allowed to convene itself in several
ways--by making the legislature a continuous body, at the
request of two-thirds or three-fifths of the legislative
membersh ip, at the request of the officers of both houses
or some combination of these methods. Presently in Montana,
debate in a special session is limited to what the governor
allows. That presents the second major issue in special
sessions: many contend that the legislature should be
able to discuss whatever it thinks is necessary.
There is great interest in session. reform in Montana. The
reason for the interest is apparent:
in sixty years--since
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1911--only six legislatures have been able to complete their
business in sixty days. Montana lawmakers and citizen groups
have proposed numerous session reforms, but none has been
enacted.
Legislative continuity. Legislative continuity can be provided by altering the length and frequency of sessions, by
lengthening and perhaps staggering the terms of office, by
permitting interim study and by providing for the carry-over
of legislation and organization from the first to the second
annual session or from the regular session to a special
session.
Many believe that a legislative council is one of the more
effective ways of enhancing legislative continuity. The
issue concerning legislative councils and other interim
research is whether they are fundamental and should be specifically authorized in the constitution. Another effective
way to achieve legislative continuity is to make the legislature a continuous body. That means the legislature would
retain its power to act throughout the biennium, not that
it is necessarily in session throughout the biennium.
Size. There seems to be no pattern in the size of legislative
assemblies, except that the senate always is smaller than
the lower house. Until the last decade, state legislatures,
like the United States Congress, had tended to increase in
size because it was much easier in periodic reapportionment
to add members than to reduce an area's representation. The
critical question not only is whether the legislature should
be large or small, but also whether the size should be set in
the constitution. There are several ways size can be provided
for in state constitutions. The size of both houses or of
one house, if unicameral, could be fixed in the constitution;
maximum and minimum limits could be set so that the reapportionment agency has some leeway, or, like Montana, the size
of the legislature could be left to statute.
CHAPTER IV
LEGISLATORS
American state constitutions have traditionally enumerated the
qualifications legislators must meet. Originally, they covered
such a wide range of subjects as wisdom, property ownership,
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religious denomination, age, residence and citizenship. Today
most constitutions have age, residence and citizenship requirements which, in effect, generally allow all qualified voters
to run for office.
Early in the history of representative government, the peop l e
realized that a man who owed his livelihood to the king or to
the government's chief executive was a poor choice to represent
their interests against that king or executive. As a result
dual officeholding provisions developed.
There are two
ma jor issues involved in dual officeholding provisions--the
a p po intment of a legislator to another civil office a n d the
el ec tio n of officeholders to the legislature. Unlike Montana,
most constitutions allow a legislator to resign his office to
run for another;
they also allow an officeholder to run for
the legislature on the condition that he forfeits the original
offi c e upon election. Most past and contemporary constitutiona l
a u t ho r ities agree that dual officeholding provision s are of
l it tle practical value.
Term of office for legislators also is a constitutional issue.
The elec tion of legislators for a fixed period of tim e, such
a s two o r four years, originated in America. Most states held
an nual elections until the 1830s when legislatures began
to b e d i s credited in the public eye; during this period
the move to biennial elections and terms increased dramati ca l ly. The issue today is whether to have longer or
sho rter legislative terms.
In some states senator s and
repr e s entatives alike hold two-year terms and in o t h ers they
bot h hold four-year terms.
However, the most commo n scheme
i s to have senators elected to four-year terms and t h e repr e s entatives to two-year terms; that is the present situatio n in Montana.
In recent years senatorial terms in some
sta tes have been increased to four years, but all at tempts
t o inc r ease them to six years have been defeated.
At o ne time a major question was whether the amount of
l egislative compensation should be set in the con s ti tution .
Be cause the cost of living and the value of the do llar fluctuat e, the common answer to the question now is that salaries
and allowances should be left to statute. However, many
sta tes, like Montana, provide that increases in sala ries
can not go into effect during the term for which the enacting
l egis lators sit.
Another important question today is whether legislator s
s h o u l d be paid per diem or annual salaries.
But perhaps the
most significant question is whether the legislature or a
compensation commission should set legislative salarie s.
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CHAPTER V
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE

The legislative process must be governed by rules to ensure
stability and order. Bills must be considered publicly and
orderly; majority will must prevail but arbitrary action must
be guarded against.
The constitutional issue is whether such
safeguards should be included in the constitution or left to
legislative rules where they can be modified to meet changes
wrought by time. There were few procedural limitations in
the early constitutions; they entered state constitutions
during the same period most of the other limitations discussed
in this study entered state constitutions--the 1800s. The
Montana Constitution, like other constitutions of its era,
contains a large quantity of procedural provisions. Many of
these provisions are omitted or combined with others in modern
constitutions.
The journal requirement for constitutional amendments in the
Montana Constitution is the best example of the danger of
including procedural requirements in a constitution; the single
subject, the subject expressed in the title and amendment by
reference are the most controversial procedural requirements
found in constitutions. Most constitutional authorities
believe such requirements prevent dangerous legisiative abuses,
but that they should be left to legislative rules or, if included in the constitution, that they should not be subject
to judicial review.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Is the legislature to be trusted or to be held suspect? The
Constitutional Convention's answer to this question will be
the most important factor in the shaping of Montana's
legislative article.
If delegates believe that the legislature
can be trusted, they will write an article dealing mostly with
fundamentals; it will set forth broad outlines of legislative
power,structure and procedure, and leave the means and methods
of carrying out these directions to be formulated by the
legislature itself in statutory law or rules of procedure.
On the other hand, if delegates hold the legislature suspect,
they will write an article which will set forth not only
fundamentals but also detailed checks and instructions of how
the legislature is to function.
In each article of the constitution, delegates will make many decisions they do not
want left to the deliberations of successive legislatures.
Both approaches to the legislature have precedent in American
constitutional history; in fact, the two approaches appear to
be cyclical.
The first state constitutions--those adopted following the
Declaration of Independence--made the legislature the dominant
branch of government.
These constitutions were brief and left
all details to be developed and shap ed in statutory law as
changes of time demanded.
One constitutional historian, James
W. Hurst, wrote of the legislatures these early constitutions
created:
The early constitutions gave the legislature broad
power. There they bore witness to its high public
standing. The first constitutions simply vested
''legislative" power in described bodies. The
grant implied the historical sweep of authority
that Parliament had won, except as this was
limited by vague implications to be drawn from
the formal separation of powers among legislature,
executive, and courts.
Typically, the early constitution makers set no
procedural requirements for the legislative
process. They wrote a few declarations or
limitations of substantive pol ic y making.
But
these generally did no more than declare what
contempo rary opinion or commu nity growth had
already so deeply rooted as t o require no constitutional sanction . . . • 1
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This faith in state legislatures was shaken,however, during
the 1800s as the United States entered a period of territorial
and industrial expansion.
Having little experience in financing
internal improvements and having no agencies to handle these
affairs, state legislatures made a poor showing. They embarked on a period of reckless spending, borrowing and investment.
They had not yet developed the technique of general
legislation, thereby increasing their susceptibility to all
forms of bribery and corruption. As a result, "[b]etween
1864 and 1880, thirty-five new constitutions were adopted
in nineteen states.
Distrust of the legislature was the
predominant characteristic of all of them."2 And'' [b]y 1880
the pattern for state constitutions as legal codes and as
obstructions to the free exercise of legislative power, was
set."3 The 1889 Montana Constitution was written in this
mold.
In fact, one contemporary observer and commentator
believed that the constitutions adopted in North and South
Dakota, Washington and Montana in 1889 reflected the pinnacle
of the American people's distrust of their state legislatures.
He wrote:
They [these four constitutions] approach a code of
laws, rather than a resume of governmental principles . .
The framers seem to have thought that the governments
would at best be entrusted to untrustworthy officials . . . .
No evidence is stronger in this country of the suspicion
that State officials cannot be trusted than is afforded
by these constitutions.4
During this period and later, state legislatures developed the
techniques of passing general laws, like general incorporation
acts, and established regulatory agencies which could supervise
all matter of private concerns.
In other words, state legislatures themselves corrected many of the practices which had
brought about their disrepute, while many of the prohibitions
and legislation which the people placed in their constitutions
became antiquated stumbling blocks to efficient viable government.
These constitutional restrictions on the legislature are cited
as one of the greatest reasons for the decreasing role states
play in the federal system. As the activities of government
have expanded, the response of state legislatures has been held
back by constitutional provisions and the federal government
has been forced to assume more and more governmental functions.
In 1955 President Eisenhower's Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations reported:
[M]any State constitutions restrict the scope,
effectiveness, and adaptability of State and local
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action. These self-imposed constitutional limitations make it difficult for many States to perform
all of the services their citi z ens require, and
consequently have been the underlying cause of
State and municipal pleas for Federal assistanc e.5
A similar observation was made by Elihu Root in 1906 when he said:
It is useless for the advocat es of states' rights
to inveigh against the supremacy of the constitutio nal laws of the United States or against the
extension of national authority in the fields of
necessary control where the states themselve s fail
in the performance of their duty.
The instinct
for self-government among the people of the
United States is too strong to permit them long
to res pect anyone's right to exercise a power
which he fails to exercise.
The governmental
control which they deem just and necessary they
will have.
It may be that such control would
better be exercised in particular instances by
the governments of the states, but the people will
have the control they need, either from the states
or from the national government; and if the sta t·es
fail to furnish it in due measure sooner or later
constructions of the constitution will be found
to vest the power where it will be exercised-in the national government.6
The approach of constitutional conventions to legislatures and
state gover nment in general seems to have made a complete circle
in recent years.
Recent conventions have reduced the amounts
of legislat ive prohibitions and statutory material in their
constitutions. This is especially true of the constitutions of
Alaska, Hawaii and Illinois.
This report was written with the view that the convention might
try to draft a constitution creating a legislature which could
do the most good rather than the least evil.
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CHAPTER II

LEGISLATIVE POWER
A state con s t itut i on is a limit i n g d ocume nt, while the federal
Constitutio n is a grant of powe r.
I n other words, the federal
government h as only those powers enumerated or implied i n the
federal Constitution, l but the states have all governmental
power not denied them by the United States Constitution or by
their own constitutions. The powers of the states are reserved and inherent; thus, by nature, they are unlimit ed.
Therefore, there is no need to enumerate the powers of the state
government in the constitution.
The state constitution immediately defines and limits the powers
of the state government when it provides for the doctri nes of
the separation and balance of powers. As Chief Justice Marshall
noted, these doctrines demand that "the legislature makes, the
executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the law. 2
Having defined legislative power, the state constitution restricts it by incorporating specific prohibitions, grants and
mandates and statutory material into its body.
11

In all but two state constitutions (Minnesota and Maryland),3
the people specifically delegate to the legislature complete
or plenary power. Most state constitutions delegate this
plenary power in the first section of the legislative articles.
For example, Article V, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution
states:
"The l egislative authority of the state shall be
vested in a legislative assembly. •
" Chief Justice Denio
of the New York Supreme Court ruled that in these provisions,
the people
committe d to the legislature the whole law-making
power of the Stat e , which they did not expressly
or impliedly withhold.
Plenary power in the
legislature, for all purposes of civil government,
is the ru l e . A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception.
In inquiring,
therefore, whether a given statute is constitutional, it is for those who question its validity
to show that it is forbidden.4
This means that the powers of the state do not have to be
enumerated because they are already reserved to the state.
Any further delegation of authority to the legislature is
.
superfluous because no power can be added that the legislature
does not already possess. Actually, further delegati ons of
power tend to become limitations on the power of the legislature
to make laws. "Every constitutional provision that specifies

-15-

LEGISLATIVE POWER
what shall and shall not be done concerning any area of
public policy constitutes a limit on legislative power. 5
On this subject Chief Justice Denio wrote:
"Every positive
direction contains an implication against anything contrary
to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint the purpose of
that provision. 6 Because of this doctrine of implied
limitations, not only positive limitations but positive grants
of power and legislative detail in the state constitution
restrict the action of the legislature. These limitations,
grants and details abound in most constitutions written from
1830 to 1945.
If one wants to know to what extent the
legislative power is restricted, he must review all the
articles of the constitution.
11

11

The Montana Constitution, like others of its era, contains
many direct limitations on and many positive grants of
legislative power.
It also contains many detailed provis i ons .
Among its limitations on legislative power, the Montana d ocument contains provisions for the initiative and referendum
[Art. V, Sec. 1); a section prohibiting special and local
legislation [Art. V, Sec. 26), sections earmarking revenues
[Art. XII, Sec. lb] and a section limiting state indebtedness [Art. XIII, Sec. 2).
Other limitations on legislative
power include the restriction of the legislature to sixty day biennial sessions [Art. v, Secs. 5 and 6] and the legi slature's inability to call itself into special session and to
decide what it can discuss in that special session [Art.
VII, Sec. 11]. These and procedural limitations are discuss ed
in detail elsewhere in this report.
The Montana Constitution's grants and mandates of legislativ e
power range from permission to levy income taxes [Art. XI I ,
Sec. la] and to publish the decisions and opinions of the
Supreme Court [Art. VIII, Sec. 32] to orders to establish
and maintain a public school system [Art. XI, Sec. 1] and
provide for separate departments of agriculture and labor
and industry [Art. XVIII, Sec. 1).
Heavily detailed provisions range from Article XV, which
resembles a corporate code, to many sections scattered
throughout the articles on the legislature, the judiciary,
the executive and taxation.
For example, Article V, the
legislative article, is divided into forty-five sections
and is eight pages long.
Section 30 of that article tells
the legislature how to buy its stationery and how to provide
for its fuel and lights.
As an example of how detail can
cause trouble, Section 22 commands that all bills be "print ed ."
The threat of legal suits arguing that the word "printed" meant
only the use of the hot lead process prevented the legislature
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for many years from adopting the newer , fas ter a nd c h eaper
methods of re p r oducing bills.
Consti t utiona l authorities generall y agr e e tha t a constitu tion
should b e a doc ument of fundamental s ; it should n o t be an
el a borat e d ocument brimming with legislative detail.7 The
federal Co n stitution exemplifies the ideal of a fundamental
constitution. Concerning that document Chief Justice
Marshall wrot e in McCulloch v. Maryland 8 that if a constit u tion wer e t o specify all the subdivisions of government, al l
their powers and how those powers were to be used, it would
r e semble a legal code.
It would be too much for the human
mi nd to embrace, and it would never be understood by the people .
He concluded:
Its nature [the constitution's], therefore, requires
that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects be deduced from the nature
of the objects themselves.9
I n a similar vein, Justice Cardozo said:
"A Constitution states
or ought to state not rules for the passing hour but principles
for an expanding future. 11 10
This is a noble, but often difficult, goal to achieve.
No
clear line can be drawn between what is fundamental and what
is statutory. Often a state constitution cannot help but
r e flect "the problems, interests, and concerns of its people. 1111
These often take the form of "good government" provisions,
which are placed in the constitution in the name of reform.
These pr ovisions are often felt to be needed, but like all
provisions which do not deal with fundamentals, they have a
habit of being outgrown by the state. As an example, limited
biennial sessions and the popular election of the executive
cabinet were "good government" provisions in their day. And
at present many people believe that similar, but modern "good
government" provisions are needed.
Perhaps the only way to
a void their becoming a nuisance is to draft them in broad
language and to adopt a provision similar to Hawaii's to prevent these provisions from being narrowly interpreted:
"The
enumera tion in this constitution of specific powers shall not
be construed as limitations upon the power of the State to
provide for the general welfare of the people. 11 12 Also,
because no constitution is completely timeless, a clear
method of amendment should be provided.
Because delegates should try to limit the subj e ct matter of
the constitution to fundamentals on l y and b e cause it o f ten is
difficult to distinguish fundamentals from non-essentials,
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a set of criteria should be formed with which each proposal
can be tested.
In The State Constitution:
Its Function and
Form For Our Time, Frank P. Grad, one of America's foremost
constitutional authorities, tried to develop such criteria.13
His article is reprinted for the convention delegates in Montana
Constitutional Convention Commission's Report Number 4, A
Collection of Readings on State Constitutions, Their Nature and
Purpose, pages 71-103. Briefly, Grad believes the following
questions should be asked of each provision:
The basic inquiry in evaluating any proposal to
include a particular subject or provision in a
state constitution should be whether the value of
embodying this proposal in higher law, beyond
change by normal lawmaking processes, is greater
than the cost of doing so.
In the balancing
process necessary to reach a final decision, the
importance of the provision to the people and to
the effective government of the particular state
must be weighed against the cost in terms of inflexibility, obsolescence, decreased responsibility
of the government, constitutional instability
and the nullification of inconsistent government
action.
In reaching a decision, consideration should
also be given to whether the policy embodied in the
proposal is one likely to endure, or whether it is
likely to suffer rapid obsolescence by reason of
societal or technological changes. Another factor
to be considered is whether adequate means other
than inclusion in the constitution are available
to achieve the particular objective.14
Once these questions have been asked, Grad believes a final
thought should be considered:
[I]n view of the fact that all of the provisions
in a state constitution operate as limitations
on the legislature and on the government as a
whole, and in view of the fact that the cost of
including a proposal is likely to be high in the
terms described, the burden of proof concerning
the need for inclusion should be squarely on
its proponent, and any doubts on the issue should
be resolved against inclusion and in favor of
the freedom of government to respond to emerging
problems wit hout constitutional limitations,
express or imp lied.15
In a similar vein, Dr. Ellis Waldron inverted Chief Justice
Denio's principle of statutory construction, quoted earlier,
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to express a principle of constitutional draftsmanship:
"In
inquiring, there fore, whether a given constitutional provision
is required, it is for those who support its validity to show
that its inclusion is necessary. 16
11

For the most part delegates to the 1889 Constitutional Convention
did not follow any criteria in pruning statutory provisions
from the constitution. When the Montana Constitution of 1884,
which was adopted almost verbatim by the Convention of 1889,
was submitted to the people for their approval, the delegates
attached an explanatory statement entitled "An Address to the
Voters of the Territory of Montana." In that statement they
said:
While it may appear that some legislation has
crept into our work, yet it must not be forgotten
that experience has demonstrated the fact that the
wide demands of the State require certain, and,
perhaps, manifold restrictions upon legislative
bodies , and the only way to reach them is to embody
such restrictions in the Constitution itself.17
Francis Thorpe , one of the foremost constitutional historians
and authorities in 1889, wrote:
"the conventions in Washington
and Montana framed a legislative code rather than a body of
fundamental laws for the new states."18 He believed both
constitutions were examples of "The American People Versus
Themselves. 19 In judging the Montana Constitution, Thorpe
wrote:
11

The northwestern states cannot avoid the evils
of civil life by incorporating into their fundamental law the elaborate and repeated proofs
of the distrust of the people towards those who
shall be elected to conduct the State government.
It is plain that these conventions lost the
opportunity to remedy the acknowledged evils
complained of by the people of some of the older
States by making a simple organic law and putting
power and responsibility in the hands of those to
whom the control of civil affairs is to come.20
Those who agree with Thorpe's judgment would hope that the
Montana Constitutional Convention of 1971-72 does not also
miss its "opportunity."
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LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Prohibitions against local and special legislation developed
as a result of the confusion and corruption which spread
through the state legislatures during the nineteenth century.
However, the confusion and corruption were not entirely the
fault of the legislators. Until well into the nineteenth
century, mobilization of enterprise capital in the form of
limited-liability joint-stock corporations required a special
act of legislation to secure the privileges of doing business
in that fashion.
In a sense, the "general incorporation"
statutes--pioneered by New York State in 1811 and spreading
generally to other states through the second and third quarters
of the nineteenth century--were the legal foundation of modern
American capitalist enterprise.
The general incorporation statute in essence allowed any group
meeting certain statutory standards to secure a charter by
filing articles of incorporation with a designated state officer-in Montana the secretary of state. The fact that prior to such
statutes, charters were a special privilege to be secured from
the legislature and the further fact that many early capital
mobilizations were concerned with internal improvements such
as canals, turnpikes and railroads that needed powers of
eminent domain to secure rights-of-way and essential monopolies
of service, placed tremendous pressures on legislatures responsible for granting the charters.
In the common historical
view, this was a fulcrum for the special-interest activities
that corrupted the legislatures during the middle decades of
the century, and led to growing popular distrust.
Moreover, legislatures commonly undertook direct regulation
of the monopolistic utilities they had chartered, only gradually
developing or allowing specialized regulatory bodies such as
public service commissions to exercise these controls. This
further exposed the legislatures to great special interest
pressures.
Similarly, in the beginning legislatures had no
machinery or techniques to handle private concerns.
For
example, the legislature had not yet given the courts authority
to grant divorces or to change names; so in each of these
instances, the legislature had to enact private bills, swelling
the legislative workload. Article v, Section 26 of the Montana
Constitution,limiting special legislation, is virtually a
repository of all the unhappy experiences of the previous century, during which time functions initially accomplished by
special legislation were gradually placed in special administrative or judicial agencies, or handled by general legislation
such as the general incorporation statutes.
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Montana and thirty other states have constitutional provisions
which prohibit local and special legislation.21 In general,
a local law is considered to apply only to the government of
a portion of the state, such as a single city or county;
while a special law applies to "a portion of the state's
people, its institutions, or its economy in some sense other
than geographical."22 Local legislation normally is banned
to prevent the legislature from meddling in local affairs
and to allow the legislature to devote most of its time to
issues which affect the state as a whole.
If special or
private laws are permitted, the influence of private interests
is increased and more opportunities for corruption develop
as special interests seek private bills from the legislature.
Special legislation also could give some citizens rights or
privileges that are denied to others. But perhaps the major
reason special legislation is forbidden is that when it is
allowed, it soon dominates the legislative calendar and
crowds out statewide legislation.
There are, however, problems with prohibitions of local
legislation.
It is contended that local legislation simply
becomes general legislation.23 In other words, general laws
are often worded so that they can apply to only one city or
county.
It also is argued that because Montana is a large
state with drastically different eastern and western sections,
there is a need for laws which affect only one area.24
However, this problem seems to be solved by Article V, Section
26, of the Montana Constitution. The provision specifically
forbids the legislature to make laws on more than eighty
specified subjects, and ends with a general prohibition:
"In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable,
no special law shall be enacted."25 This appears to leave
open the possibility that where a general law cannot be made
applicable and a special or local law is not expressly prohibited, such a special or local law might be enacted.
The problem with provisions enumerating forbidden areas is
that many of the items soon become dated and reflect the
problems of an earlier day.
Newer constitutions either leave
out this provision (Connecticut and Hawaii) or simply have a
general prohibition like Alaska [Art. III, Sec. 17) and
Illinois [Art. IV, Sec. 13). The Illinois provision reads:
The General Assembly shall pass no special or
local law when a general law is or can be made
applicable. Whether a general law is or can
be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial
determination.26
The Illinois provision is very similar to the last sentence
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of the Montana provision.
Two southern states which recently
have revised their constitutions, Virginia and Florida, still
enumerate forbidden subjects of legislation.27
The question of special legislation is discussed further in
the study on local government in this series of reports for
the Montana Constitutional Convention.
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

When the original states formed, it was believed that frequent
election of state legislators and executives was the only
direct check the people needed to make their representatives
responsible. This attitude changed during the 1800s as state
legislatures fell into disrepute.
The idea developed that the
people needed a more direct voice in governmental policies
because many legislatures were controlled by political machines
or corporations.
Devices were needed that would bring state
government back under the control of the people. The initiative
and referendum did not take power away from the legislatures;
rather, they merely allowed the people to bypass dominated
legislatures.
In 1898 South Dakota became the first state to
adopt direct legislation.28 In little more than ten years
the initiative spread through the Western states, as it and
the referendum became major objectives of the Progressive
movement.
Senator Joseph M. Dixon, who later led Theodore
Roosevelt's Bull Moose Campaign, led the movement which in
1906 won adoption of the initiative and referendum in Montana.
Alaska is the only state to adopt the initiative and referendum
since the beginning of World War I; however, no state has
repealed these measures.
Initiative
Twenty-one state constitutions provide for the initiative,
which gives the people the power of direct legislation.29
Many authorities believe the initiative is not a limitation
upon the legislature; by permitting the people to enact
legislation, the initiative merely allows the people to bypass lawmakers when they are unresponsive.
However, other
authorities believe the initiative is the ultimate limitation
upon the legislature because it gives the legislative function
to the people. There are two major forms of statutory initiatives--direct and indirect.
In the direct initiative,
proponents circulate a petition across the state and obtain
the required number of signatures; the proposed law then is
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placed on the ballot at the next general election, at which
time the people as a whole can enact or reject the measure.
In the indirect initiative, after the people have circulated
petitions and have obtained the necessary signatures, the
proposed law is su bmitted to the legislature for consideration.
The legislature may enact the measure or a substitute, in
which case both go before the voters.
If the legislature fails
to act upon the bill within a specified period of time, the
measure is automatically placed on the ballot.
The procedures which must be followed in using the initiative
differ from state to state. Article V, Section 1 of the Montana
Constitution provides for the direct initiative.
In Montana,
advocates of a measure must obtain enough signatures to equal
8 percent of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election
in each of two-fifths (23} of the counties; the total number
of signers statewide must equal 8 percent of the votes cast
in the last gubernatorial election.
If sufficient signatures
are obtained, the measure is placed on the ballot at the next
general election.
The Montana provision further specifies
that the petitions must be filed with the secretary of state
at least four months before the next election and that each
petition must contain the full text of the proposed law.
The
people are forbidden, however, to use the initiative to propose appropriation bills, local and special legislation (as
defined in Article V, Section 26} and constitutional amendments
and conventions. The Montana initiative is called a statutory
initiative because it cannot be used to propose constitutional
amendments. The people in fifteen states have the power to
propose constitutional amendments through the initiative.
Since 1906, thirty initiatives have been proposed in Montana;
fourteen of them have been passed by the people.30
Referendum
Twenty-three states provide for the referendum, a device by
which the people can void acts of the legislature.31 In
Montana, laws which deal with appropriations or are necessary
to the "preservation of the public peace, health, or safety"
and local and special legislation (as defined in Article V,
Section 26} are excepted. There are two types of referendum,
and the Montana Constitution [Art. v, Sec. l] provides for both.
First, the legislature may refer to the people any measure it
has passed for their approval or rejection. For example, the
1971 Legislature referred the question of a sales tax to the
voters.
In the same category there are types of legislation
which the Constitution commands the legislature to refer to
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the people; for example, constitutional amendments [Art. XIX,
Sec. 9] and all laws incurring a state debt over $100,000
[Art. XIII, Sec. 2]. The second form is the petition referendum.
Under this provision, petitions are circulated across the state;
if enough signatures are obtained, then the law must be placed
on the ballot for approval or rejection.
The procedure by which the referendum is accomplished differs
from state to state, but the number of required signatures is
normally less than that required for the initiative.
In
Montana, 5 percent of the legal voters of the state--a number
based on the total number of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election--must sign the petitions.
In addition, at
least 5 percent of the voters in each of two-fifths (23)
of the counties must sign the petitions. The petitions, which
must contain the complete text of the referendum, must be
filed with the secretary of state no later than six months
after the legislature passed the legislation.
In Montana the
law concerned is in full effect until the election, unless
15 percent of the legal voters of a majority of the state's
counties sign the petition. Like the initiative, the referendum must be voted on at the next general biennial election
unless the legislature specifies a special election approved
by a majority of each legislative chamber. Article V, Section
1 exempts both the referendum and the initiative from the
executive veto.
Since the referendum was adopted in 1906, thirteen petition
referenda have reached the ballot and five have been passed
by the people. Twenty-eight legislative referenda have
reached the ballot and twenty have passed.32
Conclusions
Advocates of the initiative and referendum argue that the
two measures make other limitations restricting the legislature
insignificant, and yet do not prevent the legislature from
performing its duties efficiently. Advocates like to say
that the referendum and initiative can be used as "guns behind
the door."
If the legislature refuses to pass needed legislation or passes legislation detrimental to the people, the
people can completely bypass the legislature to correct the
matter.
In this way, advocates argue, the people can prevent
a malapportioned or dominated legislature from ignoring their
will.33
Opponents reply that although the referendum and initiative
can prevent or resolve legislative deadlocks (for example,the
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sales tax issue the 1971 Montana Legislature referred to the
people), they also encourage the legislature to "pass the
buck." Opponents also believe that the initiative and
referendum ask too much of the voter.
In their opinion, these
devices only serve to confuse voters because they are so technical.34
The most famous example of an initiative in Montana history
was Initiative 28.
During the 1922 Legislature, Governor
Dixon found it impossible to pass an adequate mining tax.
He
and other supporters of the tax carried on the fight with
Initiative 28, which proposed a graduated license tax on the
gross proceeds of mines.
The miners became so outraged with
the proposal and Dixon's other Progressive tendencies that they
stepped up their campaign against his re-election in 1924.
They centered their opposition against Dixon rather than the
initiative, and, as a result, Dixon lost his bid for re-election,
but Initiative 28 passed by 22,048 votes.35 Dixon lost the
governorship, but ironically the forms of direct legislation
which he had done so much to have the state adopt in 1906
enabled him to win the biggest battle of the election.36
The Montana provision for the initiative and referendum
raises two issues:
1. The demand that the petitions be signed by 8 percent
of the voters in each of twenty-three counties (two-fifths of
the total number of counties in Montana) may not be equitable.
The state's twenty-three smallest counties have a total population of 62,010, while Montana's eight urban areas have a
population of 374,661. Both Yellowstone and Cascade counties
have larger populations than the combined population of Montana's
twenty-three smallest counties; yet, they cannot use the
initiative or referendum to meet distinctively urban problems
without going to rural counties for support.
2.
Should the initiative power be expanded to allow the
people to call a constitutional convention or should that
matter remain solely with the legislature to initiate?
EXECUTIVE VETO
The executive veto is a limitation and check on the power of
the legislature.
In all but three states, every bill passed
by the legislature must be approved by the governor. Most
constitutional authorities believe that the theory of the
balance and check of power demands an executive veto. This
belief is reflected in the constitutions of forty-nine of
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the fifty states; all but North Carolina provide for an
executive veto.
However, Maryland [Art. III, Sec . 52B]
and West Virginia [Art. IV, Sec . 51B] do not send their
appropriation bills to the gove r nor; appropriation bills
automatically become law.37
Two steps in the veto procedure are of crucial importance to
legislative power--the legislative vote required to overturn
a veto, and the ability of the legislature to reconvene after
adjournment to reconsider measures vetoed at the end of the
session. Montana [Art. V, Sec. 40] and thirteen other sta t es
require two-thirds of the members present in both houses to
overturn a veto; twenty-two states require two-thirds of the
members elected to both houses; one demands three-fourths o f
the members elected; six require three-fifths of those elec t ed
or present, and six demand only a majority of the elected members of both houses.38 In the last case, the governor's veto
may bear little more weight than an advisory statement.
The opposite situation develops when the governor's veto is
absolute.
This happens when the governor vetoes measure s
after the legislature has adjourned, and the legislature is
unable to reconvene to consider the vetoed measures.
This
is the situation in Montana and in all other states whose
legislatures are not continuous bodies or cannot reconvene
to consider post-session vetoes.
The constitutions of Hawaii ,
California, Missouri, Louisiana and New Jersey provide for
post-veto sessions.39 Montana [Art. VII, Sec. 13] and forty two other states give their governors the item veto--the right
to veto items in appropriations bills.40
When the legislature is in session, every law which the
governor does not veto or sign after a certain number of days
automatically becomes law.
In Montana, the period is five
days [Art. VII, Sec. 12]. Once the legislature has adjourned ,
the procedure changes.
Fourteen states, among them Montana
[Art. VII, Sec. 12], give their governors the ''pocket veto . "
In these states, every bill the governor does not sign is
dead.
The reverse is true in most states.
In twenty-nine
states a measure becomes law if the governor does not
specifically veto it; in Iow<1 the governor must sign or veto
all bills.41
As mentioned above, Article V, Section 40 of the Montana
Constitution requires the legislature to submit orders,
resolutions and votes of the two houses to the governor for
his signature.
However, the section goes on to exempt from
this requirement those motions which deal with the adjourn ment of the legislature or with the private business of the
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two houses.
Section 1 of Article V also exempts the initiative
and referendum from the governor's veto.
The Montana Legislative
Council has recommended that Section 40 of Article V be clarified
so that constitutional amendments, like other forms of direct
legislation, do not have to be sent to the governor for his
signature.42
The veto power is discussed further in the study on the executive
in this series of reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
JUDGE OF ELECTIONS, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS
Section 9 of Article V states:
"Each house shall choose its
other officers, and shall judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members.'' All other states have similar
provisions, which are specific grants of power by the people
to the legislature. The Montana Supreme Court has described
the provision as a grant of "power necessary to the existence
and independence of each house as an instrumentality of
government. 43 Montana courts have ruled that the legislature
is the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications
of its members.
They have, in fact, refused to settle contested elections:
11

This power, emanating from the sovereign people,
cannot be delegated by either house or both acting
together; and likewise neither house possesses the
power to divest itself of the authority thus conferred upon it.
So long as the constitution stands
as it is now written, no officer, individual, court,
or other tribunal can infringe upon the exclusive
prerogative of each house to determine for itself
whether one who presents himself for membership is
entitled to a seat.44
The court has held, however, that the constitutional section
does not block a recount of votes in a legislative election.45
In addition, it has been established that a federal court can
intervene if the legislature in judging the qualifications of
a member denies him any right guaranteed by the United States
Constitution or demands of him qualifications not in the state
constitution . That happened in Georgia in 1966 when the
legislature refused to seat Julian Bond because of his statements against the Vietnam War and the draft system.
The United
States Supreme Court ruled that the legislature had denied
Bond his constitutional rights under the First Amendment and
ordered the legislature to seat him.46
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LEGISLATIVE VACANCIES
Twenty-seven constitutions provide for legislative vacancies
to be filled by election, twelve as provided by law, five by
gubernatorial appointment, four by appointment by the county
commissioners from the county or counties where the vacancy
occurs, one by appointment according to law, and one has no
provision.47 Of the ten recent constitutions, Alaska, Hawaii ,
Connecticut and Michigan and the Arkansas draft constitution
provide that vacancies be filled as provided by law.48 The
Alaska and Hawaii constitutions also provide that if no pro vision is made by the legislature, the governor will fill the
vacancy by appointment.
The Virginia and Florida constitutions
state that vacancies will be filled by election as provided b y
law.49 However, the Virginia provision is more elaborate t h a n
the Florida provision.
If the vacancy occurs during the
legislative session, the legislature issues the writs of
election; if the vacancy occurs while the legislature is not
in session, the governor issues the writs of election as
provided by law.SO The Idaho draft provision states that
vacancies will be filled according to law, except that a n un expired senate term must be filled at the next legislative
election unless it is filled by a special election as prescribed by statute.51
The Illinois Constitution provides that a vacancy must be
filled by appointment according to law within thirty day s
after it occurs, and that the office must be filled by a member of the same political party as the former legislator .
If
the vacancy occurs in a senatorial district "with more tha n
twenty-eight months remaining in the term, the appointed Se n a tor
shall serve until the next general election, at which time a
Senator shall be elected to serve for the remainder of the
term.us2
The Maryland draft provision states that vacancies will be
filled as prescribed by law.
It stipulates, however, tha t a
legislator must be replaced by a member of the same politica l
party.
It further states:
"An appointee shall serve only
until the next general election held at least ninety days
after the vacancy occurs."53 In other words, if the appoint ment is made within ninety days of a general election, it
continues through the immediate election to the following one .
Montana's constitutional provision on legislative vacancies
has undergone a complete metamorphosis since 1889. Originally ,
it provided that all vacancies were to be filled by election s
called by the governor; today no constitutional provision on
the subject exists.
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In its original form, Article V, Section 45, of the 1889
Montana Consti tution provided:
"Whe n vacancies occur in
either house the Governor or the person exercising the functions
of the Governor shall issue writs of election to fill the same."
The people amended this provision in 1931 to provide that
county commissioners were to appoint persons to fill vacancies
caused by death:
When vacancies, caused by death, occur in either
hous e of the legislative assembly, such vacancies
shall be filled by appointment by the board of
county commissioners of the county from which such
vacancy occurs. All vacancies occurring from
other cause shall be filled by election upon
proclamation of the governor.54
In 1966 the people repealed this article; a later statute provides that the county commissioners of the district where the
vacancy occurs are to appoint the replacement.55 In districts
composed of more than one county, the commissioners of the
several counties jointly make the appointment.
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BICA.."-1ERAL OR UNICAMERAL
A central i ssue in leg islative structur e i s wh ether the
legislatur e shoul d b e composed o f one or two chambers. Many
believe that the final choice will greatly affect how the
legislature performs its duties.
The legislature should
represent the peop l e and enact the will of the majority with
due regard for the state's mino r ities.
In considering the
a~guments for and against bicameralism and unicameralism, the
reader should ask:
"Which system will enable the legislature
to best accomp l ish its work?"
Montana has a b icameral legislature composed of a senate and
a house of representatives . Section 1 of Article V of the
Montana Constitution states:
"The legislative authority of
the state shall be vested in a legislative assembly, consisting
of a senate and house of representatives." There was no recorded
opposition to bicameralism in the r1ontana Constitutional Convention
of 1889; apparently, the delegates did not even discuss unicameralism on the floor. 1 According to one contemporary observer,
there was a great suspicion of legislators in 1889, and the
constitutions ado p ted that year in Montana, Washington, and
North and South Dakota epitomized t h e belief that "the overnments
would at best b e entrusted to untrustworthy officials."
Therefore, the delegates did not substantially question the belief
that two houses were needed to check each other's possible evil
intentions.
Today, however, the situation has changed; vigorous
debate rages between unicameralists and bicameralists. The
Montana legislature considered--but rejected--amendments that would
have created a unicameral legislature in 1937 and more recently
in 1967 and 1969.

1

Nationally the dormant unicameral issue was raised in 1964 when
the United States Supreme Court ruled in Reynolds v. Sims 3 that
the states no longer could follow the analogy of the federal
government and apportion one house according to geography (the
"little federal" analogy--one senator for each county) . '!'he
court ruled that "seats in both houses of a bicameral legislature
must be apportioned on a population basis."4 Originally, a major
argument for t wo houses was that each should represent different
interests; in fact, the proponents of bicameralism stressed that
the more the two l1ouses differed in organization and composition,
the more meaningful and valid their checks on each other. 5 Now
that both houses are apportioned according to population, many
question the need for a second house.
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In ~'1ontana, the split in party control of the senate and house of
representatives during six of the last ten leqislativc sessions
and the resulting deadlocks and special sessions have been the
major concern of unicamcralists.
llistor_y
There is no easy explanation of why bicameralism is so prevalent
among the American states, but only one state, Hebraska, has a
unicameral legislature. One answer often given is that the states
merely emulated the national government and the English Parliament, which have bicameral legislatures.
But the reasons why
these governments arc bicameral do not now apply to the states.
The British and U.S. federal governments have two legislative
houses because each one represents different interests; at present,
on the other hand, both chambers of state legislatures are based
on population.
In the government of the United States, the llouse
of Representatives is based on population and is representative
of the people, while the Senate is based on geography and is
representative of the states.
In Parliament, the House of
Commons represents the people and the House of Lords the nobility.
But in reality, Parliament no longer represents balanced
bicameralism because the Lords have lost most of their political
power and no longer have an absolute veto over the Commons. One
Enqlish historian wrote of Parliament:
Political institutions that stand the test of time are
organisms subsisting upon their adaptability to their
environment and ever changing with the conditions of
their existence.
Parliament is not bound up with any
political theory or any transient constitution: it has
been the tool of monarchs, of oligarchs and of democrats. 6
The bicameralism of Parliament was ''the product of historical
events rather than a premeditated governmental scheme." 7 'I'he
bicameralism of the American colonies and states developed in
the same way; it developed to meet the needs of different
interests and today these different interests no longer exist.
nut unlike Parliament, the American institution did not change;
instead, a political philosophy developed to justify and maintain
it.
Bicameralism developed in America to meet the common people's
demand that government be more responsive to their will.
In
the seventeenth century almost all the colonial governments
were unicameral, but by 1763 only Pennsylvania and Delaware
retained unicameral legislatures.
"As a rule colonial
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governmental organizations, whether royal or proprietary,
p rovi ded for the natural evolution of two houses."8 It was,
in fact, remarkable that any of the colonies retained unicameral
governments.9
[W]hen the insistent demand of the colonists secured
for them the right to participate in formulating
governmental policies, their representatives joined
with the colonial governor and his councib of
assistants in a single legislative body.
These representatives sat with the governor's council but the
two did not fuse.
The one body came to represent the landed
interests and the other the people, and their bickering
eventually led to separation into two distinct chambers.
An excellent example of this process was Massachusetts, which
developed America's first bicameral legislature. The Massachusetts government began as a private corporation which was
fortunate enough to bring its charter to the New World where
it was free of the direct oversight of the English government.
According to the charter, only shareholders were to have a
voice in the government of the colony, but at the first meeting
of the stockholders in the New World, other settlers also
demanded a voice.
Necessity and compromise soon led to the
addition of a popular body to the government and to the eventual
formation of a bicameral legislature. At first the two groups
sat together, but eventually disputes led to their separation.
The two bodies became so angry at each other while trying to
decide the ownership of a sow that they separated into two
houses. The Massachusetts bicameral legislature, like Parliament
and the legislatures of the other colonies, was the "product
of an accommodation of divergent social interests."11
For the most part, when the colonies became states they retained
the system with which they were familiar; Vermont, however,
entered the union with a unicameral legislature.
During the
formation of the states and the national government, a political
philosophy developed to insure that the new state and feder al
constitutions incorporated bicameralism. The major architect
of this philosophy was John Adams, whose paper, Thoughts on
Government, was used in the drafting of the constitutions of
North Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts
and whose other paper, A Defense of the Constitutions of
Government of the United States, was the major defense of
bicameralism during the radification of the Federal Constitution. 12
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Adams thought America was drifting toward social revolution,
so he seized upon "the separation of powers institutionalized
in bicameralism as the best hope for maintaining stability,
human rights, and the leadership of the Whig revolutionaries
in the succession governments. 13 He stressed reason demanded
a second house, independent of the people and their representatives, which could check their hasty legislation and attempts
to usurp the rest of government.
He believed the lower house
"should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at
large.
It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. 14
But he did not advocate universal manhood sufferage to accomplish
this goal.
Rather, he advocated property qualifications for
voting and office-holding to bolster the effect of the bicameral
check upon the people.
In his day these qualifications were
common and an accepted practice.!~ Like women and children, men
without property could not vote or hold office in most of the
states. This assured Adams that the members of the lower house
would act with at least some responsibility.
11

11

Class representation, then, was a major tenet in this political
philosophy and a major component of bicameralism:
Under the earliest state constitutions there were
higher property qualifications for membership in the
state senate, and for the privilege of voting for
senators, than in the case of the other branch of
the legislature; so that the two houses were elected
by different constituencies and represented somewhat
different social and economic groups or interests.16
For example, in North Carolina any man who paid taxes could vote
for candidates to the lower house, but only those who owned at
least fifty acres could vote for senatorial candidates. A man
had to own at least 100 acres to be a candidate for the house
and at least 300 to be a candidate for the senate.
Not all
states were the same.
Some states omitted property requirements
for voting and others omitted them for qualifications to office,
but all the states had one or the other.1 7 The philosophy
stressed that for the check of the second house to be meaningful,
the two houses had to be composed of different interests. The
senate assured the wealthy that they would select and compose
one body of the legislature; it guaranteed them an opportunity
to check the radical or hasty legislation of the common people.
Thus, what had developed to make government more responsive to
the people became a device to check their will.
When the federal Constitutional Convention adopted a bicameral
legislature, it set the pattern and all states thereafter
entering the union adopted bicameral legislatures. As the 1800s
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progressed, unicameralism lapse d into disuse.
By 1836, Pennsylvania, Georgia and Vermont had add ed second chambers and no
state in the union had a unicameral legislature. Bicameralism
with its checks on hasty legislation had become so established
by 1850 that in the Indiana Constitutional Convention a proposal
for a unicameral legislature was met with laughter. 18 However,
this trend reversed itself at the turn of the century when some
of the major tenets of the bicameral philosophy disappeared.
Jacksonian democ racy and the Civil War had granted universal
manhood sufferage and property requirements no longer existed.
Also the checks of bicameralism had lost some of their validity
because both houses were composed of virtually the same type of
people and interests.
In the early 1900s during the Progressive Era, unicarneralism
came into vogue again. The Progr es sives were concerned primarily
with reforming America's city governments.19 At a time of great
co rrup tion in the cities, they succeeded in discarding the complex
bicameral form of city government with all its alleg ed checks on
corruption and, in an effort to fix responsibility, substituted
the unicameral mayor-council and council-manager forms of city
government.
Successful with municipal reform, the Progressives turned to
the states; by 1920, ten states had considered ado ption of
unicameral legislatures. 20 The movement then waned as the
prosperity of the middle 1920s led the nation to lose interest
in reform,21 but the Great Depression of the 1930s led the nation
to again search for answers to its problems. 2 2 In 1937
unicameralism went into effect in Nebraska, and twent~-t~o other
states (Montana among them} considered its adoption.2
The
drive for unicameralism again sputtered as World War II broke
out; it remained dormant until the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down its Reynolds v. Sims decision. Today, unicameralism is
again a vital and controversial issue in the reform of state
governmen t.
Arguments For and Against Bicameralism and Unicameralism
The central debate between bicameralists and unicameralists still
revolves around the arguments John Adams compiled. Two basic
philosophies of man are involved in the controversy. Adams
argued that although most men may be motivated by benevolence
and good intentions, most or all frequently transgress and all
"confine th eir ben e volence to their families, relations .
village, city, county, province, and that very few indeed
extend it impartially to the whole community." Therefore, he
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reasoned that if most people were capable of preferring their
own interests or those of their families and communities to
those of the nation as a whole, some "provision must be made
in the Constitution in favor of justice, to compel all to
respect the common right, the public good, the universal law
in preference to all private and partial considerations. 2 4
Adams wanted private property protected, and he firmly believed
that a two-house legislature was necessary to guarantee this
because:
11

A single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies,
and frailties of an individual; subject to fits of
humor, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm,
partialities or prejudice, and consequently productive
of hasty results and absurd judgments.25
The opposing philosophy was that of the democrat, exemplified
by Benjamin Franklin who asked:
"May not the wisdom brought
to the legislature by each member be as effectual a barrier
against the impulses of passion, etc, when the members are
united in one body, as when they are divided?" He reasoned
that if one chamber could check the other, then one that was
under the influence of passion, haste, folly, and the spirit
of encroachment could "obstruct the good proposed by the
other, and frustrate its advantages to the public."26 An
anonymous contemporary of Franklin gave the classic statement
of the virtues of a unicameral legislature which was, of
course, in direct opposition to Adams' version:
The highest responsibility is to be attained in a
simple structure of government, for the great body
of the people never steadily attend to the operations
of government, and for the want of due information
are liable to be imposed upon.
If you complicate
the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in their sentiment about the
sources of abuses or misconduct; some will impute
it to the senate, others to the house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the
people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly
abortive.
But if . . . you vest all the legislative
power in one body of men (separating the executive
and the judicial), elected for a short period, and
necessarily excluded by rotation from permanency
and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by
delays imposed on its proceedings, you will create
the most perfect responsibility: for then, whenever
the people feel a grievance, they cannot mistake the
authors and will apply the remedy with certainty and
effect, discarding them at the next election.27
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There are two famous analogies which praise and fault bicameralism. George Washing ton was reputed to have been asked at a
dinner why th e Un ited States had copied England in having a
"select as well as a popular IIousc in our Congress." He had
just been served a steaming cup of tea, a portion of which he
poured into his saucer.
He then answered:
This cup is the llouse of Representatives.
Its contents
have come directly from the people, who may be in a
state of great excitement. Th is saucer is the Senate,
in which I can hold the scalding liquid till its heat
has subsided enough to make it safe to drink.28
On the other hand, Benj amin Franklin made an analogy between
a bicameral legislature and the famous two-headed snake of
political fables.
He said:
She was goinq to a brook to drink, and in her way
was to pass through a hedge, a twig of which opposed
her direct course; one head chose to go on the right
side of the twig, and the other on the left; so that
time was spent in the contest, and, before the
decision was completed, the poor snake died with
thirst.29
Arguments For Bicameralism
There are few arguments asserted for bicameralism because few
people since John Adams have felt it needed defense.
It will
become evident that many of the arguments for bicameralism
more accurately could be termed arguments against unicameralism.
Those argumen ts include:
--Bicameralism Protects the Propertied Classes and
Conservatism . Protection of the propertied class was
traditionall y the most important reason for bicameralism, but
today since property requirements for voting and holding office
no longer exist and sufferage has been extended to almost every
man and woman, the argument no longer is pertinent.
However,
it is sometimes asserted that bicameralism exists in state
governments to insure that they remain conservative in character.
Because each chamber can prevent laws from being changed, the
states are guaranteed that change will be slow and well considered,
it is argued .30 The Englishman Lord Bryce noticed this
characteristic in 1888 in The American Commonwealth:
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The mere tendency of two chambers to d isagree wi t h
one ano ther is de emed a benefit by those who hold ,
as the Americ ans do, tha t every new measure is prima
facie lik e l y to do mo r e harm than good.
Mo st bil l s
are bad - - ergo , k ill as many as you can.31
--Bicameral ism Permits Rep r esentation of Differen t I nt e rest s.
Like the on e above, t his arc1ument originally was one of the
most importan t reaso ns for u icameralism, but today it is s e ldom
used. Origi nally, b icameralists emphasized that for two legislative bodi es to be j e alous of each other and for the che c ks
to work, each must rep resent different inte rests. Justice
Story in hi s Commentaries on the Constitution of the Uni ted
States wrot e :
[T]he v alu e of the check will, indeed, in a grea t
measure, d e p e nd upon this difference of organiz at i on.
If the t e r m o f office, the qualifications, the mode
of elec tio n , t he persons and interests represe nte d
by each bran c h are exactly the same, the check wi ll
be less powe r f ul, and the guard less perfect, than
if some o r all of these ingredients diff e r, so as
to bring into play all the various interests and
influen ces which belonq t o a free, honest, and
enlighte n ed so ciety.32
However, since Rebno lds v •_Jams no sue~ differences ~xis t .
Bo th houses must e ap portioned according to population and
the princip le of "one man, one vote." '!'hat, of course ,
nullifies the major re ason f or the development of bicame ralism
in England , the colonie s an<l the states--the represen t a tion
of differe nt i nteres ts; it has led many authorities to q uestion
the need fo r a seco n d house. This was foreseen by the United
States Sup r eme Court in its decision in Reynolds v. Si ms .
Chief Justic e Warren wrote:
We do no t believe that the concept of bicameralism
is rendered anachronistic and meaningless when the
predominant basis of representation in the two
legi slative bodies is required to be the same-popu lation.
A pr ime r e ason for bicameralism,
mode rnly considered, i ~ to insure mature and
deli berate considerati o n of, and to p revent precipitat e action on, propos e d legislative measures. 33
Bicamera lists also argue t hat the two hous e s still can refl ect
differ e nt districtinq metho <ls--singl e and multi-member
dis t r i cts, different leng t hs in terms, different q ualifica tions
a nd d ifferent sizes.
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--B ic a meralism Acts as a Check on Popular Passion. The
argument that the check of the second house is an extra guaran t e e
of civil liberties insists that during a time of great popular
emotion, when it is dangerous for a politician not to act
according to the will of the people, the second house will prevent the legislature from passing legislation abridging an
individual's civil liberties.
--Bicameralism Guarantees Critical Review of Legislation
and, Therefore, Prevents Passage of Hasty and Ill-Considered
Legislation. Because the two houses are naturally jealous of
each other, they are extremely critical of each other's
proposals.
Bicameralists maintain that a bill must be very
good to survive or remain unaltered under the scrutiny of the
second house.
The check of the second house results in higher
quality legislation than would the internal review of only
one house, it is argued.
--Bicameralism Prevents Corruption. Bicameralists maintain
that two houses are harder to corrupt than one, because the
briber has fewer people to influence in a single chamber than
in two. They argue that it would be very difficult to corrupt
both bodies at the same time.
Bicameralists also believe that
two houses dilute the effectiveness of lobbyists, so a
bicameral legislature would be more independent than a unicameral one.
--The Mode of Discussion in a Bicameral Legislature Produces
Better Legislation. Bicameralists believe that two successive
deliberations by two different bodies forges wiser and fairer
legislation than does one debate by one group.
--Bicameralism Is the Traditional Form of Government in the
United States and Is Familiar to the People.
Because the people
are familiar with bicameralism, they understand and utilize i t
better than unicameralism.
Arguments Against Bicameralism
As noted above, the arguments for bicameralism imply those
against unicameralism.
In turn, the arguments against bicame ral ism
will imply some of the arguments for unicameralism.
The list
of arguments for unicameralism is longer than the list for
bicameralism because almost all the studies on the controver sy
have been done by unicameralists or have resulted in finding s
supporting unicameralism.
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--Bicameralism Does Not Provide Detter Representation
of Rural Areas.
No matter which is adopted--bicameralism or
un1cameral1sm--actual representation of rural and urban areas
will be proportionally the same because both must be based
on the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" axiom.
However,
unicameralists argue that representation is increased in a
one-house legislature becau3e voters can pinpoint responsibility. The voters have only to follow the actions of their
legislators in one house; responsibility cannot be shirked
easily or blamed upon another house and set of legislators.
Also unicameralism simplifies the entire legislative process
so the average voter can watch its proceedings with more
clarity and understanding.
A small chamber--bicameral or unicameral, even with singlemember districts--necessitates large districts.
In Montana
that means districts composed of four or five rural counties,
or districts formed by joining rural areas with urban areas
which could completely dominate them.
It also means that in
the large districts a legislator may represent an area more
than 150 miles long; stated more directly, a constituent may
live that far from his representative.
Unicameralists contend that if bicameralism is retained, there
is no way to avoid one small chamber--the senate--where the
rural areas would lack the "feeling" of representation because
of the large size of their districts or because they are grouped
with heavily populated urban areas.
However, unicameralists
contend this can be avoided in a unicameral legislature with
single-member districts. They argue that a unicameral legislature
composed of seventy-five to 100 members would avoid the presence
of one house where groups would feel under-represented. Unicameralists also contend that such a unicameral legislature
with single-member districts--like a lower house with singlemember districts in a bicameral system--would increase the
feeling of representation in urban areas because it would help
increase the representation of minority groups within the cities.
--Bicameralism Does Not Protect the Propertied Classes and
Does Not Represent Different Interests Because No Such Legislative
Distinctions Exist Today.
Protection of the propertied classes
and varying interests were the two most important arguments used
by John Adams and Justice Story in their justification of bicameralism.
But today, unicameralists argue that neither contention
has any basis since the removal of property requirements for
voting and holding office and the Supreme Court's Reynolds v.
Sims decision. Most unicameralists assert that bicameralism
has fallen back on secondary reasons for its justification.
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Unicameralists argue that devices such as different terms and
qualifications will not make the senate and its checks and
balances any more valid. They believe that the second house
still will be a self-defeating check composed of representatives
of the same people. One political scientist, John Wahlke, wrote:
"It may----se-safely said that formal prerequisites for the office
of state legislator no longer influence significant ly the
character of legislative membership. 11 34 He maintains that
informal requirements are more important. For example, formal
requiremen ts do not prevent women, Negroes and many occupations
from being represented in the legislature, yet they all frequently
arc under- represented. Wahlkc states:
Far more influential [than formal requirements] is
the play of social, psychological, economic, and
political factors.
It follows that to recruit
different kinds of people into our legislatures
would require more than formal changes in constitutions or statutes.35
Therefore, unicameralists argue that making each house reflect
different kinds of districts, lengths of terms, membership
qualifications and total membership will not make their
composition substantially different as long as both are based
on population.
--A Second House Is Not A Check On Popular Passions.
Unicameralis ts argue that a second house never has been a good
protector of minority rights. They assert that Montana experience
bears them out.
During the Red Scare of 1917-1919, the bicameral
Montana Legislature and later the United States Congress, using
Montana's example, passed stringent anti-sedition acts, which
were used to deny many citizens their rights.36
--There Is No Need For A Second House. The Frenchman Sieyes
made the classic statement of this argument:
"If a Second
Chamber dissents from the first, it is mischievous; it if
agrees with it it is superfluous.3 7 Unicameralists emphasize
that the checks and balances of bicameralism have not worked
and that they are not needed because of judicial review and
the executive veto, which "are also more consistent with the
separation of powers doctrine because they involve one branch
of government's checking the other rather than a self-defeating
internal check within one branch. 11 38 Unicameralists maintain
that deadlocks are inherent in bicameralism because two houses
create an internal check within one branch of government.
They
believe that the resulting deadlocks frustrate the major purpose
of the legislature--to represent and enact the will of the
majority while providing some guarantees of the rights of
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minorities.
Unicameralists point out that such deadlocks are
virtually impossible in a legislature of one chamber.
In
addition, several studies have shown that the executive veto
is much more effective than two houses as a check.39
Also, since both houses now repres ent the same interest--the
people--unicameralists ask:
"When both chambers are apportioned
on a population basis, isn't a particular county or district
as well represented by ten 'representatives' as by those same
representatives and a 'senator'? 40
11

--Bicameralism Does Not Guarantee Critical Review and Does
Not Prevent Hasty and Ill-Cons idered Legislation.
Unicameralists
use three major arguments to refute clai~s that bicameralism
guarantees the critical review of legislation and the prevention
of hasty and slipshod legisla tion.
First, they argue that because there are two houses, there are
nearly twice as many bills introduced in a bicameral legislature.41
These bills must pass through both houses before ~hey can be
enacted; that leads to congestion and confusion.
Unicameralists
assert that the second house often receives bills too late in
the session to review them adequately.
They also argue that
the first house often passes bills on the unfound~d assumption
that the second house will carefully examine them, and the
second house often passes them on the equally unfounded assumption
that the first house has given them adequate consideration. 42
Because of the rush, noncont rov~rsial bills often receive little
consideration by either house. 4
Because of congestion and
because each house can deny responsibility for the passage or
defeat of a bill by blaming it on the other, the confusion can
be used by those who want to kill a bill or sneak a measure
through the melee.
Unicameralists charge that the end-of-session
log jam is a common phenomenon in bicameral legislatures, while
the unicameral legislature of Hebraska reaches the peak of its
congestion in the middle of its legislative session. 44 Although
log jams mainly are the result of constitutional limitations
on legislative sessions, "the fact remains that the two-house
form is not securing the careful deliberation on legislation
which its proponents have always claimed that it guaranteed. 4 5
11

Second, unicameralists argue that because both houses represent
the same interest--the people--the check of the second house
is valueless.
Justice Story himself stated that the check of
the second house has value only in the degree it differs in
composition from the first. 46 Today, according to the
unicameralists, any substantial critical review between the
houses often is due to political partisanship. 47
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According to Alvin Johnson, author of The Unicameral Legislature,
numerous state studies have shown that if the two houses are
controlled by the same party, there is normally no critical
review of the measures sponsored by the party leaders of the
other house; if the two houses are controlled by different
parties, there are no real disputes except on party issues.
However, \vhen discussing party issues, the unicameralists assert,
each house probably will be acting as a party representative
and not as a "disinterested and sincere check on the other." 4 8
Also if each house is controlled by a different party, an impasse
may develop.
Unicameralists point to Montana's 1971 Legislature
as an example.
However, unicameralists must admit there are exceptions to the
general rule described above. For example, in Montana, legislators sometimes divide according to region, and there always
will be some legislators who have particularly strong opinions
on some subjects which will make them cross party lines.
However, emphasizing the lack of critical review, unicameralists
assert that the outcome of a debate usually will be known
before the measure reaches the floor.
Johnson summed up the
state of critical review in a bicameral legislature with a
play on Sieyes' famous statement: "if both houses are of the
same political complexion, one chamber is superfluous; if the
two houses are controlled by different parties, the second house
is likely to be obstructive. 11 49
Third, the unicameralists question the quality of the check
by the second house. Professor Carroll, who did an intensive
study of unicameralism and bicameralism in Vermont, discovered
that the two houses of Vermont really did check each other.
However, he found that the bills "which they rejected in that
process would certainly not be styled radical, or, indeed,
seriously different from those which they were passing from
year to year."50 Another study found that for the most part
the check of a second house does not operate extensively
because the legislation of the first house often is killed
before it reaches the second house.
In other words, "most
proposed legislation is lost in the house in which it is first
introduced. 11 51
As another example of the phenomenon, the state of Maryland
undertook a study to determine "to what degree, and with what
effectiveness . . . second r~view . . . [is] present in the
Maryland General Assembly. 115
Of the 298 bills introduced in
the house and passed by both chambers, only 35 received "worthwhile review" (bills which were amended for reasons other than
semantics); of the 196 introduced in the senate and passed by
both chambers, only 19 received "worthwhile review." The study
concluded:
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The results cast serious doubt upon the validity
of any checks and balances arising from a
bicameral legislature. The very small percentage
of bills which did receive a worthwhile review
does not seem to ju~5ify the tremendous cost of
a bicameral system.
The Model State Constitution of the National Municipal League
recommends the adoption of a unicameral legislature.
In
discussing the check by the second house in a bicameral
legislature, it states:
[I]n spite of the far more extensive experience
with the bicameral system, there are no data to
support the claim that two houses result in better
policies and more carefully written laws. There
are no data to support the claim that the second
house is a constructive check against hasty action.54
--Bicameralism Does Not Prevent Corruption or Make Lobbyists
More Responsible.
Luce wrote of this subject:
"It is said
that it is harder to corrupt each of two chambers than to
corrupt a single chamber.
Yet everybody knows that with two
chambers the briber has two chances to accomplish defeat. 1155
The corrupter is an individual or group which has no place in
a legislature; on the other hand, lobbyists often play important
and needed roles in the legislature.
Yet unicameralists assert
that they both work in much the same way: they use a negative
approach rather than a positive one; their major objective is
to defeat measures rather than to pass them.5 6 Unicameralists
argue that the bicameral legislature is well suited to this
negative approach because there are numerous places in the
process of passing a bill through two houses where it can be
defeated or held up.
In a unicameral legislature the structure
and procedure are simpler and more open to public view; therefore, unicameralists maintain that the role of the cor~upter
is minimized and the role of the lobbyist is made more
responsible and aboveboard.
Unicameralists also emphasize that in a one-house legislature
there are no conference committees.
Such committees are
fixtures of bicameral legislatures.
\vnen a bill is passed by
one house, amended by the other and the first house refuses to
accept the amendments, the bill is referred to a conference
coTilffiittee. Many political commentators believe that legislation
is often amended for the sole purpose of throwing it into a
conference committee "where interests which could not safely
come before a standing comnittee in open session can secure
what they desire in secret." Professor Walker describes a
conference cor.v:iittcc this w.:i.y:
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Conference committee meetings are not open to the
public and no records are kept of the pro ceedings.
They work under pressure near the end of a session.
Their repo rts must be accepte d or rejected as
submitted.
No amendment can be made. Wh ile in
some legislatures the confer en ce committee cannot
introduce new matters into i ts report, in others
it is not so limited and co~ple te new bills many
emerge. The conference committee is a powerful
thir d house, whose deliberations are not public.
If corruption is the only object
the lobby,
this is the place to practice it.

g;

Because conferenc e committees do not exist in single chamber
legislatures, unicameralists assert that one of the major
sources of legislative corruption is removed. To support
this, they point to experience: the great period of
legislative corruption took place in l\merica in the late
1800s when all the state legislatures were bicameral.
--The Mode of Discussion in a Bicameral Legislature
Does Not Provide Adequate Consideration of Legislation.
Unicameralists do not believe that successive deliberation
by two different bodies is better than one debate by all
legislators.
Th ey argue that such a belief is contrary to
principles of debate and discussion recognized in all other
fields of inquiry.
Sheldon Amos, in The Science of Politics,
wrote:
[l\) common discussion in one broadly representative
c h amber must surpass in value any series of discussions conducted first by persons having exclusively
one order of interests and afterwards by those having
exclusively another order.
When the two alternative
courses are contrasted in this way, it seems almost
absurd that there should be any doubt as to the side
on which the advantage lies.SB

According to Amos, it is equally i mp ortant to have all the
"various modes of thought, prepossessions, and habitual standards
of opinions" brought into the discussion at one time rather than
having "some exclusively recognized and enforced" when the
measure is before one house and "the opposite or different ones
exclusively recognized" on another day when the measure is
before the second house.59
--Just Because Bicameralism Is the Traditional Form of
Government Does Not Mean It is a Good Form of Government .
Unicameralists acknowledge that bicameralism is indeed the
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traditional form of state legislatures, but they point out
that it also was the traditional form of American city government
until the Progressive Movement in the early 1900s. Before the
Progressives engineered the change to unicameral city government,
our cities, according to one foreign observer, were the blight
of American government.
Lord Byrce wrote in 1888 that there
was "a want of methods for fixing public res~onsibility on the
governing persons and bodies" in the cities. O He described
city government as "the weak point of the country."6 1 According
to unicarneralists, bicameral city government was the traditional
form, but it certainly was not good.62 By 1964, only two of
America's 17,997 municipal governments were bicamera1.63
Unicameralists also argue that Americans know and understand
unicameralism, partly through their working relationship and
knowledge of unicameral city governments.
Similarly, many
Americans arc familar with the predominately unicameral corporate
structure.
--Bicameralism Obscures Res~onsibility.
Unicameralists claim
bicameralism gives representatives of the people many ways to
evade responsibility and makes it nearly impossible for the voter
to hold his representative accountable.
The legislator may vote
for a bill which he actually opposes, expecting it to be killed
in the second house. 64 He is, therefore, able to maintain a
voting record which does not accurately reflect his beliefs.
The legislators also can take advantage of the conference
committee to evade responsibility in a bicameral legislature.
Both houses may pass a bill in slightly different form and
deliberately not reach agreement in the conference committee,
so that each house is on record in support of the measure and
yet it is not passed. Michener described many of the evasionary
maneuvers that can be taken by legislators in a bicameral
legislature when he wrote:
[A] measure may be passed in one house under the claim
that it is the best that could be obtained from the
second house, rather than upon its merits; or a measure
may be passed in one house on the ground that the choice
was between a version \10rked out in conference or nothing.
In all of these cases, it is impossible for the average
voter to know who was responsible for the final action
and who should be held to account.65
In contrast, the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures in
its recent study of the fifty state legislatures ranked tge
Nebraska unicameral legislature first in accountability.
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Arguments For Unicameralism
--A Unicameral Legislatur e Is Accountable.
In theory, the
people arc the fundamental source of all governmental power;
if a representative does not vote the way his constituents
want, they can replace him with s ome one who will.
l3u t unicameral ists argue there are many ways a legislator can "muddy
the water" to evade responsibility in a bicamera l legislature,
thereby making it impossible for a voter to know who is
accountable for the passage or defeat of various measures.
Unicameralists believe that in a unicameral legislature the
voter's task is much easier because the structure is simpler.
In Nebraska, there are only forty-nine legislators to keep
track of.
Unicameralists argue that a citizen or reporter
can see who the opposing leaders are merely by watching the
debates.
Legislators cannot evade responsibility because
there is no second house upon which to shift the blame, and
there are no conference committees to do work clandestinely.
Also, procedures can be incorporated in a unicameral legislature
to make it even more accountable.
For example, in Nebraska a
member can request a recorded vote at any time. All committee
meetings are open to the public and the committees must hold
public hearings on all bills. Public notice of five days must
be given prior to the hearings. Also, "a report on a bill or
resolution must be made to the Legislature within eight
calendar days after the committee has acted upon the particular
measure and the chairman must be accountable for the reasoning
behind each decision. 1167 There must be five legislative days
between the technical review of the bill and its final reading
and passage, and it must be on the desks of the members in
final form for one day before final passage.68
Proponents claim that the assertion that a unicameral legislature
is more accountable than a bicameral legislature is• based on
experience, not theory. As mentioned previously, the Citizens
Conference on State Legislatures rated the Nebraska unicameral
legislature first in accountability after a study of all state
legislatur es in 1970. 69 Earlier, in 1954, the research committee
on state legislatures of the American Political Science Association made a report similar to the one made by the Citizens'
Committee.
It said that the unicameral legislature did not
guarantee that all the members would be virtuous, but that
legislators in a unicameral system
are merely obliged to operate in a fairly simple
structure where procedure can be observed and
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reported to the public currently, understandably,
and more accurately than is possible among the
cross currents of two houses and their various
standing and conference committees.70
--Unicameralism Is More Eff icient Than Bicameralism and
Its r::fficiency Improves the Quality of Legislation.
Robert
Luce, an advocate of bicameralism, wrote in 1924:
\vhat will occur when our lawmaking methods are
reorganized to meet modern needs is another story.
Some day it is going to be recognized that government has come in our time to have two distinct
functions--one it ha s always had, the function of
justice; the other, the new function of business.
When these come to be handled separately, the
function of business may very well call for unicameral treatment, as in the case of all business
corporations. Justice, however, the rights 9 nd
wrongs of men, will always call for those methods
that secure adequate caution, deliberation, reflection, assurance. 71
Today, there is a great need for legislatures to be efficient
and just at the same time.
Unicameralists have used the onehouse legislature of Nebraska and the first legislature of
Vermont as proof that by making a legislature more efficient,
the quality of legislation is improved. These two legislatures
have proved that efficiency and justice can be given at the
same time.
In a unicameral legislature, fewer bills are introduced. 72
And, because there is only one house for bills to pass through,
there are no end-of-session log jams caused by late introduction
or postponement of legislation and the ensuing rush to route
them through two houses.
'rhe unicameral legislature of Nebraska
reaches peak of its congestion during the middle of its
legislative session, rather than at the end of it.73 By improving
the legislature's efficiency, the Nebraska unicameral system has
improved the consideration its legislation receives and acts to
the benefit of justice:
[T]he unicameral legislature of Nebraska has been
criticized not for its haste, but rather because it
takes much longer to get a bill through the legislature
than under the old system.
Despite the absence of
a second house and the fact that only about half as
many bills are introduced as formerly, the sessions
have been longer.
It is probably true to state that
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today no other legislature gives consistently
more thorough consideration to measures that it
enac ts than that of Nebraska.74
Dr. Carroll in his study of the unicameral legisl a ture in
Vermont further sub stantiates this assertion. He states that
one of the major arguments used against unicame ralism in Vermont
was that laws frequent ly were changed and amended; bicameralists
argued that if there had been adequate consideration of the
legislation before its initial passage, amendment would not have
been necessary. They believed "the check which a second chamber
would provide would insure more deliberation and wiser legislation
and thus render the laws more stable. 75 However, upon investigation, Carroll found that the public laws of Ve rmont were 98.07
percent more stable and the private laws 85.45 p ercent more
stable under the unicameral legislature than under the bicameral
legislature which rep laced it.76 This led him to conclude:
11

There is no evi dence that the action of the bicameral
legislature was less hasty or less unwise than that of
the unicameral legislature. On the contrary, the
records show that its action was probably less wise,
if not more hasty, than that of the unicameral body.77
--Unicameralism Is More Economical Than Bicameralism.
Unicameralists argue that money saved by eliminating one house can
be reinvested in higher legislative salaries and in legislative
research facilities .
By reinvesting these savings, the quality
of legislators will improve, and legislature will become more
knowledgeable and independent of the governor and the state's
interest groups.
Unicameralists admit that similar savings
can be made in a bicameral legislature if it reduces the size
of its chambers to equal the one body of the unicameral legislature.
However, there are additional savings in unicameralism
through elimination of much duplication in staff, printing
and other legislative operating expenses.
Conclusion
At present, there is only one unicameral legislat ure in the
United States. The people have a strong faith in bicameralism
and are slow to undertake major reform of their government unless
that government is shown to be shockingly inadequate.
For
example, executive succession was not clarified until after
President Eisenhower suffered his heart attack in 1955. For
the most part, publi c apathy and the ability of legislators to
muddle their way thro ugh the legislative process without major
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breakdowns have allowed bicameralisn to remain in existence--to
a great degree unaltered.
There are several ways a bicameral legislature can be reformed
to make it more responsive to the needs of the twentieth century
and to cure many of the shortcomings unicameralists see in its
legislative process.
It can be reduced in size so the voters
and the press have fewer people to follow; it can be compelled
to record all votes, making it more responsible to the voters;
joint committees can be initiated to reduce duplication and to
increase responsibility.
Sessions can be made more frequent
and flexible, ennbling the legislature to perform its work in
a more thoughtful and orderly manner.
Many problems could be
solved by these devices, which are discussed at length elsewhere
in this report.
But the possible problem of deadlock, the disjointed consideration
of measures by two different groups often using different or
opposite criteria, problems of conference committees and the
possibility of legislators shirking responsibility would remain.
As presented by its proponents, a legislature of one chamber
has much to recommend it. Oddly, it is often claimed that
unicameralism is the pipe dream of theorists and philosophers,
men who have experience with ideas, but none with legislation.
Yet it is bicameralism which is defended by ideas and philosophy
and attacked by experience.
Corruption and much of the abuse
of legislative power known in America have developed under
bicameralism, not unicameralism. Checks and balances sometimes
have proven ineffective; log jams and hasty and ill-considered
legislation exist in abundance. There are problems inherent
in bicameralism which cannot be remedied by changes in procedure
and rules; confrontation, deadlock and confusion are part of
its very nature.
Under bicameralisn, responsibility is difficult,
if not impossible, to fix.
It has been shown in the nation's
cities that unicameralisrn works; many believe it has dramatically improved city government by making its workings clear and
efficient. 78 The Nebraska legislature has proven that effective
checks against hasty and sloppy legislation can be incorporated
into a unicameral system. 79 Also, one study showed the unicameral
legislature of Vermont passed more thoughtful and better laws,
which needed less amendment, than the bicameral body which
rer,laced it.80
Still, the structural choice between a unicameral and a bicameral
legislature is not the only important decision to be made.
Men
of quality must be attracted to the legislature and the
legislature's capabilities to be informed and independent must
be increased. Many would aqree that either a unicameral or a
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reformed bicameral legislature is a step in the right direction,
and it is healthy for our government to be subjec ted to
q uest ioning of such fundamental nature.
LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS
The question of legislative sessions has substantial importance
for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
From its very
beginnings as a territory, Montana has restricted the frequency
and duration of its legislative sessions, a policy widely
questioned today.
Th e Organic Act of the Montana Territory originally provided
for annual forty-day sessions, but in 1868 Congress stipulated
that all territorial legislatures were to meet in bi ennial
session s. Congress again restricted the Montana legislature
in 1873 when it ruled that all territorial legisl atures were
limite d to forty-day sessions every other year.
In 1880,
Congress extended this limitation to sixty days. 81 The 1884
Montana Constitutional Convention limited the legislature to
forty-da y biennial sessions; the 1889 Montana Constitutional
Convention increased the limitation to sixty days , where it
has remained.
The Montana Constitution provides:
No session of the legislative assembly, after the
first, which may be ninety days, shall ex ceed sixty
days.
[Art. V, Sec. 5 (in part)]
The legislative assembly (except the first) shall
meet at the seat of government at twelve o'clock
noon, on the first Monday of January, next succeeding the general election provided by law, and
at twelve o'clock noon on the first Monday of
January, of each alternate year thereafter, and at
other times when convened by the governor.
[Art.
V, Sec. 6)
The legislators and citizens of Montana have proposed many
changes to these constitutional provisions; however, they
remain unchanged.
There are two interrelated constitutional issues crucial to
the discussion of legislative sessions:
their freque ncy and
their duration.
The issue of frequency centers aroun d the
debate between advocates of annual and biennial sessions. The
issue of duration revolves around the question of whe ther a
constitution should place limits on the length of legislative
session s.
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Frequency of Legislative Sessions
Controvers y has raged over the frequency of sessions since
the early parliamentary history of England.
At first the
king called Parliament only when he needed to raise revenue,
so the people were loath to have many sessions called.
But
this attitude changed when the king began to abuse his power.
Soon the people wanted guarantees of more frequent sessions
so they could place some restraints on the king 1 s government .
Most American colonies began as busine ss corporations, so their
governmen ts (board of directors) held frequent meetings at
stated intervals. Later, under the Royal Governors, the colonists bitterly complained of irregul ar sessions, arguing they
were an infringement of their libert ies.
Our forefa thers placed great faith in their legislatures and
believed they should meet often.
The Maryland Bill of Rights
of 1776 stated:
"For redress of grievances, and for amending,
strengthen ing and preser ving the laws the Legislature ought to
be frequen tly convened. " And the Massachusetts Bill of Rights
of 1780 stated:
"The Legislature ought frequently to assemble
for the redress of grievances, for correcting, strengthening,
and confirming the !aws, and for making new laws, as the common
good may require. 118
All but one of the thirteen original
states began with annua l sessions.83 This feeling of confidence
contrasts strongly with the feeling of distrust which developed
in the mid-nineteenth century, when the railroads and other
corporate interests beg an to corrupt state legislatures. They
succeeded in dominating the legislatures because these lawmaking
bodies had little visibi lity. The people could not accurately
follow the actions of their legislatures because communica tions
were primitive and, as in Montana, the special interests sometimes
owned most of the press.8 4 But rather than make the actions of
legislators more visible and responsib le, the constitution s of
that era limited them to meeting once every other year and
limited the number of days they could meet.
Legislative
authorit ies opposed thes e restriction s when the states began
adopting them, and time and experience have since judged the
restric tions harshly. And the pendulum has begun to swing back
to annua l sessions.
In 1948, six states held annual sessions.85
This number increased to twenty-six in 1970 and to thirty- three
in 1971.86 Modern studies merely list the arguments for
biennial sessions; none advocates them.
For this reason and
because there are no authorities or studies which can be cited
as documentary evidence, the section on biennial sessions in
this report is considerably shorter in length than the discussion
of annual sessions.
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Biennial Leg i s l ative Sessions
Bienn ial ses sions grew out of a fea r and dis tr u st of g o vernment.
For e xample, T. R. White, in Comme ntaries of the Constitution
of Pennsylvania (1873), wrote that the convention adopted
biennia l s e ssions with the belief
tha t less evil was likely to be done by a legislature
meeting once in two years th a n by one meeting every
year.
The proposal was fran k ly stated by its advocates
to be a companion provision to the clause forbidding
local and special legislation, both clauses being
meant to reduce to a minimum the opportunities for
evil legislation.87
This philosophy goes hand in hand with the belief that there
already are enough laws.
"Annual sessions," it has been argued ,
"inevitably will lead to the persistent advocacy of new
legislation and to the adoption of meretricious policies. 1188
In other words, proponents of biennial sessions believe
legislative sessions should be short and business-like so
there is not enough time for unnecessary laws to be enacted.
Because there are fewer sessions, the legislature will receive
greater attention from the public, it is contended.
Similarly,
legislative proposals will receive greater consideration
because they cannot be revised or repealed for two years.
Biennialists also point out that one session is cheaper than
two, and that one session curtails the legislature's harassment
of the administrative branch of government.89
Advocates of biennial sessions maintain that sessions every
other year are better for legislators themselves. They mai n tain that the quality of legislators is better under biennia l
sessions than under annual sessions because some of the state's
best citizens are too busy to give up a great deal of time
to public service, but might be able to give up some time
every two years. Also under the biennial system, legislators
have more time to cultivate constituents and effectively campaign
for re-election.
In addition, proponents of biennial sessions
contend that the time between sess i ons can be well spent by the
legislators performing interim stud ies.90
Annual Legislative Sessions
In 1884, the year Montana held its s e cond cons t i tut i on al
convent i on and adopted forty-day b ienni al legisla t ive sessions,
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Simon Sterne criticized biennial sessions in an address to the
American Bar Association:
To cut in half the time of the session of the legislature, as a cure for bad legislation, is not only
to prove ourselves ignorant of the cure for our
evils, but to ignore the causes of the evils . • • .
This proposed remedy is contrary to the tendencies
of modern civilization; it is the abdication of a
function, not its specialization and development;
it is the merest refuge of imbecility, a confession
that on this subject we are bankrupted in thought;
that instead of being able to turn out better laws
by selecting better legislators and improving their
methods, our invention offers no other cure than
to close the gates of our legislative mills every
other year, in the vain hope that in the alternative
year they may produce better laws.91
This biennial approach to legislative sessions also ignored
one of the reasons why men like Thomas Paine stressed annual
sessions--"for the purpose of correcting the wrong (where
any wrong has been done) of a former legislature. 92 Robert
Luce, the dean of American legislative scholars, has observed:
"Rarely can the most expert of legislators anticipate all
possibilities. The occasion for amendment is virtually
inevitable. As a rule the sooner the amendment can be made,
the better."93 With annual sessions the people can quickly
repeal bad laws and implement changes.
Luce also challenged
the argument that biennial sessions produce fewer and better
laws.
He wrote:
"[I]f the demands of the citizens are to
be met as much in biennial sessions as they are in annual
sessions, just as many laws must result from one system as
the other."94
11

The greatest objection to annual sessions, besides a fear of
too much government, has been that the costs would be
exorbitant. Proponents of annual sessions admit that costs
would increase, but argue that legislative expenses are
nominal compared to those of the rest of state government.
In 1969 when the total state budget was $358 million, the
Montana Legislature cost about $1.1 million, or only threetenths of one percent of the total. A Utah legislative
authority has stated that "a few bad laws can cost the state
much more than the extra time necessary for adequate deliberation might have cost."95 Massachusetts is a case in
point: it changed from annual to biennial sessions in 1938
primarily because of "considerations of expected economies. 9 6
11
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Five years later, a special legislative committee gave the
follow ing harsh judgement of biennial sessions:
This commission wishes to point out that the change
from annual to biennial legislative sessions not
onl y was a retrogressive step in our democracy , but
sign ified a cataclysmic decline in the scope, value,
integrity and importance of our Legislature.
As a
matter of fact, if biennial sessions had alway s been
the rule in this Commonwealth, now would have been
the time to change to annuals.
In other year s the
tempo of life was slower; changes occurred less
frequently; in the interest of economy, circumstances
might have permitted less frequent meetings of the
Legislature. Today, the rapid pace of life and
communal affairs demands a Legislature that is in
touch with the pulse of the Commonwealth • • • . .
This Commission therefore strongly recommends the
recon sideration of this whole question and a return
to annual legislative sessions as soon as poss ible
as the first step towards an improved legislat ive
system . 97
In addition, the state had saved very little money by going
to bienni al sessions. One year after the report, the people
of Massachusetts voted to return to annual sessions.98
One of the most obvious arguments for annual sessions is simply
the grea t changes that have taken place in civilization since
the turn of the century. Technology and invention have greatly
added to the complexity of society and consequently to the
complexity of government. Today change is fast and continuous,
a fact recognized by federal, county and municipal governments
which mee t more frequently than once every two year s.
Underlining this thought, Robert Luce wrote:
Laws are enacted because the world moves, because
Science and Invention never sleep, because even
Custom always marches. Our ills come not because
laws are in the van, but because they are so far
in the rear. The Legislature always lags.99
Argumen ts of a less philosophical nature in favor of annual
session s have been the growth in demand for legi slative
services , the need to restore the balance of power between
the legisl ature and a permanent executive and the di fficulties
in formulat ing an accurate biennial budget. Advocates of
annual sess ions assert that state government has become big
business .
"In 1890 Montana had 16 counties inste ad of 56,
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and thirty-ei ht state agencies where there are now more than
one-hun dred." OO In 1890 the legislature appropriated about
$187,000 annually: now it appropriates about $300 million.101

1

Proponen ts of annual sessions argue that no business of this
size has a governing body that meets only once every two years.
They are amazed that in Montana many city and town councils,
county commissioners and school boards find it necessary to
meet weekly or monthly, yet the state's highest legislative
body, the board of directo rs of a $300 million enterprise, meets
only once in a twenty-four month period.
Advocates also argue that the powers of the governor and the
legislatur e no longer are in balance. The legisl ature has no
control over how often and how long it can meet: in special
sessions it does not even control what it can discuss.
To a
degree the latter is true even during the regular sessions,
because as in all meeti ngs, the person or persons who control
the agenda control the meeting.
Because the legislature is not
a continuo us body, it is quite dependen t upon the executi ve
branch of government (a continuous body for four years) and
lobbyists for much of its information about proposed legislation.
Also because the legisla ture cannot reconvene itself, the
governor 's veto is absolu te after the session is over. The
Connecticu t Legislative Council has stated:
"The worst aspect
of the biennial session is that it encourages the expansion
of executive power. 102
11

In fiscal matters, promo ters of annual sessions argue that
biennial sessions necessi tate planning budgets of actual
expenditures three years in advance.
This is a difficult task
because such plans are subject to factors such as "national
economic fluctuations, migrations in and out of the state,
.
the expansion of government functions, and unforeseen emergencies."lO~
Such long-range plans are particularly precarious during an
inflat ionary period.
Many subtleties are involved, such as,
inflation of another kind--s chool attendance.
In figuring a
budget for the University System, the legislature has to
anticip ate the money the system will need because of the growth
in the enrollment over the next biennium.
The Montana Citizens
Committee on the State Legislature quoted one legislator as
saying :
The budgets have to be prepared over three years in
advance, and as was the case in the University System
this fortieth session, a tremendous increase was
necessary because the estimate used in the prior
session was too low in regard to the student enrollment;
and consequently the University System had to rob all
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other accounts just to hire necessary personnel.
Also, we would have much better control if we
worked an annual budget.104
The Citizens' Committee advocated annual sessions, saying:
If the legislature met annually, it would be in
a better position to do a thorough, detailed study
of all appropriations which now is being done
within a restricted time limit in an atmosphere of
hurry, pressure, and harassment.
Moreover, adjustment necessitated by unforeseen developments and
emergencies could be made with great ease if the
legislature met annually.105
It also can be contended that a biennial budget hinders the
legislature in achieving its goal of economy. For example,
when the legislature has to estimate a department's expenditures over a two-year period, it may tend to give the agency
the "benfit of the doubt" rather than economize.lOG It also
is asserted that biennial sessions and their biennial budgets
may force the state to wait more than a year to take advantage
of new federal programs granting loans and matching funds to
projects assisting small businesses, agriculture, highway
construction, welfare, housing and education.107
Advocates also believe annual sessions would lead to further
reform which would help lawmakers perform their legislative
duties more effectively. The Illinois Commission on the
Organization of the Legislative Assembly wrote:
Justification for minimally necessary tools such
as staff and secretarial assistance or office space
does not depend on annual sessions; we believe such
tools to be necessary whether or not annual sessions
are implemented. We are convinced, however, that
securing and utilizing these tools will be extremely
difficult without annual sessions.
Consider for example the problem of developing an
expert staff for the standing committees of the
General Assembly.
It is next to impossible to hire
competent specialists for a period of only six
months out of twenty-four.
With annual sessions,
on the other hand, it would be feasible to staff
committees on a year-round basis under conditions
that would lead to the development
a permanent
career service for the legislature.! 8

og
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All these problems have slowly forced the states into a journey
toward annual sessions.
But in that journey, several states
have stopped along the way to try two innovative devices: several
species of the unlimited biennial session and the alternating
budget session.
Biennial Sessions: Unlimited and Limited to Legislative Days
The unlimited biennial session is a device used by the United
States Congress and by several state legislatures. Congress
initiated this device under the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946. Each Congress or legislature spans a biennium
(a two-year period) with the first session recessing rather
than adjourning sine die.
In the case of Congress, the first
session meets in January of the odd-numbered years; the second
session meets in January of the even-numbered years.
Before
the between-sessions recess is taken, both houses must agree
because Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitution
states that "neither house, during the session of Congress,
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days." Most state constitutions have a similar provision
{see Art. V, Sec. 14 of the Montana Constitution). The unlimited
biennial session is said to have the advantage that bills
introduced in the first session are carried over into the second
session without the need for reintroduction; in other words,
there is continuity over the biennium.
The legislatures of Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio and Vermont have
used the unlimited biennial sessions.
By having their two
houses agree to recess, these states were able to attain an
effect similar to annual sessions.
In 1970, however, Wisconsin
and Illinois adopted constitutional provisions providing for
annual unlimited sessions.
Tennessee has and Utah had time restrictions on the length of
their sessions, but because their courts ruled the limits
applied to legislative rather than calendar days, they can
recess as long as they like, provided each house agrees, and
then reconvene.
Even if they do not recess, they can add ten
to twenty days to their sessions by excluding weekends from
legislative days. This was possible in Utah because the state
attorney general ruled that the Constitution's sixty-day
specification could be interpreted to mean sixty legislative
days rather than sixty calendar days.
Hafen explained this in
the Utah Law Review:
The opinion based its conclusion on the conflict
in the constitution between the sixty day limit,
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Utah Const. Art. VI 16, and the provision for
ad journment:
"Neither house, without the consen t
of the other, shall adjourn for more than three
days . . . . " Utah Const. Art. VI 15. Becaus e
adjournment is contemplated by the constitution
under these conditions, the attorney general
reasoned that there is apparently no limit to
the time of adjournment if both houses do consent.
Thus, the sixty-day provision must refer to
legislative days because otherwise a sixty-day
ad journment after the first day of the session
woul d frustrate the legislative provisions.l0 9
This is the same reason the United States Congress has to have
the consent of both houses before it can recess. This technique,
which is short of constitutional change, theoreti cally could
be used in Montana, which has a similar provision in its
Constitution. Article V, Section 14 of the Montan a Constitution
reads:
Nei ther house, shall, without the consent of the
other , adjourn for more than three days, nor to
any other place than that in which the two houses
sha ll be sitting.
This device, however, may appear as nothing mor e than a clever
maneuver around the constitutional provision which limits the
length of the legislative session.
In the Montana Constitution,
the language is open to either interpretation--the traditional
one or the one taken in Utah.
In any case, Utah in 1970, like
Illinoi s and Wisconsin, adopted a constitutional amendment
authoriz ing annual sessions.
Alternati ng Budget Sessions
The other device to provide more frequent sessions is the
alternat ing budget session. This system provides for annual
sessions with either the even- or odd-year sessions limited to
discussion of fiscal matters.
Legislatures undertook this
reform in the belief that it was too difficult to develop
budgets for a two-year period, and that appropriati on bills
were the biggest contributor to the log jams of legislation
that developed at the end of every regular session. The
alternating budget session remedies some legislative problems,
but it creates others because it limits the legisla ture's
flexibili ty to meet future problems. When a consti tution
limits the sessions to the discussion of certain subjects,
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the legislature spends some of its time debating what should
and should not be discu ssed, and the courts become involved
in deciding which laws should or should not have been discussed and passed. This happened in Maryland where the idea
of budget sessions originated.110
In 1946 Maryland's tax commission recommended annual legislative
sessions "to consider the State budget on a yearly basis. 111
The commissio n wanted more frequent sessions, believing that
it was impractical to budget the state every two years.
It
did not recommend restri ctions on what the legislature could
discuss in the even-year sessions. Acting on this recommendat ion ,
the Maryland Legislative Council submitted a bill to the
legislatur e which provi ded for annual sessions. The bill made
no distincti on between the even- and odd-year sessions except
that the even-year session could not exceed forty-five days and
that the budget must be submitted on the first day. The Committee on Constitutional Amendments, however, decided to impose
restric tions on the subject matter that the legislature could
discuss during the even- year session. Like all legislative
bodies that have sessions limited in length, the Maryland
legislatur e, limited to ninety-day sessions, was acutely aware
of the "inevitable log jam of legislation that piles up during
the closing hours of the session."1 12 The subject matter
restricti on was the commi ttee's attempt to prevent the log jam
from occurr ing during the even-year session.
In 1948 the people
of Maryla nd passed a constitutional amendment which created
even-year budget sessions.
However, in 1964 Maryland repealed
the budget- only sessio n "because of dissatisfaction with the
restrictive 'budget' limitation. 113
11

11

After Maryland created budget sessions, they became fashio nable
and several states adopted them.
Similarly, when Maryland
repealed her budget sessions, other states followed her lead,
and the national trend now is to repeal them.
Maryland (1964),
Californ ia (1966), Kansa s (1966), Hawaii (1968), Delaware (1968)
and West Virgina (1970) all have dropped the budget limitations
from their second session s. Today, rather than limit subject
matter, studies suggest the incorporation of a series of deadlines into the legislative rules to prevent the "inevitable
log jam" at the end of the session.114
In creating budget sessions, the Maryland legislature dissipated
its effort to provide more frequent sessions by joining it with
an attempt to prevent the hasty and inadequate legislation
which always emerged from the perennial log jam of legislatio n.
What began as a move to give the state annual sessions became
an attempt to improve the quality of legislation by the addition
of even-year sessions limited to the discussion of fiscal maII~rs.
This same log jam and its legislation are common in Montana.
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Split Sessions
The log jam and resulting hasty legislation stimulated reform
of a different kind in California. California invented the
split session--an attempt to improve the quality of legislation
that was not coupled with an attempt to provide more frequent
sessions. The session remained biennial; the split session
merely divided the session into three parts.
In theory the split session seemed promising.
It created a
recess of no longer than thirty days between a short preliminary
session in which bills were introduced and a longer session in
which the bills were debated, passed or rejected. The recess
was supposed to provide legislators and the people an opportunity to study legislation and separate the good from the bad.
The recess also provided a time in the legislative process for
dialogue between the people and their legislators.ll6
In 1911 at the height of the Progressive Movement, California
passed the split session amendment along with the initiative,
referendum and women's suffrage.
The plan was inaugurated under most favorable
conditions. The legislature of 1913 was progressive in character, and its membership desired
to act in full accord wit9 the letter and spirit
of the new arrangement.l
During the recess the state printed complete sets of the
3,887 bills and sent them to all county and city clerks, public
libraries, high schools, chambers of commerce and boards of
trade. Legislators also could send a maximum of ten sets to
their constituents. Newspapers printed summaries of the bills,
Progressive groups sponsored citizens' meetings across the
state to discuss the measures and legislators met with their
constituents. Yet the people were not able to make good use
of the recess. The enormous number and complexity of the bills,
the desultory and diverse desires of the electorate, and the
short length (thirty days) of the recess defeated its purposes.
After 1913 the initial enthusiasm never was shown again.
But
pressure groups made profitable use of the recess after 1913. 118
The provision which allowed each legislator to introduce two
bills in the second session if approved by two-thirds of his
house also weakened the California split session.
By custom,
the legislature automatically allowed every member to introduce
his share. Confusion at the end of the session continued because
the biennial restriction accentuated the need for legislation
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and because legislators procrastinated on important bills.
California added an even-year budget session to this odd-year
split session in 1946 and replaced both with annual sessions
in 1966. One historian of the California split session wrote:
Although designed to correct, at least in part,
some of the worst features of the legislative
practices that prevailed, the operation of the
plan has obviously not accomplished that result.
It is often difficult to detect in the record of
the practice of any of the ideas that formed the
theory.119
When West Virginia embraced split sessions in 1920, it was
seeking to improve the quality of its legislation, which suffered
because the constitution limited the legislature to forty-five
day biennial sessions.
But under split sessions, legislators
still found it impossible to give bills adequate consideration.
The split session amendment forbade introduction of legislation
during the last session without three-fourths approval.
In
contrast to California, few bills obtained the needed approval;
however, congestion of legislation at the end of the session
did not end, because of the forty-five day limit. The people
of West Virginia repealed the amendment in 1929.
In assessing
the merits of the split session in West Virginia, one political
scientist wrote:
Viewed from the standpoint of results achieved,
it is unquestionably true that the split session
has proved a dismal failure.
It has not prevented
the enactment of bad legislation; it has not
accomplished the enactment of good legislation.1 2 0
The Duration of Legislative Sessions
The transformation of a proposal for annual sessions into
budget sessions in Maryland and use of the split session in
California and West Virginia were attempts to prevent hasty and
inadequate legislation at the end of each session.
But in
reality, they were treating only the symptoms of the basic
ill--the insufficiency of time in constitutionally limited
sessions.
The evils of time and frequency limits--chaotic
sessions and ill-considered legislation--have stimulated much
reform.
States that have tried budget sessions, split sessions
and recessed unlimited biennial sessions seem to have concluded
that the most satisfactory reform is to simply remove the
restrictions on legislative sessions.
An excellent example is
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California, which invented the split session, tried budget
sessio ns and replaced both with annual unlimited sessions in
1 966.
Thirty states limit their legislative sessions to a specific
number of days, while four more indirectly limit their sessions
by sto pping the pay of legislators after a specific amount
of time.1 21 Montana's sixty-day limit is most common amont the
states (See Appendix B).
Lim ited sessions, like biennial sessions, grew out of distrust
and fear of state government--feelings often justified during
the nineteenth century as railroads and other corpor ations
corrupted many state legislatures.
It was during this period
that New Jersey became the first state to limit its legislative
sessio ns. As Luce put it, "New Jersey found a new application
for the ingenious idea that the way to handle an evil is to
lessen its o~~ortunity. The shorter the session, the less harm
it can do. 111
New Jersey limited the number of days legislators
could receive full pay.
In 1845, Louisiana became the first
state to limit the actual number of days in the session by
adopting the same sixty-day limit later imposed by Montana.
Californ ia in 1908 and Colorado in 1910 simply paid their
legislators $1,000 a year, which in effect encouraged legislators
to end sessions as soon as possible.123
Limited Legislative Sessions
One argument for limited sessions, particularly rel evant for
Montana, is that unlimited sessions would make it impossible
for many people to serve who find service possible in a limited
session .
It is contended that unlimited sessions would end
Montana 's tradition of a citizen legislature and would create
a profes sional legislature in its stead.
Some urge that needed
reform can be achieved without abandoning Montana's sixty-day
limit by adopting a split session that could meet early in
December, recess for the holidays during which time committees
could begin their work and then reconvene late in January to
enact legislation.
A second argument is that unlimited sessions are expensive and
lead to unnecessary legislation. On this subject, Alvin Johnson,
the author of The Unicameral Legislature, wrote:
Since the quantity of bills to be passed upon is
cons idered one of the principal causes of poor
leg islation, many advocates of reform have suggested
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limiti ng the numbe r of laws.
One of the simplest
ways to do this i s to shor ten the length of the
legis l a tive s essions o r to ma ke them less fre q uen t .
Sixty days is u sually suggested as the maximum
leng th of sessio n and the biennial meetings as the
idea l frequency.1 24
Another arg ument main tains that it is easier for the public
and the pre ss to keep surveillance over the legislature i n a
limited ses sion than i t is in an unlimited one.
Still an other
states tha t the legislature has plenty of time, but that i t
makes poor use of the time it has.125
No clear l ine can be drawn between when a legislature c eases
to be a cit izen legi slature and becomes a professional one,
but it does seem to h ave some re lation to the length of session.
Supporters o f a ci tizen legi sla ture believe that a rep resenta tive shoul d b e a " participa ting" member of the communi ty he
represents , rather t han a spe c ialist in government, and that
this "greater represe ntativen e ss" justifies "the risk o f le!~G
efficient and even l ess compe t ent legislative performan ce."
They also maintain t hat if sessions are lengthened, sala r i es
will incre a s e to such an exte nt that many people will ru n for
office sole ly for th e money.
It also is contended that a shift
to annual se ssions may discou rag e some legislators who are now
willing to s pend alt ernate win t ers in Helena.
Lengtheni ng the
session, wh ether annu al or biennial, will affect the capacity
of some occ upational g roups to serve; crop-farmers in particular
might find a longer se ssion disadvantageous.
It must be
recognize d that the t raditional opening-date of Congress and the
state leg islatures was fixed at a time when agriculture was
the domina nt way of li fe.
Advocates o f limited s essions also maintain that other re forms
can be mad e to allevia te the need for lengthened sessions.
They main tain that if legislators were better prepared wh en they
arrived f o r the sessi on, they could accomplish more in l e ss
time. They contend t his goal can be accomplished by seve ral
steps.
I f legislators could introduce bills before the s ession
began, they could immediately begin business when they ar rived.
Also if a bill drafti ng service were provided, bills cou ld be
written in clear and co nstitutionally correct form so th e need
for amendment during the session would be reduced. The d rafting
service a lso could eli minate overlapping bills so the total
number of bills would b e reduced.
S i milarly, if legislative
counc ils were strengthe ned and interim work increased, th e
legis lators would be informed when the y arrived so they c ould
immed i a tely tackle important issues.
Proponents of limi ted
sessions also contend t h at a great deal of time could be saved
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and more work accomplished if each legislator had staff
assistance in the form of a secretary and research assistant.
In addition, if more powers were given to the state's political
subdivisions so they could handle their own problems, the
legislature's work load would be lightened and it could spend
more time on &tate issues. Advocates of limited sessions also
argue that much of the problem with the log jam of legislation
at the end of every session could be corrected by the legislature
incorporating a series of deadlines to spread the flow of
legislation throughout the entire session.
Unlimited Legislative Sessions
Proponents of unlimited sessions emphasize that because sessions
are unlimited does not mean they will continue indefinitely.
Unlimited sessions mean that the legislature will be the judge
of how much time it needs to give adequate consideration to
proposed laws. To the proposition that legislators procrastinate
if there are no limits on sessions, supporters of unlimited
sessions respond that in California and Colorado, annual
salaries have encouraged legislators to finish their work as
soon as possible. 12 } On this subject Dr. McGeary has written:
Contrary to the belief of some critics, state
legislators, especially in those states such
as Pennsylvania where they are paid on an annual
basis, are not interested in needlessly prolonging
a session. The average law maker wants to adjourn
as soon as the press of business reasonably allows.1 28
In addition, all the techniques which can help speed up the
legislative process in limited sessions (see earlier discussion)
also can be used to allow an unlimited session to finish its
business quickly. Advocates of unlimited sessions maintain the
legislature needs to determine the length of its own sessions
because the legislature and its laws suffer from trying to
work within a limit and because a fixed limit may not allow
the legislature to meet future needs.
Supporters of unlimited
sessions contend that toward the end of Montana's limited
session, the problem is to find enough time simply to process
each bill. This lack of time is readily illustrated by Joint
Rule 7-2 of the Montana legislature.
Under this rule, unless
good cause can be shown, a bill must be reported out of
committee within seven days after reference. The legislature
uses this rule because of time limitations; the fact it is
frequently waived by unanimous consent indicates that it is
impossible to work within the limitation. Montana has this
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rule at a time when most studies of legislative procedure
recommend rules which prevent hasty consideration of bills in
corranittee and which require several days' notice before bills
can be reported out. For example, The Council of State
Governments in its Key Points in Legislative Procedure: Twenty
Ways to Expedite the Legislative Process, makes the following
recommendation:
Final committee action upon a specific measure
should require adequate notice. The rules should
specify the minimum notice, e.g., "two legislative
days," and the manner of notice, e.g., "in the
Daily Calendar by bill number and sponsor."
It may
be necessary to provide for emergencies by requiring
an extraordinary majority of the committee to
consider a bill not meeting such notice requirements
and comment in the committee report on such a bill. 12 9
Studies also recommend that several days' notice be given before
committee hearings are held~ so citizens can have time to come
to the Capitol to testify.l~0
Opponents of the present sixty-day limitation question whether
it really allows a citizen legislature. They maintain that if
a legislature is a citizen legislature, it should be representative of all the people.
But under the present Montana
system, it can be contended that only a few classes of people
can afford to be legislators--retired people, insurance salesmen, ranchers and farmers who are not busy during the winter
months and professional people who have partners to carry on
the business while they are away. Meanwhile, many small
businessmen, teachers, white collar workers and laborers cannot
afford to run for the legislature. James Miller wrote in the
National Civic Review: "By conservative estimate at least 75
percent of our population that would otherwise be qualified to
serve cannot possibly afford to. 1 31 Opponents of the sixtyday limitation contend that willingness to make financial
sacrifices is not necessarily an adequate criterion by which
to select good legisla t ors. And even if it were an adequate
criterion, they question whether a farmer really sacrifices by
being in a legislature which meets in January and February.
The same question could be asked concerning teachers if the
legislature were to meet in July and August.
In other words,
any system chosen will have advantages for some groups and
disadvantages for others.
So advocates of unlimited sessions
ask:
"Would it not be better to have annual unlimited sessions
coupled with annual salaries, which would hold down the length
of the sessions, so that all the state's residents could compete
on equal footing for legislative seats?" On this question,
11
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John Burns , author of The Sometime Governments , observes :
I t is increasingly apparent that in today's society
a l eg i slature must be both "citizen" and "professional"-both close to the people and capable of coming to
grips with complex public problems. The same
qualities that make a legislature more "professional"-adequate salaries, skilled staff, enough time--make
it possible for a greater variety of the citizenry to
serve in the legislature, and thus make it more
"representative. 132
11

Proponents contend unlimited sessions would not be too expensive,
arguing that today in Montana the legislature costs less than
three-tenths of one percent of the state budget. And as Luce
argued earlier, there would be no increase in "unnecessary"
legislation because both limited and unlimited sessions must
produce the same amount of legislation if they are to equally
meet the demands of the state and its people.
Critics of limited sessions maintain that limited sessions
do not help the people and the press follow the legislature;
rather, they hold that limited sessions create confusion and
pressure and as a result, only the professional lobbyist with
a limited number of bills can effectively watch the flow of
legislation. Dr. Ellis Waldron of the University of Montana
writes:
Whatever the justification for a constitutional
60-day limit in 1889, its gross effect today is
to heighten the legislative advantage of organized special interests whose politics are a
daily preoccuption. Meanwhile broadly significant legislation in areas such as health, environmental control, education and community development suffer precisely because their base of
popular support, although broad, lacks organized
representation at the right time and in the right
places. The action is over in the short legislative session before spokesmen for these broad
interests can identify each other and get organized. This must always be the case in some measure,
but a 60-day measure is destructive of public
interest and effjctive representation under modern
circumstances.13
Advocates of unlimited sessions concede that many legislatur e s
could make better use of their time.
It is recognized that a
series of deadlines can modify the flow of legislation and,
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to some extent, minimize pressures at the end of the session.13 4
But charges that existing legislative time is wasted are only
questionably applicable to the Montana legislature, which in
recent years has striven in various ways to improve its
legislative procedure through pre-session bill drafting,
freshmen orientation sessions, organizational caucuses and
interim research.
Following Legislative Council studies, the
legislature has simplified its rules and procedures and streamlined its committee structure.
Advocates of unlimited sessions state that experience proves
that session restrictions have done nothing to improve legislative work.135 In fact, they contend, limited sessions have
done harm:
It seems incredible that men should have expected
from the curtailment of sessions any result other
than that which has actually followed.
Everywhere
it has pr~~uced bad work, slovenly, slipshod,
hurtful. 1
Most political scientists criticize time limits on legislative
sessions. The nation's foremost commentafj~s on the legislative
process call these limits "indefensible."
Jewell and
Patterson wrote in 1966:
The limitation is most frequently 60 days, occasionally less, and rarely over 90 days.
Such
limitations, often quite reasonable when they
were adopted, limit severely not only the
leg islature's opportunities for deliberation but
the effectiveness of its committees and the
ability of less senior members to develop experience and to become acquainted with legislative
norms. No single factor has a greater effect on
the legislative environment than the c~~~titutional
restriction on the length of sessions.
Robert Luce wrote in 1920:
Putting on a time limit is perhaps the most preposterous device men ever conceived for the remedy
of political ills . . . • If the adminstration of
justice became conspicuously defective, nobody
would risk his reputation for sanity by advising
that the courts should sit only from New Year's
Day to Easter . . . . In the ordinary affairs of
life when we find work is not being thoroughly
done, we demand that more time and thought and
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energy shall be put into the work. That is prec ise l y
what we should demand of men who undertake to
l e gislate for us.139
In he r 1954 study for the American Political Science Association ,
Dr. Ze ller wrote:
The restrictions on length of sessions are the real
reasons for bad legislation--not extended periods
of discussion. Certainly it would be impossib le to
say that legislation or the quality of legisl ators
has been improved by limiting the sessions.1 40
Supporters of unlimited sessions contend that if the experience
of the l a st 100 years recommends anything it wo u l d seem to be
that the legislature should have maximum flexibili ty to determine th e frequency and duration of its sessions. Luce writes
that if it is important that bad laws are not p as sed, it is
equally important that good laws be as good as po ssible.
He bel i e ved frequent and unlimited sessions were n ecessary
to achieve this goal, and posed the following exe r cise to those
questioni ng whether legislative sessions should be limited:
Refl ect on the difficulty of the lawmaker' s task
before meting out to him too savage condemnation.
By yourself take at random a single statute and
see how much study you would have to give i t before
you approved not only its main proposition b ut also
eve ry minute detail, every phrase, every word, yes,
every punctuation mark.
Then imagine yoursel f confron ted with 1360 such propositions and perhaps only
sixty days at your command. The chances ar e i n that
time you could not understandingly even read a ll the
bil ls introduced at one session of a legislature in
one of the larger States.
Do you think, the n, that
you could master them all? Do you think yo u could
find the existing law in each case, know how t he
change proposed would modify it, see clearly how far
the e ffect would reach, measure the evil t o be cured,
and d ecide whe t her the change would be wis e ? Try it.1 41
Harvey Wa lker observed that if the people are serious about
reforming and improving the state legislatures, t hey must
reflect their convictions through positive actio n, not mere
talk.
He wrote of sta t e legislatures:
If th ey are ever t o reach the heights of whi ch
they are capable, if our most able men and women
are t o find in legislation an attractive career,
publ ic confidence in legislatures must find
pract ical expression in law.142
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Special Sessions
Robert Luce has written:
"Whenever a Constitution blocks the
natural paths of community action, others will be sought, if
the occas ion is urgent." 1 ~ 3 This statement is especially true
of legis lators' need for more time to do their work, and is
readily illustrated by the great increase in the use of special
sessions across the nation.
In 1968-1969, twenty-four states
held thirty-eight special sessions.1 4 4 Because the sixty-day
sessions did not provide enough time for the legislature to
accomplish its work, the governor of Montana called special
sessions in 1967 and 1969 and two in 1971. A major problem
with the use of special sessions to provide more time is that
the practice makes the legislature appear incompetent. Many
people assume that the legislature has neglected its business,
forcing the governor to give it more time and money, when
actually it may well be impossible to do a good job in sixty
days. 14 ~
The same men who limited the legislatures to biennial sessions
foresaw the loophole provided by special sessions.
Tennessee
in its 1834 Constitution was the first state to limit special
session discussion to items specified by the governor:
"They
shall enter on no legis lative business ixcept that for which
they were especially called together."! 6 But this wording
proved too inflexible, so Nevada allowed the governor to add
topics of discussion during the session. Gradually many states
have swung back to the belief that legislators are competent
to judge when they need to go into session and what they need
to discuss.1 47 In 1868 Florida allowed its legislature to
discuss whatever topics both houses unanimously recommended,
and in 1885 changed the provision to a two-thirds vote of both
houses.1 48
Today nineteen states limit debate in special sessions to
subjects assigned by the governor.149 Of ten recently drafted
constitu tions, only Connec ticut and Michigan f;bow only the
governor to call sessions and set the agenda.
The other
eight constitutions also permit the legislature to call special
sessions . Four of these- -Alaska, Florida, Illinois and
Arkansas--limit debate in executive special sessions, but both
Florida and Arkansas permit a specified legislative vote to add
subjects of debate.1 5 l
The other four--Virginia, Hawaii, Idaho
and Maryland--limit debate in neither executive nor legislative
special sessions.152
These eight constitutions provide diverse methods for legislatures
to call themselves into special session. Alaska, Hawaii and
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Virginia permit their legislatures to meet at the request of
two-th irds of the memberships;l53 Arkansas' proposed Constitution
requires a request of three-fifths of the legislative membership.154
The new Illinois Constitution and the proposed Idaho Const itution
provide for continuous sessions, so their legislatures could
convene at any time.
However, the Illinois Constitution further
provides that the legislature may convene at the reques t of the
presiding officers of both houses, and the proposed Idaho
Constit ution states a majority of both houses may call a special
sess ion. 155 The proposed Maryland Constitution, like Illinois,
permits the presiding officers of both houses to call a special
session. 156 The Florida Constitution allows the legislature to
call special sessions as provided by law.157
Montana's legislature, along with twenty-six other state legislatures , cannot convene itself into special session and, along
with e ighteen others, can discuss only what the gover nor allows
it to. 1 5 8 Article V, Section 6 of the Montana Consti tution states:
The legislative assembly (except the first) shall
mee t at the seat of government at twelve o'clock
noon , on the first Monday of January, next succeeding the general election provided by law, and at
twelv e o'clock noon on the first Monday of Janu ary,
of each alternate year thereafter, and at other
times when convened by the governor.
Section 11 of Article VII reads:
He [the Governor] may on extraordinary occasions
co nvene the legislative assembly by proclamation,
stat ing the purposes for which it is convened, but
when so convened, it shall have no power to legislate on any subjects other than those specified in
the proclamation, or which may be recommended by
the governor, but may provide for the expenses of
the session and other matters incidental thereto.
He may al3o by proclamation convene the senate in
extraordinary session for the transaction of executive business.
All state constitutions permit the governor to call the
legislature into special session, and the wisdom of this is
not chal lenged.
However, many contend that the legi slature
also shou ld have this power. Under the separation of powers
and the check and balance doctrines, all three branc hes of
governmen t must be equal and independent so they are capable
of checking one another.
If the legislature cannot call
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itself into session and must rely solely upon the governor,
it can be argued that the legislature is not equal to or
independent of the other two branches of state government.
Twenty years ago, Harvey Walker in The Legislative Process
stated tha t there was no longer any justification for such
restrictions.
He believed that the legislature should be able
to call itself into session.
In regard to the legislature
being restric ted only to those subjects the governor allowed,
Walker stat ed:
Needless to say, there is no justification whatever
for the restriction of the subjects to be considered
at a special session to those named by the governor.
Let him make his suggestions, if he desires, but
leave the legisla tors free to consiggr such matters
as seem to them to require action.
John Burns, writing for the Citizens' Conference on State Legislatures , the body which evaluated the state legislature s and
ranked Montana forty-fi rst in terms of quality, wrote in 1971:
The legislature should also have the power to call
itself into speci al session by a decision of the
presiding office rs, or by a majority decision of
its members.
Bo th of these alternatives should,
in fact, be open to it. The legislature should
also be able, by the vote of a simple majority, to
expand its agenda during any special session called
by the governor.16 0
He cited a recent experi ence of the Missouri legislature as
an example of the need for such a provision.
In 1969 a bill
which granted greater freedom to local governments was
approved by the necess ary house and senate committees and had
passed the house but not the senate before the legislature
was forced to adjourn.
The bill was sorely needed by the
cities of Missouri and had received no opposition in either
house. That spring the governor called a special session but
refused to include the bill in the agenda; thus, a badly
needed bill which had no opposition had to wait eighteen
months before being pas sed.161
The Illino is provision for special sessions resembles what
Burns proposes:
The Governor may convene the General Assembly or
the Senate alone in special session by a proclamation stating the purpose of the session; and only
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bus ines s encompassed by such purpose , t o gether
with a ny impeachments or con f i r mation of a p pointments s hall be transacted.
Special sessions of
t h e General Assembly may als o be convened by joint
p roc l amation of the presiding officers of both
houses, issued as provided by law.162
Harvey Walk e r wondered why people feared to give the state
legislatures more freedom to decide their own affairs when
they thought nothing of giving such privileges to cities and
towns.
He observed:
City councils fortunately possess the freedom
of action which state legislatures lack. They
hold continuous sessions, never adjourning sine
die and never having to concern themselves with
special session. There are special meetings,
but the council itself calls them and determines
what shall be considered.
If those who fear
greater liberty for state legislatures would
only look at the city councils as an example of
what can safely be done in a democracy, they
would admit that there is little to fear.
It
is only fair to point out in passing that there
are many ~ities in the United States with larger
populations than many of the states.
It is not
uncommon for a large city to have a budget large~
than that of the state in which it is located. 16
Montana Experiences With Session Reform
Mon t a n a leg islators first proposed constitutional amendments
creating split sessions in 1933 and budget sessions in 1965.
In almost every legislature since 1933, lawmakers have
proposed amendments to alter Montana's legislative sessions.1 64
The reason for the interest is apparent: in sixty years--since
1911--only six legislatures have be en able to complete their
business in sixty days Jthe legislatures of (1913, 1915, 1939,
1941, 1945 and 1947).16
Increasingly Montana citizens have
become aware of the problem, and t heir awareness has been
reflected in the actions of the leg islatur e and the formation
of citizens' groups. For example, i n 1966 the Montana Legislative Council recommended that th e legislature adopt budget
sessionsl66 and the Montana-Idaho Assembly on State Legislatures
recommended that the restrictions on legislative sess i ons be
removed. The Assembly stated i n its first recommendation :
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(C]onstitutional restrictions on the length of
legislative sessions should be removed and that
legislatures should be free to determine the
frequency and length of legislative sessions.167
In 1967, the Montana Citizens Committee on the State Legislature in its Re ort to the Fortieth Le islative Assernbl of
the State of Montana recommen e a option o annua sessions.
The question of session reform had become imperative that year.
Until 1967 the legislature had used the device popularly known
as "stopping the clock" to evade the time limit and to
complete its work.
In Standard Oil Co. v. The State Board of
Equalization, 168 the Montana Supreme Court had ruled it would
go no further than the legislative journal in challenging
legislation; therefore, it became the practice of the legislature
to ''stop the clock" on the sixieth day so all the journal
entries made during the succeeding days appeared under the date
of the last legitimate day of the session. This device had
been commonly used since the early 1920s. The Citizens'
Committee report of 1967 stated:
One veteran legislator remarked that a session
usually extends from one to five days beyond
the constitutional maximum.
Because legislators
are not paid after the 60th day, they usually
cannot afford to stay for more than five extra
days. After the fifth day, according to this
legislator, it is impossible to obtain a quorum:
"The legislative shop closes even though the
states' business is not finished. 169
11

In 1967 several legislators became tired of the subterfuge of
stopping the clock and threatened to enter the real date into
the journal, an act which probably would have invalidated all
the business undertaken after the sixtieth day.
Under that
threat, the governor called special sessions in 1967 and 1969
and two in 1971 to enable the legislature to finish its business.
In immediate response to not being able to stop the clock, the
legislature in 1968 offered a constitutional amendment creating
eighty-day biennial sessions. The proposal had no organized
support, b~~ organized opposition defeated the measure 132,153
0 That same year, the Montana Citizens Committee
to 92,093.
on the State Legislature published another report recommending
annual sessions.171 During the 1969 and 1971 legislatures,
legislators proposed amendments creating budget and annual sessions,
but none was passed.
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LEGISLATIVE CONTINUITY
In a legislature there is a need for continuity. Without
cont inuity, committee investigations and research ass e s s i ng
new trends in lawmaking would stop at the end of each session,
forcing an uninformed legislature to meet at the next session;
many b ills and resolutions that did not complete the legislative
process in the last annual session would have to be re-introduced
and p r o cessed, causing the legislature to needles s ly repeat
itself a nd depriving it of time it could spend on other labors.
As mentioned previously, altering the length and fr equency of
sessions could give the legislature more time and continuity.
Legislative continuity also can be provided in th ree other
ways: by lengthing and perhaps staggering the terms of office
(discuss ed in Chapter IV); by creating a legislat ive council,
and by p roviding interim committees.
Both leg islative councils and interim committees a r e devices
to give continuity to the research activities of t h e legislature.
Professor Albert Sturm has defined legislative councils as
permanent, bi-partisan, joint legislative research
committees that meet periodically between se ss i ons to
consider problems expected to confront the l e g islature
at its next session. With few exceptions, they are
composed of legislators, and usually they h a v e permanent
res earch staffs. Their activities include the development
of comprehensive, impartial analyses of public issues,
wh i c h provide legislators sound, factual base s for
de liberation and decision, thus facilitating more intellig ent policy-making.
In many states, activiti es of the
leg islative council are co-ordinated with othe r types of
serv ice functions, notably bill drafting and l egislative
refe rence.
In short, the legislative council provides
the organizational framework for research and technical
services essential for modern lawmaking.172
Montana' s Legislative Council is composed of twelve legislators,
six from each house and six from each party. Th e council forms
subcommittees to undertake the research projects r equested by
the legi slature. These subcommittees--called interim committees
in Montana--are created and sponsored by the council and use
its research staff and r es ources.
Each subcommittee is composed
of legisl ators and chaired by one of the twelve c ouncil members.
In some states the legislature's standing committees and subcommittees simply continue to exist as interim committees after
the leg islature has adjourned.
Several large states, including
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New York a n d Californi a, which can af ford research staff fo r
each comm i t tee, use t his system of interim committees.1 73 In
other states, interim committees are created by the legisla ture
to investigate parti cular problems or new deveiopments during
the interim.
Because they are not as permanent as a council,
they lack the council' s continuous, planned approach to solving
legislati v e problems, and they find it difficult to hire
experienced staff to perform research.174 Interim committees
often are u s ed by sta tes in conjunction with legislative counc ils,
thus addi n g another r esearch tool to the legislature.
In terim
committees are partic ularly active in states where the legi slative cou ncils canno t make recommendations.175 However, s o me
states (fo r example, California, Hawaii, New York and Oregon)
which use i nterim c ommittees d o not have legislative counc ils . 1 76
Under its p resent s y stem, Monta na does not have independent
interim committees; they are subcommittees of the legisla t i ve
council.
Most consti tutions do not specifically provide for interim
committees and legisl ative councils, and it usually is conte nded
th a t they s hould be p rovided for by statutory, rather than
constitu t i onal langu a g e.
Most states have recognized that the
legislature needs to perform research and conduct investiga t i o ns
during t h e interim be tween sessions and have assumed that the
l e gislature has the inherent power to do so.177 However,
Montana Qro v e d to b e an exception in 1954.
In Mitchell v.
Holmes,1 7 8 the Montana Supreme Court declared the act establi shi ng
the first Montana Leg islative Council unconstitutional. Accor di ng
to the court, the act violated the doctrine of separation of
powers i n Article IV a nd the session limitation in Article V,
Section 5.
In discus sing the violati o n of Article IV, th e c ourt
wrote:
The Act permits the legislative department, through
this council, to exercise powers of investigation
properly belongi ng to the executive and judicial
dep artments of th e state government.
It permits the
legislative depar tment, through t his council, to
exercise powers of the judicial d epartment by giving
such council the p ower to "compe l the attendance of
wit nesses before i ts h e arings and req uire the prod u c tion of papers, documents or oth er evidence re~~~red
by it, and to issu e subpoenas f or such p urposes. "
In arguing that the Leg islative Counc i l a ct transgressed the
Const itution's sixty-day biennial ses sion lim itat i on, the
court wrote:
It is clear from a reading of t h e Ac t t hat the
duties of the proposed council are t h e same as
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t hose performed by members and comm i tte e s of the
r egul ar legislative assembly d u ring a regular
60 -day s~ssion, with the excep tion o f finally
enact ing p roposed measures in t o law.
The int ent and purpose of thi s Act is to permit
the l e g islative assembly to p erform duties and
exerci s e powers , acting through but eight of its
members, over a period of more than two years,
which the Constitution permits only to be performed
and exercised by a duly organized legislative
assembly over a 60-day perioa . 180
In 1957 the Montana Court reversed itself in State v. Aronson . 181
The court quoted a California decision to refute the contention
that a second act establishing a council violated the separation
of powers doctrine:
The separation of powers doctrine does not require
that we classify these incidental governmental duties,
and that we thereafter limit such activity to the
particular branch of the government first selected . .
Intelligent legislation upon the complicated problems
of modern society is impossible in the absence of
accurate information on the part of the legislators
and any reasonable procedure for securing such
information is proper.182
Arguing that the legislature could work during the interim, the
court stated that interim committees had been used nationally
since the Civil War. 183 In an attempt to show the irrationality
of the prior decision, the court extended its logic to
administrative agencies:
[V]arious administrative boards, commissions, and
bodies in this state and throughout the nation, both
state and federal, have been delegated authority by
law to establish rules and reg ulations for the
conduct of their functions.
These rules and regulations
have the force of law, and it would be a strange
situation indeed to say that i n Montana a rule and
regulation passed by an adminstrative board having the
force of law is the exercise of the legislative
function, and therefore not valid because done in the
interim period between legislative sessions.18 4
The court could find no decision e x cep t Mitchell v. Holmes
which denied the legislature the " power t o c r eate by s ta t u te
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a committee to serve in the interim between sessions of the
assembly."
It wrote:
"[O]n the contrary, all courts have
uniformly held that the investigative power exists in the
legislative branch which may be exercised after final adjournment as well as during the session. 185
11

Interim committees have been challenged on similar grounds, but
the "courts have generally found these objections to be outweighed by the need for interim investigatory powers and by
the inability of interim coxrw~ttees or legislative councils to
actually pass legislation."
To insure that a fu t ure court cannot cripple legislative
councils and interim committees as happened in Montana, many
recent constitutions specifically allow the legislature to
undertake interim work.
The two most pervasive examples are
Article IV, Section Sa of the Illinois Constitution and Article
IV, Section 11 of the proposed Idaho Constitution, which
provide for continuous sessions. Continuous sessions enable
the legislature to have committees and subcommittees meet
throughout the biennium. The Illinois provision reads:
"The
General Assembly shall be a continuous body during the term
for which members of the House of Representatives are elected. 187
11

The constitutions of Alaska, Michigan and Missouri specifically
provide for legislative councils.1 8 8 The Alaska provision
[Art. II, Sec. 11) is typical:
There shall be a legislative council and t~e
legislature may establish other interim committees.
The council and other interim committees may meet
between legislative sessions. They may perform
duties and employ personnel as provided by the
legislature. Their members may receive an allowance
for expenses while performing their duties.
The Constitution of Virginia and the draft constitutions of
Arkansas and Maryland have more general provisions. Article IV,
Section 7 of the Virginia Constitution reads in part:
"The
houses may jointly provide for legislative continuity between
sessions occuring during the term for which memhers of the
House of Delegates are elected." The draft provisions of the
Arkansas Constitution reads:
"Interim committees of the General
Assembly, including a legislative council and other joint
committees, may be established."189 The Maryland draft provision
states that t he legislature "may permit its committees and
subcommittees to meet between sessions of the General Assembly."190
As well as conti n uity of research, continuous sessions provide
a means for continuity of org anization and procedure between
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annual sessions and regular and special sessions during a
legislative biennium.
If continuous sessions are coupled with
annua l salaries as recommended by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, 191 legislators would be encouraged
to quickly accomplish their business.19 2 It is contended that
continuous sessions would enable the legislature to rapidly
finish its work and adjourn until needed, at which time it
could quickly assemble, accomplish its work and adjourn again.
No time would be lost selecting officers, staff rules and
procedures. Continuity, to a lesser degree, also can be
provided in non-continuous sessions; the constitutions of
Michigan and Pawaii, for example, specifically allow the legislature to carry unfinished bills over from the firs t to the
second annual sessions. 193 Virginia's Article IV, Section 7
appears to allow the legislature to provide for this by
statute.
Presently the Montana Legislative Council provides continuity
to the legislature's research.
However, the Montana legislature
lacks continuity in organization and procedure.
If the legislature is unable to finish its work in sixty days and has to
conduct a special session to finish its business, it has to
re-organi ze and re-introduce the bills it was unable to completely process. Paradoxically, this lack of conti nuity deprives
the legislature of more time and keeps it in sessio n longer.
LEGISLATIVE SIZE
American lawmaking bodies were instituted and have
developed without any approach to uniformity in the
matter of size. No theory, no principle, no rul e,
can be deduced from the figures.
Haphazard at the
sta rt, they have since shown nothing more than
tendencie8.194
The one exception to that statement might be that state senates
always are smaller than the lower houses. And there are two
prominen t trends:
1. Until this last decade, state legislatures, like the
United States Congress, had tended to increase in size because
it was much easier in periodic reapportionment to add members
than to reduce an area's representation.
2. Reformers for years have advocated the paring of
legisla tive membership.l95
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The general trend--until recently--of growth in legislative
membership is shown by the fact that the total number of state
representatives in the nation increased from 5,634 in 1943 to
5,913 in 1963.
In the same period, the number of state senators
increased from 1,820 to 1,913. In the last eight years, the
number of representatives decreased to 5,618, but the number
of senator s increased to 1,976, so the two trends almost canceled
each other.
No order or pattern is readily apparent in the
changes in size which took place during these eight years:
eleven states decrea sP.d and six states increased the number of
representat ives; fift~ en states increased the size of their
senates and only four decreased the size.1 96 However, there
may be a trend in the way states are responding to the "one-man,
one-vote'' reapportionment standards.
Like Mon~ana, they may
be using the same distric ts for both chambers--either combining
them for upper house representation, or dividing upper house
districts to give lower house representation.
There are several ways a state constitution can deal with the
size of the legislature. Some states (California, for example)
set a specific numbe r for the legislative membership in their
constitutions .
In California, reapportionment of the house
is accomplis hed by dividing the state into eighty districts with
one represen tative from each district. The same process is used
in the senate, for which there are forty districts. Therefore~
the Californi a legisl ature is always composed cf 120 members.1~ 7
In the sa~e way, Hawa ii has a senate of twenty-five and a house
of fifty-one ; Alaska has twenty senators and forty representatives.198 Other states, like Connecticut and Virginia, constitutionally set maximum and minimum limits for their legislatures.
For examp le, Connecti cut sets a range of thirty to fifty
members for its senate and 125 to 225 for its house; Virginia
sets limits of thirty -three to forty for its senate and ninety
to 100 for its house. 199 The National Municipal League's Model
State Constit ution endors es this kind of provision. 200 This
technique may have an advantage in allowing the legislature
or the ap portionment agency some flexibility in achieving a
narrow percenta9e popul ation variance between districts. The
other al ternative, used by many states like Montana, Nevada and
New Jers ey, is to leave the matter of size to the legislature
itself.2 0l
Article V, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution provides:
"The
legislative assembly of this state, until otherwise provided by
law, shall consist of sixteen members of the senate, and fiftyfive members of the hou se of representatives." 'l'he membership
of the legislative assemb ly had grown in size from the original
seventy-one members to 159 in 1970.
In 1971, the legislature
reduced its membership to 150, cutting the senate from fiftyfive to fifty and the ho use from 104 to 100.
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Advocates of large legislative bodies maintain that only a
large house represents the diverse views of the electorate ,
that a large legislature is hard to influence or corrupt and
that it is a great educator.
A large legislature acquaints a
large number of people with the legislative process; they, in
turn, diffuse this knowledge among an even larger number of
people.
A la~ge legislature also assures there will be ample
legislators for committee work.
Proponents of larger size
stress that a large house moves more slowly than a smaller
one; thus, there is less chance for hasty change.202
On the other han~ it sometimes is urged that large legislatures
are inefficient. 63 The Montana Citizens Committee on the State
Legislature observed:
"If it [the legislature] is too large,
it becomes cumbrous and forfeits its meaning and purpose.
In
its bigness, it becomes unwieldy and impairs its own motion
and action.
It enmeshes itself in its own numbers."204 Other
critics believe tha~ debate and deliberation are impossible
in a large house. 2
Compromise is said to be more difficult
because it is much harder to retreat "before hundreds than before
tens. 11206 Critics also believe that large bodies are more
easily controlled by a few, a belief based on the political
maxim stated in the Federalists Papers: "in all legislative
assemblies, the greater the number composing them may be, the
fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. 11207

°

Critics of a large legislature maintain that in a small chamber
the actions of the lawmakers can be easily seen, so they are
more accountable.
Also it is said that" [p]arty spirit is
mitigated by friendly relations" and fewer bills are introduced. 208
T~e~ also argue that membership in a small house is more prestigious.20~
Proponents of large legislatures reply that too much power is
invested in members of small houses.
A member's vote has more
weight, so he can more readily kill good laws and pass bad
legislation. 210
In 1968 when Montana was the forty-first state in the nation in
population and had the twentieth largest state legislature, the
Montana Citizens Committee on the State Legislature recommended
that the Montana !Igislature be trimmed to approximately half
its 159 members. 2
Nationally, the National Municipal League
in its Model State Constitution asse ts that most states have
larger legislatures than they need. 2 2

1

In evaluating recommendations aimed at an "average" state, like
that of the League, it should be recognized that ideal size is
a product of several factors.
For example, if Montana had the
national average of constituents per member, the senate would
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have only eight members and the house twenty.
If the Montana
house were half its present size (50), some single-member
districts would comprise at least five counties.
In large
districts, many counties of small population would have to
be attached to larger population centers which might dominate
the entire district. Most would agree that a legislative
chamber should have enough members to fill committee assignments;
to retain the people's sense of being represen~ed; to keep
districts of reasonable geographic size in the less populous
areas of the state, and to allow representation of rural areas
and urban minorities.
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CHAPTER I V
LEGISLATORS

QUALIFICATIONS
American state constitutions traditiona lly have enumerated the
qualifications which legislators must meet.
In the beginning
they covered such a wide range of subjects as wisdom, property
ownership, religious denomination, age, residence and citizenship.
Besides excluding poor men and clerics, the early
constitutions often were optimistic about who would be elected.
Luce wrote:
William Penn set forth in his Frame of Government
of 1682 that "seventy-two persons of most note for
their wisdom, virtue, and ability" should be chosen.
When Pennsylvania came to make her Constitution of
1776 this was shortened into "persons most noted
for wi sdom and virtue" from which it may or may not
be inferred that there was despair of getting persons
of ability.
Even the hope of wisdom aod virtue is
not found in the Constitution of 1790. 1
Vermont is one of the few states today which has a statement
similar to that of William Penn:
"The House of Representa tives
of the freemen of this State ~hall consist of persons most
noted for wisdom and virtue."
Other states have dropped such
requirements along with property, religious and sex require ments, and retain only qualifications like age, residenc e and
citizenship, and disqualifications like mental incompetence
and criminal records.
Today, the state const~tutions generally
allow all qualified voters to run for office.
All states directly impose an age qualification for legislative
candidates or indirectly imply one by requiring the candidate
to be a qualif ied voter of the state. Th e most common requirement is 21 for the lower house; most states specifically require
it or imply it by requiring the age of majority or the age of
a qualified voter. Thus, the minimum age for a member of the
lower house is subject to change in some states since the
nation passed the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the federal
Constitution lowering the voting age to 18.
Of the other states, one requires it s representatives to be
22 (Idaho); three req uire them to be 24 (Delaware, Kentucky
and Missouri), and five require th em to be 25 (Arizona, Colorado,
Hawaii, South Dakota and Utah).
Many states also demand that
their senators be 21 years old or simply require them to be
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qualified voters of the state.
However, the most common age
limitation for senators is 25, which twenty-three states
require. Other states set limits of 24 (Montana), 26 (Texas)
and 27 (Delaware): seven set limits of 30 (Hawaii, Kentucky,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee and Vermont). 4
Most states also have United States citizenship and state or
district residence requirements. A few states require a
specific length of United States citizenship: Maine with five
years is the most stringent. 5 Louisiana has the most extreme
residence provision, requiring a legislative candidate to
have lived in the state for five years and in his district for
two years.6
Montana's constitutional provisions are typical. Article IX,
Section 11 of the Montana Constitution states that all qualified
voters are eligible for office. According to Section 2 of
that article (as affected by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the
federal Constitution), a voter or candidate for office must be
at least 18 years old, and a citizen of the United States who
has lived in Montana for a year and who is not a felon.
Section
3 of Article V further requires a representative to be at least
21 and a senator to be at least 24, and both to have lived in
the county or district they represent for at least one year.
The Montana residence requirements are lower than those of four
of the seven constitutions adopted since 1959--Alaska, Florida,
Hawaii and Illinois7--and higher than three of these constitutions-Connecticut, Michigan and Virginia.a The states with lower
requirements simply demand that the candidate live in the district
or be a qualified voter of the district. Of the recent constitutions, all but Alaska have lower age requirements. A senator
in Alaska must be 25 years old, 9 but in the other states, members
of both hyuses simply have to be 21, or, in Hawaii, the age of
majority. O
DUAL OFFICEHOLDING
Early in the hjstory of representative government, the people
realized that a man who owed his livelihood to the king or
to the government's chief executive was a poor choice to
represent their interests against the king or executive. They
also discovered that the chief executive wielded great power
and influence by his ability to grant offices and pensions:
he could manipulate votes by granting favors and by making
legislators monetarily dependent upon him.
As a result, dual
officeholding prohibitions developed to insure the independence
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of the representatives. 11 All of this experience was supporting
e vidence for Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers,
whi ch maintained that the three branches of government--the
executive, the legislature and the judiciary--should be kept
s e parate. With Montesquieu's doctrine in the forefront and
wi t h their own experience with the Royal Governors, almo s t all
Amer ican states incorporated dual officeholding prohib itio ns
i nto their constitutions. 12 These prohibitions were aime d a t
two major problems: the appointment of a member of the leg is l at ure to a civil office in another branch of the governmen t
and t he election of an officeholder to the legislatur e.
Appointment of a Legislator to Another Civil Offi ce
Reca ll i ng their experience under the Royal Governors, the states
did not want their legislators to become "governor's men," so
led by South Carolina they prohibited legislators fr o m accepting
addit i o nal offices. They did not prohibit the gove rnor from
appoint ing legislators to other offices; the legi s l ators simply
had to give up their seats to accept them. The i ssue, however ,
became more complicated during the federal Conven tion when the
delegates considered the bi a s that might be created by the
mere pros pect of receiving an office from the Pre sident or the
Congres s itself. The d e bate revolved around wheth er the
lawma k e rs should be ineligible to accept all office s established
during their terms or in e ligible to accept all offic es under
the fe deral government. The delegates decided in fav or of making
the legislators ineligible only to those offices cr eated or
increas ed (in salary or benefits) during their term. 13 Article I ,
Section 6 of the United S t ates Constitution reads:
No senator or representative shall, during the t ime for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office
un der the authority of the United States, whi c h shall
have been created, or the emoluments thereof sha ll have
b een increased, during such time.
Acco r d ing to Luce, five-sixths of the states have gen eral dual
officeholding prohibitions, most of which are simi lar to the
federa l provision. A few of the other states have f ollowed the
more severe example set by Georgia in 1796, prohibit ing the
appoin tment of legislators to any office during thei r t e rm.1 4
The Mon tana provision falls into the last category. Art i cle V,
Section 7 of the Montana Constitution reads:
"No sen ator or
represe ntative shall, during the term for which he s ha l l have
been elec ted, be appointed to any civil office un de r the state."
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The Montana provision is very string ent. The Montana Supreme
Court decided in 42nd Legislative Assembly v. LennonlS that a
legislator cannot resign his seat to accept another office.
The courts also have at least implied that the word "appointed"
encompasses elected, so legislators cannot resign their seats
and run for another office. 'l'he provision's ambiguity forces
the courts to decide who is a state officer and who is a state
employee.16 Prior to the Lennon decision in 1971, many legislators sought or held state office during their legislative
terms and many local officials, such as mayors, sat in the
legislature.
None of the constitutions adopted since 1959 has a provision
as harsh as Montana's. They generally only prohibit legislators
from assuming appointive (not elective) offices or offices
created or increased during their term.
Michigan and Connecticut forbid their legislator' to accept any state appointive
offices during their terms. 1
Alaska forbids legislators,
during their term and for one year afterwards, to be appointed,
nominated or elected to any office created or increased during
their term. The Alaska provision also provides, however, that
legislators may run for governor or secretary of state, and may
accept employment with or election to a constitutional convention.18
Hawaii forbids legislato rs to be appointed or elected to any
office created or increased during their term of office.1 9 The
Illinois Constitution states that legislators cannot be appointed
to any office created or increased during their term.20 Virginia
simply prohibits the legislature from electing one of its members
to an office:21 Florida has no dual officeholding provision.
The Election of Officeholders to the Legislature
Most states also incorpor ate prohibitions against the election
of officeholders to the legislature, a situation they believe
could create a conflict of interest or place too much power in
the hands of one man. The provisions forbid the holding of more
than one office at a time and stress that no federal officer is
to sit in the state legisl ature.
However, like the constitutional
provisions against the appointment of legislators to office,
these provisions usually allow the officeholder to resign his
post and then to sit in the legislature. The Montana provision,
Article V, Section 7, is typical:
"No member of congress, or
other person holding an office (except notary public, or in the
militia) under the United States or this state, shall be a
member of either house during his continuance in office."
Connecticut and Michigan have provisions similar to Montana's:
~ichigan, however, specifi cally extends the prohibition to the
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officers of the state's political subdivisions.22 Virginia also
has a provision similar to Montana's, but enumerates many of
the offices whi ch are affected. 23 The Alaska Constitution states
that no legisla tor may hold any other office or position of
profit under the state or federal government, and the Hawaii
Constitution applies the same prohibition only to offices of
the state.2 4 The Illinois Constitution merely prohibits the
officeholder from receiving salary from his office for the time
he spends with the legislature:
"No member of the General
Assembly shall receive compensation as a public officer or
employee from any other governmental entity for time during
which he is in attendance as a member of the General Assembly."25
Florida has no dual office provision.
Most past and contemporary constitutional authorities agr ee
that dual officeholding articles are of little practical value
in constitutions:
"the sweeping exclusion of lawmakers from
eligibility to other offices during their terms is a matter of
doubtful expediency. 1126 In his Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States, Justice Joseph Story, one of America's
first great constitutional authorities, wrote in 1833:
"A
dishonorable traffic in votes . . • would never be restrained
by the slight network of any constitutional provisions of this
sort.'' After reviewing the history of state governments, Story
felt that the absence of such a provision had made no state
"less pure or less intelligent," or that the existence of one
had prevented "one rash measure or introduced one salutary
scruple into the elements of popular or party strife. 2 7 He
observed:
11

History, which teaches us by examples, established
the truth beyond all reasonable question, that genu ine
patrioti sm is too lofty in its honor, and too
enlightened in its object, to need such checks; and
that weakness and vice, the turbulence of faction
and the meanness of avarice, are easily bought,
notwithst anding all the efforts to fetter or ensnare
them. 28
Luce believed that the evils dual office prohibitions were
supposed to prevent were overstated :
"it is probable that there
has been far less ground for their fears than critics would have
us think, and that their prohibitions have been of slight practical usefulness." He agreed that man must always protect
himself from his baser desires, but he believed that the ultimate
decision to incorporate restrictions within a constitution rests
upon whether they do more good than harm. Luce argued that dual
officeholding restrictions had become a source of many problems. 29
Frank P. Grad, a constitutional adviser to the Illinois Constitutional Conventio n , recommended in 1969:
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[T]he prohibition on dual office holding, while
clearly well-intentioned, should be left to
legislation which could more adequately and
flexibly deal with the line drawing that is here
involved.30
LEGISLATIVE TERMS
The election of legislators for a fixed period of time, such
as two or four years, originated in America. 31 In this country,
a legislature or a congress has a predetermined life set by
a written constitution.
In England, when the American colonies
and states developed, the length of Parliament's sessions and
its members' terms were not fixed.
The king could dissolve
Parliament and issue writs for a new one whenever he wished.
Thus, the king could dissolve a Parliament of an independent
nature and continue the life of a docile one, such as the
Parliament under Charles II which lasted nearly eighteen years.3 2
In fact when the states were forming, Parliament was governed
by the Septennial Act which stated that no Parliament could
last longer than seven years. During the colonial period, the
American legislatures and the Royal Governors constantly battled
over this subject. The Royal Governors believed that to be
compelled by an agreement to hold frequent elections was an
infringement upon their prerogatives, while the colonists believed
that not to have such a guarantee was an infringement of their
liberties and rights.
Despite the Royal Governors, most of
the New England colonies won the right to annual elections
(legislative terms of one year). When the colonies became
states, all but South Carolina incorporated into thei5 constitutions this New England safeguard against "slavery." 3
In support of frequent and fixed elections, John Adams wrote:
That the representatives may often mix with their
constituents, and frequently render them an account
of their ~tewardship, elections ought to be frequent:
"Like bubbles on the sea of matter borne,
they rise, they break, and to that sea
return."
Adans stated a maxim that was to become the cry voiced whenever
anyone proposed the lengthing of legislative terms:
These elections may be septennial or triennial; but
for my part, I think they ought to be annual; for
there is not in all science a maxim more infallible
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than this, where annual elections end, there
slavery begins.34
The states held annual elections under the Articles of Confederation, but in the federal Convention of 1787, the delegates went
to biennial elections in the hope they would create a more
successful government than the one which existed under the
Confederation. The Federalist Papers devoted Numbers 51 and
52 to arguments for biennial elections as "neither too frequent
nor too rare;" it was said that more time was needed to frame
federal legislation than state l~~islation and thus that annual
elections would be too frequent.
Despite the federal lead,
however, a majority of the states retained annual elections until
the 1830s when the legislatures began to become discredited in
the public eye. During this period the move to biennial elections
increased dramatically.
Montana entered the union with two-year terms for its representatives, staggered four-year terms for its senators and biennial
legislative elections. Article V, Section 2 of the Montana
Constitution reads:
"Senators shall be elected for the term of
four years, and representatives for the term of two years, except
as otherwise provided in this constitution."
Today no state holds annual legislative elections. Massachusetts
held annual elections from 1642 until 1918 when it went to
biennial elections. 36 In twelve states, senators and representatives alike hold two-year terms and in four states they both
hold four-year terms. The members of Nebraska's unicameral
legislature serve four-year -terms. By far the most common scheme,
however, is to have representatives serve for two years and
senators for four years. Thirty-three states use this approach
(see Table 1).37
In most of the thirty-three states of the last category, the
senators serve four-year terms staggered so that some seats are
up for election every two years. Overlapping senate terms in
effect create a continuous body.
Another variance in legislative terms recently has developed in
response to the "one man, one vote" ruling and the need to reapportion state legislatures at least every ten years.
Illinois
and New Jersey have used a combination of two- and four-year
senatorial terms to allow all legislative seats to come before
the voters after each decennial reapportionment.
New Jersey
provides that all senators are elected to two-year terms
immediately after each decennial reapportionment and then to
two four-year terms.
Illinois provides for staggered terms,
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TJ\BLE I
STATE LEGI SLATIVE TERMS

TERMS

STATES

Two-year term, b o th
chambers (12)

Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia,
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Vermont

Two-year House term
and four-year
Senate term (33)

Alaska, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Delawa e Florida(a),
Hawaii, Illinois a 1, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missour~, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey a), New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming

Four-year term, both
chambers (4)

Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland,

1

ain some years, senators serve two-year terms.
Source:
Council of State Governments, American State Legislatures:
Their Structure and Procedure s (Lexington, 1971), p. 39.

-106-

LEGISLATORS

making the process more involved. The legislature divides a ll
t he legislative districts into three groups. The senato r s o f
the first group are elected to terms of two, four and f o ur
y ears; the senators of the second group are elected to terms of
four, four and two years; and the senators of the last g r oup
a re elected to terms of four, two and four years.38
The subject of legislative terms is not very controversial today,
although several states have attempted to lengthen the terms
of t heir legislators.
Since 1961, the terms of senators have
been increased from two to four years in Michigan, Nebraska and
Tennes see; similar attempts failed in Georgia, Idaho and New
York. Attempts to increase senatorial terms to six y ears
fail ed in Kentucky and Oklahoma. Attempts to incre ase the terms
of t he lower house from two to four years were reje cted in
Flori d a , Georgia, Kentucky, New York, Oklahoma and Texas. 3 9
The major argument for longer terms is that they woul d lessen
the t urnover in the legislature. That would allow members to
acq ui r e more experience and perform their work more efficiently.
Propone nts of longer terms suggest that it always t a k es at
leas t o ne session to understand the legislative process. 40 They
say shor t terms "impair the right of the people t o full representation because a legii!ator's effectiveness is reduced by
his lack of experience ."
In oppo sition to longer terms, we are reminded that "the
l egis lative task is not just getting things don3--i t is also
represe nting the people. 1142 Advocates of short leg islative
terms be lieve that frequent elections are needed to insure that
legi sl a tors are responsive to the will and needs o f the people.
They a ssert that the concepts of representative gove rnment and
popu l a r sovereignty re s t on the ability of the peopl e to remove
and r e place unresponsive representatives.
If the p eople have
no control over their representatives for a long pe riod of time,
then the representatives can ignore and act against the will of
the p e o ple. Advocates of short terms modify John Adams' maxim
to say "where frequent elections end, tyranny begins. " They
also a ssert that i f annual sessions were adopted, the argument
for l o nger terms would be weakened because a ne\1 lawmaker would
serve in two sessions each biennium.
In reply to arguments that t he voice of the people should be
heard t hrough frequent e l e ctions, advocates of longe r terms
assert t hat this is not a s crucial as it used to be. They suggest tha t since pub l i c o pinion is registered much f aster today
than in the past through vastly improved communications facilities, t he frequency of elections is no longer "so crucial
especi a l ly because the opposing considerations [leg islative
exper i e nce and the co s t a n d disruption of frequent elections]
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have become more important as the public opinion problem has
become less important. 43
11

Advocates of short legislative terms reply by asking:
How can
public opinion ever be less important? And how can improved
communications make a representative who is protected by a long
term more responsive to the will of the people?
Proponents of longer terms also assert that frequent elections
place an undue financial burden upon legislative candidates and
that campaigning disrupts the legislature and distracts the
legislator's attention from his work.44 Before development of
television and multi-media campaigning, Luce wrote:
It is true elections cost only half as much if held
only half as often.
It is also true that elections
disturb the placid repose of society, or at any rate
divert men from customary occupations.
Neither of
these arguments ought to be deemed relatively of
importance.
If government is our most serious concern,
then money and thought and time and eneris can be
expended on nothing of more consequence.
Of the arguments that frequent elections are "troublesome,"
Luce observed:
It is amusing, and it is sad, to see the complaint
of too much politics go hand in hand with the
complaint of misgovernment. What illogical creatures
we are! We scold our legislators because they don't
come up to our expectations, and then we scold because
we are asked to do anything about it. We want
automatic righteousness. Sorry will the day be when
we rely on that and that alone for the preservation
of our liberties. Then there will be no elections.
One man or a group of men will save us all the
expense and trouble.46
LEGISLATIVE COMPENSATION AND ALLOWANCES
At one time the question of legislative compensation revolved
around who was to pay the legislators--the state or the counties
and towns.47 Through the years, however, it has been decided
that the state should assume this responsibility.
In the past,
another major question was whether the amount of compensation
should be fixed by the constitution. But because the cost of
livinq and the value of the dollar fluctuate, the common answer
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to the question now is that salaries and allowances should be
left to statute rather than to the constitution. 4 8 This means
that legislators are in an unique situation of setting their
own salaries. However, the recently adopted constitutions of
Hawaii, Illinois and Virginia add a provision that all increases
in salaries cannot go int~ effect during the term for which the
enacting legislators sit. 9 Alaska and Connecticut, on the
other hand, provide that salaries be set by law but set no
limitation on increases.
The Montana Constitution [Art. V, Sec. 5) reads:
"After the
first session, the compensation of the members of the legislative
assembly shall be as provided by law; provided, that no legislative assembly shall fix its own compensation." The Montana
document repeats the prohibition in another section [Art. V,
Sec. 8]:
"No member of either house shall, during the term for
which he shall have been elected, receive any increase of salary
or milage under any law passed during such term."
However, the Montana Supreme Court has held that the two
constitutional prohibitions against salary increases do not
apply to expenses.SO Therefore, legislators legally can raise
the amount they receive for expenses and make the change
effective immediately. That was done in 1971, when the legislature increased the daily expense allowance for its members
from $15 to $25.51 Some members criticized the action, arguing
that the increase in expenses should not have been made
effective until the next legislative session.
The action of the legislature raises a major question: Should
the constitutional prohibition against a legislature increasing
its own salaries apply also to expenses? The methods followed
in other states vary. The recent constitutions of Hawaii,
Illinois and Virginia follow the same line of thought as the
present Montana provisions; however, their constitutional
language is more explicit. For example the Illinois provision
reads:
"A member shall receive a salary and allowances as
provided by law, but changes in the salary of a member shall
not take effect during the term for which he has been elected."52
On the other hand, Michigan forbids both salaries and expenses
from being increased, saying that such increases can become
effective "only when legislators commence their terms of
office after a general election. 53
11

A second subject which can be a constitutional issue is whether
legislators should be paid per diem (a daily rate) or an annual
salary. The legislature could be given the authority to decide
the issue as is now the case in Montana, or it could be settled
through constitutional language. For example the Alaska Constitution states that legislators are to receive annual salaries. 54
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Recently in Montana, there has been much debate over per diem
and annual salaries. Montana law now provides that legislators
are to receive $20 in salary and $25 in expenses for each day
the legislature is in session.55 In 1967 and 1968, the Montana
Citizens Committee on the State Legislature recommended annual
salaries in its reports to the legislature. The Committee quoted
many Montana legislators as criticizing the present salary and
as believing they could do more interim work and assist their
constituents to a greater extent if they were paid annual salaries.56
Many persons propose the adoption of annual salaries if the
legislature adopts annual unlimited sessions on the basis that
salaries would hold down the length of such sessions.57 With
annual salaries, it is to the advantage of the legislator to end
the session as promptly as possible.
Another issue is whether the legislature or a compensation commission should set legislative salaries. There are two questions
involved:
(1) Should any civil servant set his own salary?
(2)
Is the exercise of such salary-setting power an embarrassment
to the legislature? Many people question the wisdom of allowing
the legislators to set their own salaries because of the possibility of abuse. Although the level of salary is not a constitutional question, it underlies all the issues mentioned and
must be discussed.
Many believe that legislative salaries are inadequate to attract
many competent people and that they are too low for many people
to afford to serve their state. John Burns, author of The
Sometime Governments, wrote in 1971:
In all but a handful of today's legislatures, salaries
and other compensation remain at nineteenth century
levels.
Legislative service, as a result, is closed
to all but a tiny fraction of our people. Legislative salaries and other compensation should be high
enough to enable a broad cross-section of the citizenry-of different races, sexes, occupations, economic
circumstances--to consider legislative service. 58
State legislative salaries, excluding expenses, range from $19,200
a year in California to $200 every two years in New Hampshire.
The biennial "salar~" for Montana legislators, based on a 60-day
session, is $1,200. 9
(See Appendix F for the salaries and
expenses for each state.)
If legislative salaries are too low, why do they remain so when
most legislatures have the power to revise them? The answer
concerns that very power: legislators are acutely sensitive
to charges of "salary grabbing" and people are prone to level
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just such charges. The fear of legislators of being censured
in this manner goes back to the Congress of 1816. In that year,
congressmen raised their salaries to $1,500 a year, a figure
which John C. Calhoun thought was still too low to enable the
nation to have an "able, intelligent, and experienced House. 60
When the bill passed both houses, congressmen expected some
criticism, but not the reaction which developed. Grand juries
condemned their actions, groups burned them in effigy and demanded
their resignations, and voters demanded the defeat of all who
had voted for the bill.
No congressman was re-elected from Ohio,
Delaware or Vermont, and only a few returned from the rest of
the states. Kentucky returned Henry Clay, the speaker of the
house~ and one other man only on their promises to repeal the
bill.bl The historian J.B. McMaster wrote of this event:
11

The punishment was unreasonable, and, as is so often
the case in great outbursts of popular anger, was
harmful, for, of all the Congresses which up to that
time had assembled under the Constitution, the ablest
and most useful was that so ruthlessly swept away. 62
To avoid such an outburst and to relieve the legislators of their
embarrassment, some groups favor the creation of a commission
composed of non-legislators to set legislative ~alaries after
studing the cost of living and other criteria.6
According to
the Council of State Governments, such a commission "would
promote public confidence in proposals to raise legislative
compensation to reasonable levels and would minimize accusations
by the public and the press of legislative 'self help. 111 64
Thomas Jefferson made the first proposal for a salary commission
in his 1783 draft of what he thought the Virginia Constitution
ought to contain. The constant fluctuating of the value of
money told him that it was unwise to fix legislative salaries
in the constitution. He proposed that legislators receive
daily wages equal to the value of two bushels of wheat.
He
set the value at $2 until 1790; in that year and every ten
years thereafter a commission composed "of the most respectable
merchants and farmers" was to re-evaluate the value of the
two bushels which would then be the measure of legislative
salaries for the next ten years.65
Prior to 1970 only Michigan and Oklahoma had compensation
commissions operating under constitutional mandate.
Idaho
had created a commission by statute. However, other states
had created temporary advisory committees. The 1968 Hawaii
Constitution created a commission which was to meet every
four years starting in 1971. In the election of 1971,
Arizona, Maryland and West Virginia approved the creation of
commissions, and New Hampshire and North Dakota defeated such
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measures.
Before going into effect, the recommendations of
the Maryland and West Virginia commissions must be offered to
the legislature, which can accept or reject them.
Arizona's
commission differed in that tt has to submit its recommendations
to the people for approval. 6
Arizona's procedure may not be
wise, for as Luce once observed:
When the wage of legislators is at the mercy of a
popular vote, they arc unlikely to find generosity
paramount.
In no other matter are the American
people so parsimonious as in that of the payment
of their servants.67
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CHAPTER V

LEr.ISLATIVE PROCEDURE
All state constitutions contain sections on legislative procedure because
[i]t is essential that the leg is lative process he
governed by rules ensuring stahility, order and
predictabilitv. Bills must be considered in a
public and orderlv fashion; maioritv will must
prevail and yet syfeguards must be imposed against
arbitrary action.
Although powers of the state legislature are bv nature unlimited (see Chapt. II), most state constitutions, in fear that
state courts might deny the legislature some of these powers,
specifically provide that the legislature may select its officers, adopt its rules and judge the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members. Other provisions, like single
subject, title and amendment bv reference restrictions, provide
for the form of bills; they are placed in constitutions to
protect legislators from suprise and fraud. Still other provisions, like those providing for the journal, a quorum and
open sessions, concern the manner in which legislation is processed; they are inserted in constitutions to insure that the
public can hold its representatives responsible. The extent to
which these provisions are fixed in the constitution and not
left to legislative rules is a matter of controversy. The
provisions were few in the early constitutions, but they grew in
number during the early 1800s. Robert Luce wrote:
It was with the mushroom growth of corporations after
the invention of the steam locomotive that legislative
rules began to seem too weak. Resort to constitutional restraints may have been natural, but it was unfortunate. The more the restraints, the more ingenious
the expedients for evading them. Far wiser would it
have been to build up the character of the Legislature
than to put it in a strait-jacket. With the demoralization that followed the Civil War, reformers redoubled
their efforts for artificial safeguards. 2
The Montana Constitution of 1889 contains many of the procedural
limitations developed during the early 1800s. In many cases the
limitations have been extremely bothersome, creating large quantities of litigation. Acting on Leqi slative Council reports on
~egislative Procedures3 and Legisla ti ve Rules 4 , the Montana
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legislature has taken steps to prune antiquated procedural limi tations it had imposed on it s elf, but in many cases the legi slature was unable to completely modernize its system because man y
of the limitation s are embodied in the Constitution.
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS IN THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Below is a list of the procedura l limitations in Article V o f
the Montana Const itu tion. Each section is compared with pro visions of constitutions adopted since 1959--Alaska, Conne cticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan and Virginia--and
to three of the draft constitutions offered to the people , b ut
rejected, since 1968--Arkansas, Idaho and Maryland.
Section 9. The senate shall, at the beginning and
close of each regular session, and at such other
times as may be necessary, elect one of its members
president pro tempore. The house of representatives
shall elect one of its members speaker. Each house
shall choose its other officers, and shall judge of
the elections , returns, and oualifications of its
members.
In general, all ten constitutions studied have similar provi sions. Some, like those of Alaska and Hawaii, contain additional subjects; 5 others, like Connecticut and the proposed
constitution of Arka nsas,6 give the legislature the power t o
choose its officers in one section and the right to judge el ections, retur ns and qu alifications in another. None of the t e n
constitutions provides for the senate to elect a presiden t p ro
ternpore at the beginn ing and close of the session. There seems
to be no clear reason for this double - election provisioh. How ever, if the lieutenant governor is unable to perform his
duties, the president pro tempore assumes them, and if bo t h
the lieutenant governor and governor are unable to perform thei r
duties, the president pro tempore of the senate assumes the
duties of governor. 7 This plus the fact that the office is
mainly honorary may h ave mot i vated the delegates to want men
of different attribut es to preside over the senate while it was
in session and to perform the duties of the governor or lieuten ant governor in their absence during the interim. Three of the
ten constitutions provide specificallv for a president pro
tempore--Connecticut, Mi chigan and Virginia;8 seven do not.
Section 10. A majori t y of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from dav to day, and comnel the atten-
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dance of ahsent memhers, in s uch manner and und er
such penalties as each house mav prescrihe.
All but the proposed Idaho Constitution provide for a auorum
and compelling the attendance of memhers. 9
Section 11. Each house shall have power to determine
the rules of its proceedings, and punish its members
or other persons for contempt or disorderlv behavior
in its presence; to protect its members against violence or offers of bribe or private solicitation, and
with the concurrence of two-thirds, to expel a member,
and shall have all other powers necessarv for the
legislative assemhly of a free state.
A memher expelled for corruption shall not thereafter
he eligible to either house of the legislative assembly; and punishment for contem~t or disorderlv behavior
shall not bar a criminal prosecution for the same offense.
All ten constitutions grant these powers to the legislature. Some,
like Alaska and Michigan, comhine this section with one granting
the legislature power to judge the elections, returns and nualifications of its merrbers, while others, like Hawaii, Florida and
the proposed Arkansas constitution, 10 give the p0wer to determine
rules and to punish and expel memhers in separate sections.
Section 12. Each house shall keep a journal of its
proceedings, and mav, in its discretion, from time to
time, publish the same, except such parts as reauire
secrecy, and the aves and noes on any auestion shall,
at the reauest of anv two members, be entered on the
journal.
Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan and Virginia require a vote of onefifth of the membershin to have a r e corded vote in the journal.
Illinois requires two in the senate and five in the house to demand a recorded vote, and Florida r enuires five members in either
house. The proposed Marvland and Arkansas provisions require a
recorded vote on all votes, and the Alaska and the proposed Idaho
provisions just demand that the leg jslature keep a journa1.ll
Section 13. The sessions of e ac h house and of the committees of the whole shall be open, unless the business
is such as reauires secrecv.
Michigan, Florida and Connecticut have nrovisions similar to Montana's Article V, Section 13.12 Flo rida soecificallv allows
senate meetings on the appointment or removal of officers to be
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closed. Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois and Virginia do not have similar
provisions. Idaho's proposal reauires all sessions to be open,
and Arkansas' draft document demands that all meetings be open
and every vote be recorded.
In its proposed constitution,
Maryland states that all votes must be taken in public. 13
Section 14. Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days,
nor to anv other place than that in which the two
houses shall be sitting.
Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Idaho, Virginia and Florida have provisions similar to Montana's, except that in Florida if the
legislature cannot decide when to adjourn, the governor mav
make the decision. The Michigan provision (Article IV, Section
21) states that the two houses can adjourn separatelv for no
more than two davs. The Connecticut and the proposal Maryland and
Arkansas constitutions have no provisions which are similar,
but the proposed Arkansas Constitution allows the governor to
adjourn the legislature if it cannot agree on the time of
adjournment.14
Section 15. The members of the legislative assembly
shall, in all cases, except treason, felonv, violation of their oath of office, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their respective houses, and
in going to and returning from the same, and for any
speech or debate in either house thev shall not be
auestioned in any other place.
Four of the ten constitutions--Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois and Arkansas--have privilege provisions verv similar to Montana's.
Virginia provides that its legislators are not subject to arrest under any civil process during the session and for fifteen
days before and after the session; similarlv, Michigan protects
its legislators for five davs before and after, Connecticut
four days before and after, and Idaho for ten davs before. 15
In Maryland's proposal, onlv the privilege of sneech is protected:
Words used bv a member of the General Assembly in anv
of its proceedings, including the proceedings of any
committees and subcommittees, shall be absolutely privileged, and a member shall not be liable therefore in
any civil action or criminal prosecution. 1 6
Florida has no provision of this tvpe.
Section 19. No law shall be passed except bv bill, and
no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage
through either house as to change its original purpose.
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The Constitution of Michigan and the p ropose d constitution of Arkansas provide for the two items i n the Montana provision, but
deal with them in separate sections . The con s t i tutions of Hawaii,
Illinois and Virginia and the pr o posed c on s t itut ions of Idaho and
Maryland state that no law may be pa ssed except bv bill, but have
no original purpose provision. 17 Al aska, Florida and Connecticut
do not have similar provisions.
Section 20. The enacting clau s e of everv law shall
be as follows:
"Be it enacted bv the Legislative
Assembly of the State of Montana."
Only the Virginia Constitution and the proposed Idaho constitution do not reauire enactina clauses.
Section 21. No bill for the appropriation of money,
except for the expenses of the government, shall be
introduced within ten davs of the close of thesession, except by unanimous cons e nt of the house in
which it is sought to be introd uced.
None of the ten constitutions has a similar provision.
Section 22. No bill shall be considered or hecome
a law unless referred to a committee, returned
therefrom, and printed for the use of the members.
Of the ten constitutions, only Virginia has a similar provision.18
Section 23. No bill, except general appropriation
bills, and bills for the codification and general
revision of the laws, shall be passed containing
more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if anv subject shall be
e~braced in anv act which shall not be expressed
in the title, such act shall be void onlv as to so
much thereof as shall not be so expressed.
Alaska, like Montana, has a single subject-title rule which
exempts, in addition to appropriation bills and those codifying and revising other laws, those rearranging existing laws.
The Alaska provision further states that anpronriation bills
can concern only appropriations; ~ontana also has this provision, but in a separate section. Th e subject-title provision
of the proposed Maryland constitution is like those of Montana
and Alaska, but it exempts only "budge t law and supplementarv
appropriation laws." It, like the Alaska provision, also
states that appropriation hills can e ncompus onlv appropriations.19 Hawaii, Michigan, Virginia and Florida have subject-
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title provisions which make no exemption s . Plorida is noteworthy
for its wording:
"E very law shall embrace but one subje ct and
matter prop e r l y connected therewith, and the subject shal l be
briefly exp ress ed i n the title. 20 The Illinois Constitut io n,
and the proposed co nstitutions of Idaho and Arkansas have the
single-sub j ect provisi on but make no mention of the title
rule. 2 1 I l l inois exemp ts from the single-suhject rule appropriations a nd laws cod ifying, revising or rearranging other
laws, and Ida ho exempt s only laws that are a recodification
or a "comprehensive" r evision of existing laws. Illinois a nd
Idaho also state that appropriation bills must concern appropriations o nly. Conne cticut has no p rovis ion for the subjec t
or the titl e rule.
11

Section 24. No b ill shall become a law except by a
vote of a majority of all the membe rs present in
each hou se, no r unless on its final passage the vote
be taken by aye s and noe s, and the names of those
voting b e entered on the journal.
The Constitut ion of F lorida and the prop osed constitution of
Idaho have provisions similar to Montana's.22 Michigan's
Article IV, Section 26 requires a recorded final vote by a
majority of t he memb e r s elected and serving. The Alaska, Hawai i
a n d Illinoi s c onstitu tions and the proposed constitutions of
Arkansas and Maryla nd also demand the higher reauirement o f a
majority of t he memhe rship.23 Virginia's Article II, Sec t i on
lld requires a record ed final vote by a majority of each house,
which must i nc lude two -fifths of the total memhership. Connect icut does not have a p rovision of this kind.
Section 2 5. No
the prov isions t
title on ly, but
ded or extended
length .

law shall be revis e d or amended, or
hereof extended hy reference to its
s o much thereof as is revised, amensh all b e re-enacted and published at

The const itutions of Florida, Illinois, Michigan and Virginia
and the proposed consti tutions of Arkansas and Maryland have
provisions similar to t he Montana prov is ion.24 But the c onst itutions of Alaska, Hawa i i and Connecticut and the proposed
constitut i o n of Idaho h a v e no provision wh ich forbids amendment by r eference.
Section 27. The presidi ng o f ficer of each house shal l ,
i n t he presence of the h ouse over wh ich h e presides,
s i gn all bills and joint resolut ions passed by the
l e gislative. assembly immediate lv a fter t he ir titles
have been publiclv re ad , and th e f a ct of s i gn i ng shall
be at once entered upon t h e j ourna l .
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The Hawaii Constitution requires officers to sign the bills
immediately. The Florida section obliges them to sign the
bills during the session or as soon as practicable after
adjou rnment, and the Virginia section requires officers to
sign the bills no later than twenty days after adjournment.
The Illinois an~ Idaho provisions merely state that the bills
must be signed. 5 The other five constitutions do not have
provisions on the subject.
Section 28. The legislative assembly shall prescribe by law the number, duties and compensation of
the officers and employees of each house; and no
payment shall be made from the state treasury, or be
in any way authorized to any such person, except to
an acting officer or employee elected or appointed
in pursuance of law.
None of the ten constitutions has a similar provision. They
merely have general provisions concerning legislative officers
like Montana's Article V, Section 9.
Section 30. All stationery, printing, paper, fuel
and lights used in the legislative and other departments of government, shall be furnished, and the
printing, and binding and distribution of the laws,
journals, and department reports and other printing
and binding, and the repairing and furnishing the
halls and rooms used for the meeting of the legislative assembly, and its committees shall be performed under contract, to be given to the lowest
responsible bidder below such maximum price and
under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
No member or officer of any department of the gove rnment shall be in any way interested in any such
contract; and all such contracts shall be subject
to the approval of the governor and state treasurer.
None of the ten constitutions has a provision of this kind.
However, Michigan and Florida have general conflict of interest
provisions.26
Section 32. All bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the house of representatives; but the
senate may propose amendment s, as in the case of
other bills.
The ten constitutions used for comparison either do not mention
this subject or provide that appropriation bills can originate
in either house. The latter is exemplified by the constitutions
of Michigan, Hawaii, Virginia and Florida. 27
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Section 33. The general appropriation bills shall
embrace nothing but approoriations for the ordinarv
expenses of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the state, interest on the public
debt and for public schools. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.
Article III, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution and Article III, Section 19 of the Arkansas draft are similar to
Montana's Article V, Section 33. The other constitutions
either do not have this provision or combine it with provisions
on the single subject rule. For example, the single subject
provisions of Alaska, Illinois, Idaho and Maryland sav that
appropriation bills can encompass appropriations only. 28
Section 34. No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriations made by law, and on
warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance
thereof, except interest on the public debt.
Of the ten constitutions used for comparison, onlv the proposed
constitution of Arkansas has a similar provision; it is combi~ed_with2~he provision limiting anpropriation bills to appropriations.
Section 41. If any person elected to either house of
the legislative assembly shall offer or promise to
give his vote or influence in favor of or against any
measure or proposition, pending or proposed to be
introduced into the legislative assemblv, in consideration or upon condition that any other person elected
to the same legislative assemhlv will give, or will
nromise or assent to give, his vote or influence, in
favor of or against any other measure or proposition
pending or proposed to he introduced into such legislative assemblv, the person making such offer or promise
shall be deemed guiltv of solicitation of briberv. If
any member of the legislative assemblv shall give his
vote or influence for or against any measure or propo sition pending or proposed to be introduced in such
legislative assemblv, or offer, promise or assent so
to do, upon condition that any other member will give,
or will promise or assent to give his vote or influence
in favor of or against anv other measure or proposition
pending or proposed to be introduced in such legisla tive assembly, or in consideration that any other
member hath given his vote or influence for or against
any other measure or proposition in such legislative
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assembly, he shall be deemed guilty of br iberv; and
any member of the legislative assemblv, or person
elected thereto, who shall be guilty of either such
offenses, shall be expelled and shal l not thereafter
be eli gible to the legislative assemblv, and on the
conviction thereof in the civil courts, shall be
liable to such further penalty as may be prescribed
by law.
Of the ten constitutions, none has a provision which forbids
the legislati ve practice of trading votes or "log-rolling."
Section 42. Any person who shall directlv or indirectly offer, give or promise any money or thing
of value, testimonial, privilege or personal advantage, to any executive or judicial officer or member of the legislative assemblv, to influence him
in the performance of any of his official or public
duties, shall be deemed guilty of briberv, and be
punished in such manner as shall be provided by
law.
None of the ten states tries to forbid the bribing of public
officials in its constitution, thus leaving the matter to statutory law.
Section 43. The offense of corrupt solicitation of
members of the legislative assembly, or of public
officers of the state, or of any municipal division
thereof, and the occupation or practice of solicitation of such members or officers, to influence their
official action, shall be defined by law, and shall
be punishable by fine and imprisonment.
None of the ten constitutions leaves lobbying to be defined by
law, then prescribes the punishment for the practice as does
this Montana provision.
Section 44. A member who has a personal or orivate
interest in anv measure or bill proposed or pending
before the legislative assemblv, shall disclose the
fact to the house of which he is a member, and shall
not vote thereon.
None of the other ten constitutions has a similar provision.
However, Michigan in Article IV, Section 10 prohibits legislators from having anv interest in contracts, and ~lorida in
Article III, Section 18 directs the legislature to draw up a
code of ethics for all state emplov e es and non-judicial officers to prohibit conflict of intere s t.
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The preceding comparison shows that manv of Montana's procedural limitations no longer are found in modern constitu t ions.
The limitations that are retained in the modern documen t s
frequently are consolidated into single sections with ge ner al
headings like "Rules," "Form of Bills" and "Passage of Bi ll s. 1130
The present Montana Constitution often is confusing becau s e
related provisions are separated and follow no logical sequence.
In Standards of American Legislation, An Estimate of ~est r i c tive and Constructive Factors, Ernest Freund set forth wh at
many consider the best statement of criteria for inclusion and
exclusion of procedural limitations in a constitution. Professor Freund wrote:
The sound policv of constitution-making is to impose
procedural requirements only under the following
conditions:
(1) that they serve an object of vital
importance; (2) that they can be complied with
without unduly impeding business; (3) that they are
not susceptible of evasion by purely formal compliance or by false journal entries; (4) that they
do not raise difficult questions of construction;
(5) that the fact of compliance or non-compliance
can be readilv ascertained by an inspection of the
journal. The application of these tests would
lead to the discarding of most of the existing provisions withou t any detriment to legislation, as is
proved bv the experience of the states which never
adopted thern.31
A leading exampl e of the danger of inclusion of procedural re quirements in a constitution--the journal rule for co n sti t utional amendments--and the three most controversial p r o c edural
requirements found in state constitutions--single subject, the
subject expressed in the title and amendment bv reference- are discussed below.
THE JOURNAL RULE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Article XIX, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution provides ,
in part:
Amendments to this constitution may be proposed in
either house of the legislative assembly, and if the
same shall be voted for hv two-thirds of the members
elected to each house, such proposed amendments, together with the aves an d navs of each house thereon,
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shall be entered in full on their respective journals; and the secretary of state shall cause the said
amendment or amendments to be published in full in at
least one newspaper in each county (if such there be)
for three months previous to the next general election for members to the legislative assembly; and at
said election the said amendment or amendments shall
be submitted to the qualified electors of the state
for their approval or rejection and such as are approved by a majority of those voting thereon shall
become part of the constitution. Should more amendments than one (1) be submitted at the same election,
they shall be so prepared and distinguished by numbers or otherwise that each can be voted upon
separately. . . .
This section is perhaps the best example of the danger of including manifold procedural requirements in the constitution.
The 1897 Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to
Article VII, Section 5 which provided for the calling in of a
district judge whenever a supreme court judge was disqualified.
The amendment was "duly advertised," submitted to the people
and approved by them at the 1898 general election.
It then
was challenged as unconstitutional under Article XIX, Section
9 because it had not been entered in full along with the ayes
and nays in the journals of each house.
In Durfee v. Harper 3 2
the Montana Supreme Court declared the amendment approved by
the people unconstitutional because:
[T]he proposed amendment never was proposed as required, and therefore never ought to have been submitted.
It was a nullity before it reached the
people, and was not animated by them, because their
own solemn commands empowering its proposal, and
specifying the mode thereof, had been entirely
ignored by the proponent.33
SUBJECT-TITLE PROVISIONS
Article V, Section 23, Montana's subject-title p~ovision, reads:
No bill, except general appropriation bills, and bills
for the codification and general revision of the laws,
shall be passed containing more than one subject, which
shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any
subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not
be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only
as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.
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This is the most court-tested section in Montana's legislative
article; the only other provision rivaling it in annotation is
the section on local and special legislation. It has "proven
to be a fertile area for lawsuits ins !tuted by persons wishing
to overthrow legislative enactments."
These lawsuits are
often brought three or four vea rs after enactment of the law
in question.

3

The federal Constitution does not have a subject-title provision, but at least forty state constitutions do.35 The first
title provision seems to have been in the Georgia Constitution
of 1798.36 And the unity of subject-matter provision seems to
have been added to it for the first time in the New Jersey
Constitution of 1844.37
The major purpose of the subject-title provision is to give
reasonable notice of the subject matter of a bill to the legislature and the public before the bill is enacted. According to
Sutherland's Statutory Construction, a title meets this reauirement if it "is sufficient to direct a person of ordinary, reasonably inauiring mind to the bodv of the act. 11 38 The single..,.
subject restriction "prevents 'omnibus' or multi-subject legislation from being passed by the combined votes of the advocates
of each separate measure, when no single measure would have
been passed on its own merits. 39
11

Unity of Subject
Of Section 23's two components, the single-subject restriction
has produced little litigation--almost none compared to the
enormous quantity the title restriction has produced--yet it
is the component which prevents ~ost of the evils mentioned.
Ab out a dozen suits have challenged legislation contending the
va rious laws contained more than one subject; not one suit has
succeeded in voiding legislation.40 The Montana court has been
consistently liberal in it s interpretation of the single-subject
limitation. Like most state courts, it has ruled that the word
"subj ect " is not synonymous with "provision" if the provisions
relate to, and a~I a means of carrying out, the general purpose
of an enactment.
In Evers v. Hudson, the Montana Supreme
Court stated the following general rule, which also is common
among other states:42
The object of this constitutional provision is not to
embarrass honest legislation, but to prevent the
vicious practice, which prevailed in states which did
not have such inhibitions, of joining in one act incongruous and unrelated matters. The rule of interpretation now auite generallv adopted is that, if all
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parts of the statute have a natural connection and can
reasonably be said to relate, directly or indirectly,
to one general and legitimate subject of legislation,
the act is not open to the charge that it violates this
constitutional provision; and this is true no matter
how extensively or minutely it deals with the details
looking to the accomplishment of the main legislative
purpose. Or, stating the converse of the rroposition ,
i t may be said that if, after giving the act the be n e fi t of all reasonable doubts, it is apparent that two
or more independent and incongruous subjects are embr a ced in its provisions, the act will be held t o
tr an sgress the constitutional provision, and to b e
v oi d by reason thereof.43
In 19 21 the court applied this rule in a case challengi ng a n initiative c reating a ten-year mill levy for the univer s i t y sys tem.
According to the Montana Bill Drafting Manual:
Th e state alleged that the act was intended to do th ree
t hings: First, increase the rate of taxation, s econdly,
aut horize the legislature to levy annually no t to exceed 3 1/2 mills, third, to appropriate the proc eeds of
part of the levy for the university system. The court
sai d the chief thought was that of increasing t he r a te
of taxation which was the object and subject ma t ter of
t h e enactment, and as a detail germane to the s ub ject,
t h e people authorized the legislature to do two thin g s-fi rs t, to levy 3 1/2 mills annually during the pe riod
n a me d, and second, to appropriate annuallv the proceeds
from 1 1/2 mills of such levy. The court concluded
that no violation of section 23, article v, occurr ed . 4 4
Th e section's exception of general appropriation hills and bills
for the codification and general revision of the laws from t h e
sing l e- subject limitation was explained by the Montana court i n
State v. District Court:
Th e obvious reason for the exception of appropriation
b i l ls and bills for the codification and general revis ion of the laws is that the first are necessary for
the maintenance of the government, and hence their
va l idity ought not to be open to question for informali t y; and the latter are so extraordinary in their
character that both the members of the legislative
body and the public are presumed to know what is being
done.
Furthermore, it would be impracticable to formu la te a title which would cover every subject embrac e d
i n s uch a bil1.45
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This line of interpretation might be made stronger if its
general premise were incorporated into the constitutional
provision in a manner similar to Florida's:
"Every law
shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connec t ed
therewith.
. 1146 or by saving "one object" instead of
"one subject."
The Model State Constitution has a unique single-subject provision:
The legislature shall enact no law except by bill
and every bill except bills for appropriations and
bills for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of existing laws shall be confined to one
subject. All appropriation bills shall be limited
to the subj e ct of appropriations. Legislative
compliance with the requirements of this section is
a constitutional responsibility not subject to
judicial review.47
The last sentence has been added for a number of reasons. The
Model Constitution states that while there is little disagree ment over the desirability of a single-subject provision, i t
has created a "great bodv of highly technical decisional l a w. "
When strictly construed, the provision has nullified "on esse ntially extraneous if not frivolous grounds" sound legislation
which misled no one. 48 The Model provision provides that
compliance rests solely with the legislature, much as it does
when left to the legislative rules.
If the responsibility is
abused, the governor's veto would be the obvious remedy, in
addition to normal political processes.49
Another alternat i ve is to leave the provision out of the constitution entirel y so that the legislature can provide for the
provision in its rules where it would not be subject to judicia l
review. As men~ioned earlier, that is the technique of Conne cticut.
Subject Expressed in Title
This provision o f Article V, Section 23 has been used to void
a large number of Montana statutes, yet it offers the legislators and t he public the least protection of the section's two
components ; it merely req uires that the title be clear enough
to notify le gi s lators and the public of the subject of legislation.
Under this p rovision, a number of guidelines can be
laid down, b u t they a re extr e mely difficult to abide by. Unlike
the single s ubject ru le, there is a great variety in the criter ia
used and d e ci sions re ached. The Montana Supreme Court once stated:
-130-

LE~ISLATIVE PROCEDURE

The question of the sufficiencv of the title of
various acts of the legislatu re has been before
this court manv times. Each c ase has been decided on its ov1 n particular s et of facts . 'This
must of necessitv be the case . .
. No single
rule can be laid down which wi ll control all
cases where this attack is ma<le.50
However, the court has stressed th e importance of a liberal
construction of this provision.
In a "leading and often
cited case,"51 the Montana Supreme Court laid down the
following general rule:
Everv reasonahle presumntion sh ould be in favor
of the title, which should be more liheral~v
construed than the bodv of the law, giving t o
the general words in such title paramount weight.
It is not essential that the hest or even an
accurate title be emploved, if it be suggestive
in anv sense of the legislati v e puroose. The
remedv to be secured, and mischief avoided, is
the best test of a sufficient title, which is to
prevent it from being made a cloak or artifice
to distract attention from th e substance of the
act itself . . . . No better test . . . can
be made than bv a correct answer to the auestion :
Is this title in everv resnect so foreign to the
purpose of the act, or some integral ~art of it ,
that it gives no intimation thereof?S
The Legislative Council's Bill Dra f ting Manual, analvzing court
decisions on the title provision, stated:
While the Montana court mav not have alwavs
applied the "evidence of fraud" standard, it
has consistentlv held that if the title fairlv
indicates the general sub1ect of the act, is
comprehensive enough in its scope reasonablv
to cover all of the provjsion ~ thereof, and is
not calculated to mislead either the legjslature or the puhlic, it must b0 held to be sufficient to meet the re0uirements of the constitution.53
According to the Bill Drafting Manu al, "Details need not he
mentioned. The title need not contain a comnlete list of all
matters covered bv the act.•• 54 The means or-i nstrumentalities
through which the act is to he carr ie d out do not have to be
stated in the title. 55 J'\s Sutherl and states, "Particulars
are to be found in the act not in the caption. 56
11
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Following these guidelines, the Montana court has forgiven
acts which have had ohvious mistakes in their titles. For
example, the court upheld an act entitled "AN ACT REPEALINr.
[certain sections] OF THE POLITICAL CODE RELATINr- ~o THE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE STATE LAND Ar.ENT AND HIS ANNUAL SALARY"
although the act really amended the sections mentioned.5 7
The court also has applied a rule of liberal construction to
what bill titles encompass.
For examnle, the court upheld
an act entitled, "AN ACT TO LU1IT, REr-ULATE AND LICENSE THE
"1ANUFACTURE AND SALE OF ANY AND ALL LIQUORS OR BEVERAr.ES
THAT MAY THEREAFTER BE MANUFACTURED, SOLD OR DISPENSED IN
THE STATE OF MONTANA,'' al though it was challenged because
its title did not mention the following points:
It made no reference to: (1) a Liauor Control Board,
(2) the matter of a state hiring persons to buy
and sell liauor in the name of the state, (3)
the leasing or establishing an operation of state
liouor stores, (4) the control of an individual
in his purchase or consumption of liauors bv the
permit system, and (5) the accrual of profits
from liouo~ sales.58
Yet in 1971, the court found an act entitled "nREDr.E t-,1ININr.
REr.ULATION AND LAND PRESERVATION ACT" unconstitutional because the bodv of the act discussed "sluice-washing plants"
which the court ruled were distinct from dredge mining:
"Dredge" and "sluice-washing plant" are distinct
and different objects; thus, statute prohibiting
persons from carrving on mechanical onerations
that result in recoverv of minerals in or near
stream or riverhed with use of dredge boat or
sluice-washing plant which mentioned dredge
mining, but not sluice-washing plant, in its
title violated constitutional mandate that subject of bill be clearlv exnressed in its title.59
These three cases raise doubt about whether there are any firm
criteria which legislators and bill drafters can follow in
~ontana. The title restriction also is critized because the
constitutionality of legislation can be attacked years after
enactment, even though the sole purnose of the restriction is
supposedlv to give notice of the suhject of legislation to the
legislators and to the public. One studv has shown that an
average of five vears passes after enactment before suits are
brought against the legislation; 6 0 that means government administrators have to hase the policjes and wor:J<- of their offices
on laws which can be voided at any time. ~herefo re, it is contended that if the restriction is retained, legislation should
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be subject to challenge for onlv a limjted period of time. 61
The National Municipal League stat0.s that it did not include
a title restriction in the Model State Constitution hecause
such a restriction, like the singl e -subject rule, has voided
a great amount of "perfectlv sound le islation" on "essentiallv
extraneous if not frivolous ground s ." 2

6

AMENDMENT BY REFBRENCE
Article V, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution provides:
No law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions
thereof extended bv reference to its title only, but
so much thereof as is revised, amended or extended
shall be re-enacted and puhlished at length.
In the absense of this provision, an act could be amended in a
shorter, but more obscure, manner hv taking three steps in the
bill:
(1) referring to the law which the bill is changing bv
only its title (not printing the sections of the law which the
bill affects); (2) providing that within the law certain words,
phrases, sentences or provisions he inserted, stricken or both,
and (3) stating onlv the place in the prior act where the
change should be introduced. 63 In other words, at present, a
hill which states "'Lavr X is to be amended bv striking line
12 of Section lA and inserting instead .
'is invalid as
an amendment by reference. 64 The reason is simple:
when
these words and phrases stand alone, thev often make no sense
and give no clue to the effect thev would have on the law; thus,
legislators and the puhlic would have to consult the original
act to discover the effects of the change. With its inherent
possibilities for confusion, the method could he used intentionally to achieve legislation surreptitiouslv. 65
11

Almost all bills introduced in the legislature amend or repeal
existing laws; even a completelv new law usuallv conflicts with
some past legislation. There are two wavs to amend laws--bv
direct and implied amendment. Onlv direct amendment normally is
concerned with the constitutional r es triction that an act cannot
be amended bv referring onlv to its title.
Direct amendment
is written in the form which states that certain words or nhrases
are going to be inserted, deleted or both at a certain paragraph
and line in the existing law. To cornoly with the constitutional
restriction, this bill has to set forth both what is being
changed and hov 1 it will appear when the change is made so legislators and the public can see how the change will affect the
law.
If the bill listed onlv a few words or phrases and referred
to the law onlv by its title, a great deal of mischief could
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result. Oddly, there is little litigation over this type
of amendment ; rather, litigation surrounds amendmen t by
implication. Sutherland states:
In litigation the issue of compliance with the
constit utional provi sion generally arises in a
case involving a statute which does not purport
to amend any prior act [amendment by impli cation],
since the legislature usually complies with the
limitation when a statute purports to amend a
prior statute [a direct amendment) .66
"The definiti on of an implied amendment is purely formal--it
is an amendment that does not state that it is an amendment."67
In contrast to the direct amendment which plainly sets forth
certain words or phrases to be changed, an amendment by implication is a bill which can stand alone and make sense and
which, in effec t, states that henceforth the law will be in
that form. There is nothing deceitful about this approach;
the act tells legislato rs and the public wha t the change is
and what its ef~ect will be. Repeal by implication is the
same as an amendment by implication, except that amendment
usually affects only part of an existing statute, while repeal
normally replaces an entire section or statute. Both have
meaning because of the legal maxium that the latest enactment
of a legislature supersedes all others. That means all provisions in a prior ac t that are inconsistent with the new act
automaticall y are amended or repealed.
In other words, by
making a newer law on the subject, all past laws which conflict
with it automatically are void, and there is no need to enumerate
each one. This type of amendatory bill is very common because
it is simple and easily understood.
In contrast, direct amendment (the settirg out of each section affected) often is very
difficult or impossible because of the great size of legal
codes, the little time provided bv limited sessions and the
legislator's limited legal aid.
In addition, much of the state's
legal code would have to be reprinted each session if every
affected section of the codes had to be set out and printed .
Not only would the expense b e great, but the bills would be
incomprehensible.
There are two ways a court may interpret amendment by implication:
1. Because amendment by implication does not purport to
amend another law and becaus e it does not trv to amend other
laws merely by referring to their titles and listing the words
or phrases to be changed, it does not have to comply with the
constitutional restriction.
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2. Because in reality amendme nt bv i mn licat io n does a me nd
othe r laws, it must comolv with th e constitu t i onal restricti o n.
Gener a llv bec a use o f the p r oh l ems of dire c t amen dmen t a nd i n order
to uphold legislation, the vast ma io rit v o f the nation's state
courts have ruled in the first manner, tr v ing not to classi fv
an act as an amendment whenever po s sihle.
In other words, f o r
an act to be amendatorv, it must p r ofess to amend another act
or section. 68 An examole of this tvpe of ruling in Montana
would be State v. Gallatin Countv lligh School District. The
Montana Bill Drafting Manual revie~ ed the case this wav:
[T]he court considered an act which provided "That
as an emergencv measure, the e ffective period of
chapter 24 of the laws of the Extraordinarv Legislative Assemblv of Montana of 1933-34, he, and the
same is therebv extended to ,Tune 1, 1937, and that
all the provisions of said act shall he anc remain
in full force and effect until the date aforesaid,
on which date said act shall cease to be onerative."
The court said:
"here the reference . . . is not
to the 1 title 1 of chapter 24, but to the act itself,
its bodv and substance, 'the provisions thereof' if
vou will, but does not propose to change these provisions in anv particular; it merelv proposes to
extend the heneficial effect of those provisions
for an additional two vears. This is to prolong,
rather than to extend the life of the act. 69
11

This decision can be justified because the act did not "attempt
to modify an existing statue bv providing that certain words
phrases or clauses should be inserted, or stricken or both." 7O
However, nationallv a minoritv of state courts has held such
acts invalid because thev are, in substance, amending previous
acts. Such interpretation is in such a minoritv, however,
that the 1950 Hawaii Constitutional Convention Commission•
report on amendment bv reference did not even consider it. 1
The minority interpretation is condemned bv authorities like
Sutherland and Freund.72

7

Montana case law on the subject is confusin g b ecaus e the Mont a n a
court has internreted cases in the second mann e r as well as t he
first.
For example, the Montana c o urt decided Northern Pacif i c
Railwav Co. v. Dunham in the minorjtv manner. 73 Although the
act involved purported to he inde p~ ndent and complete within
itself, the court ruled that in su h stance it was amendatorv,
and declared it unconstitutional under Article V, Section 25.
The court said that an act cannot h e determined to be independent or amendatorv ''by the titl e [alone] nor whether
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the act purports to be an aMendment of the existing laws, hut
by an examination and comparison of its provisions with the
prior law as last in force."74
Because the decisions of State v. r,allatin Countv High School
District and Northern Pacifjc ~ail~av Co. v. Dunham are at
the opposite extremes of judicial interpretation, there are
no sure guidelines which legislators and bill drafters can
follow in Montana. Even direct amendment is uncertain because the auestion of whether a sub-section or a paragraph can
be amended without setting forth the whole parent section
never has been conclusivelv decided in Montana.
In short,
almost any act passed bv the legislature which amends other
statutes--and that includes most bills passed each session-can be chal:enged and possihlv thrown out.
The inclusion of this constitutional provision is questioned
by manv authorities. 7 5 Sutherland believes that the change
of a single word buried in a long section mav be as "effectivelv shielded from legislative and public scrutiny as it
would be bv blind amendment. ' He asserts that until some
form of distinct printing of amendatorv material is required,
"there is little reason to believe that the obiect of the
constitutional Prohihition viill be realized. 1176 The Montana
legislature has such a provision in its ,Taint Rule 6-2:
"In
sections amending existing statues, matter to be stricken out
shall be indicated with a line through the words or part to
be deleted, and new matter shall be underlined." If this
joint rule is what gives the constitutional orovision meaning,
it can be asked whv have a constitutional provision if the
legislature is capable or regulating itself with its own
rules as it has demonstrated in this instance. Sutherland
states:
[T]he desirahilitv of these constitutional provisions is auestionable and their reneal should he
carefullv considered in future constitutional revisions. Until that time a liheral judicial attitude in applving the constitutional limjtation
seems justified. Thus unnlication of the ru
of
acts amendatorv in form should be un1versal.

77

Conclusion
Freund's conclusion on the three renuirements--single subject,
subject exnressed in title and amendment bv reference--reflects
the consensus of other authorities on the subject:
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The r equireme nt s regarding title and subject-matter
undou btedly inculcate a sound legislative p ractice,
and in the great majority of cases amendment by
re-enacting a section is preferable to the amending
of words or passages torn fron1 their context.
If
the reauirement to amend in the form of re-enacting
sections were generally const rued , as it has heen
in Illinois and Nebraska, as forb idding or throwing
doubt on supplemental act s altering the effect of
existing sections [like the Montana ruling in The
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v . Dunham] its inconvenience would be much greater than its benefit; but
the Illinois and Nebraska decisions are anomalous
and indefensible.
Conceding that these requireme nts of style have had
on the whole a beneficial eff e ct upon legislative
practice and the clearness of statutes, they have a
reverse side which must not be ignored.
They have
given rise to an enormous amount of litigation; they
have led to the nullification of beneficial statues;
they embarrass draftsmen, and practices, especially
in the prolixity of titles, the latter again multiplying the risks of defect. While the courts lean
to a liberal construction, they have in a minority
of cases been indefensibly and even preposterously
technical, and it is that minority which produces
doubt, and litigation.
The reauirements were introduc e d to protect the
legislatures from fraud or sur pr ise and to stop the
practice of logrolling. The experience of those
states which have not adopted the provisions would
probably show that they are less necessary now than
seventy-five years ago, that better practices have
been compelled by public opinion, and that the
benefits of the improvement ma be enjoyed without
the attendant risks and evils. 8

7

CONVENIN~ DATE
The constitution s of thirty-seven states, including Montana,
set a definite time for the regular sessions of t he legislature to begin. 79 Article V, Section 6 of the Montana Constitution provides:
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The legislative assembly (exc ept the first) shall
meet at the seat of government at twelve o 'clock
noon, on the first Mondav of Januarv, next succeeding the general election provided hv law , and
at twelve o'clock noon, on the first Mondav of
Januarv, of each alternate year thereafter, and at
other times when conven8d bv the governor.
Other states have modified this type of provision in two wavs. 8 0
Iowa and Nevada8 1 set a defjnite convening date in their constitutions, but add that th e governor mav convene the legislature at an earlier date by proclamation. The ~1evada provisi on
reads:
The sessions of the Legislature shall be biennial,
and shall commence on the 3rd Monday of January
next ensuing the election of memhers of the Assembly, unless the r.overnor of the State shall, in
the interim, convene the Legislature hy proclamation.82
Eight other state constitutions set a convening date bu t provide
that the legislature mav change it bv law.83 The provision in
the Alaska Constitution is tvnical:
"The legislature shall
convene each year on the fourth ~onday in Januarv, hut the month
and dav may be changed bv la w. 84
11

The three remaining state constitutions--Minnesota, Texas and
Wisconsin--simplv provide th n t the co nv ening date mav he set
by law. 8 5 Similarlv, Section 4.08 of the Model State Constitution reads, in part:
"The legislature shall meet in regular
sessions annuallv as provider1 hy law. 86
11

There has been some opposition to a Januarv convenirtg date in
years following a guhernatorial election because the governor
does not have enough time to prepare his budget and "state of
the state" address. 87 This could be solved bv movirtg the date
of the governor' s inauguration to December, or by moving the
convening of the legislature to March, April or May. A proposed amendment to the Pennsvlvania Constitution stipulated that
the legislature would meet in Januarv except ''in every year
following the election of the r.overnor .
[when] it shall
meet .
. on the first Mond.1y after the first dav of March ." 88
The new Florida Constitut ion provides for an organizational
meeting of the legislature fifteen davs after the general election and for a regular sessjon on the "fjrst 'l'uP.sdav after the
first Monday in J\pril. 89
11

Occupational groups which find the Januarv convening date
particularlv convenient prohahlv would opnose anv change,
however. The general prohlern of convening dates also is discussed in the studv on the executive in this series of reports
for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
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MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVIS IO NS ON THE LEGISLATURE
ARTICLE V
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative authority of the state shall be
vested in a legislative assembly, consisting of a senate and
house of representatives; but the people reserve to themselves
power to propose laws, and to enact or reject the same at the
polls, except as to laws relating to appropriations of money,
and except as to laws for the submission of constitutional
amendments, and except as to local or special laws, as
enumerated in article V, section 26, of this constitution,
independent of the legislative assembly; and also reserve
power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls,
any act of the legislative assembly, except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety, and except as to laws relating to appropriations of money, and except as to laws for the submission
of constitutional amendments, and except as to local or
special laws, as enumerated in article V, section 26, of this
constitution. The first power reserved by the people is the
initiative and eight per cent. of the legal voters of the
state shall be required to propose any measure by petition;
provided, that two-fifths of the whole number of the counties
of the state must each furnish as signers of said petition
eight per cent. of the legal voters in such county, and every
such petition shall include the full text of the measure so
proposed.
Initiative petitions shall be filed with the
secretary of state, not less than four months before the
election at which they are to be voted upon.
The second power is the referendum, and it may be ordered
either by petition signed by five per cent. of the legal
voters of the state; provided that two-fifths of the whole
number of the counties of the state must each furnish as
signers of said petition five per cent. of the legal voters
in such county, or, by the legislative assembly as other
bills are enacted.
Referendum petitions shall be file d with the secretary of
state, not later than six months a f ter the final adjournment of the session of the legisla t ive assembly which pa sse d
the bill on which the referendum i s demanded.
The v e to powe r
of the governor shall not extend t o measures referr e d to the
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people by the legislative assembly or by initiative or
referendum petitions.
All elections on measures referred to the people of the state
shall be had at the biennial regular general election, except
when the legislative assembly, by a majority vote, shall order
a special election.
Any measure referred to the people shall
still be in full force and effect unless such petition be
signed by fifteen per cent. of the legal voters of a majority
of the whole nu mber of the counties of the state, in which
case the law sha ll be inoperative until such time as it shall
be passed upon at an election, and the result has been determined and declared as provided by law.
The whole number of
votes cast for governor at the regular election last preceding
the filing of any petition for the initiative or referendum
shall be the basis on which the number of legal petitions and
orders for the initiative and for the referendum shall be filed
with the secretary of state; and in submitting the same to the
people, he, and all other officers, shall be guided by the
general laws and the act submitting this amendment, until
legislation shall be especially provided therefor.
The enacting clause of every law originated by the initiative shall
be as follows:
"Be it enacted by the people of Montana:"
This section shall not be construed to deprive any member of
the legislative assembly of the right to introduce any measure.
Section 2.
Senators shall be elected for the term of four
years, and representatives for the term of two years, except
as otherwise provided in this constitution.
Section 3. No person shall be a representative who shall not
have attained the age of twenty-one years, or a senator who
shall not have attained the age of twenty-four years, and who
shall not be a citizen of the United States, and who shall not
(for at least twelve months next preceding his election) have
resided within the county or district in which he shall be
elected.
Section 4.
This section was repealed by chapter 273, Laws
of 1965, adopt e d at the general election of November 8, 1966,
effective under governor's proclamation, December 6, 1966.
Section 5. Each member of the first legislative assembly, as
a compensation for his services shall receive six dollars for
each day's attendance, and twenty cents for each mile necessarily
traveled in going to and returning from the seat of government
to his residence by the usually traveled route, and shall
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rec e i ve no othe r compensat i on , perquisite , or a l l owance
whatso ever.
No session of the legislative assembly, after the f irst,
which may be n in e ty d a y s , s ha l l exceed sixty days.
After the f irst session, the compensation of the members of
the legislative assembly shall be a s provided by law; provided,
that no legislative assembly shall fix its own compensation.
Section 6. The legislative assemb ly (e xcept the first) shall
meet at the seat of government at twelve o'clock noon, on
the first Monday of January, next succeeding the general election
provided by law, and at twelve o'clock noon, on the first Monday
of January, of each alternate year thereafter, and at other
times when convened by the governor.
The term of service of the members thereof shall begin the
next day after their election, until otherwise provided by
law; provided, that the first legislative assembly shall meet
at the seat of government upon the proclamation of the governor
after the admission of the state into the Union, upon a day
to be named in said proclamation, and which shall not be more
than fifteen nor less than ten days after the admission of
the state into the Union.
Section 7. No senator or representative shall, during the
term for which he shall have been elected, be appointed to
any civil office under the state; and no member of congress,
or other person holding an office (except notary public, or
in the militia) under the United States or this state, shall
be a member of either house during his continuance in office.
Section 8. No member of either house shall, during the term
for which he shall have been elected, receive any increase
of salary or mileage under any law passed during such term.
Section 9. The senate shall, at the beginning and close of
each regular session, and at such other times as may be
necessary, elect one of its members president pro tempore.
The house of representatives shall elect one of its members
speaker.
Each house shall choose its other officers, and
shall judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of its members.
Section 10. A majority of each house shall constitute a
quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members,
in such manner and under such penalties as each house may
prescribe.
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Section 11. Each house shall have power to determine the
rules of its proceedings, and punish its members or other
persons for contempt or disorderly behavior in its presence;
to protect its members against violence or offers of bri be
or private solicitation, and with the concurrence of two thirds, to expel a member, and shall have all other powe rs
necessary for the legislative assembly of a free state.
A member expelled for corruption shall not thereafter be
eligible to either house of the legislative assembly; and
punishment for contempt or disorderly behavior shall not ba r
a criminal prosecution for the same offense.
Section 12. Each house shall keep a journal of its pro ceedings, and may, in its dis cr etion, from time to time ,
publish the same, except such p arts as require secrecy,
and the ayes and noes on any q u estion shall, at the reque st
of any two members, be entered on the journal .
Section 13. The sessions of e a ch house and of the commit t e es
o f the whole shall be open, un l ess the business is such a s
requires secrecy.
Section 14. Neither house sha l l, without the consent of t he
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting .
Section 15. The members of the legislative assembly shall ,
in all cases, except trea s on, f elony, violation of their o at h
of office, and breach of the peace, be privileged from ar rest
during their attendance at the sessions of their respectiv e
houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and fo r
any speech or debate in either house they shall not be que stioned
in any other place.
Section 16. The sole power of impeachment shall vest in the
house of representatives; the concurrence of a majority of
all the members being necessary to the exercise thereof .
Impeachment shall be tried by the senate sitting for that
purpose, and the senators shall be upon oath or affirmation
to do justice according to law and evidence. When the gove rnor
or lieutenant-governor is on trial, the chief justice of the
supreme court shall preside.
No person shall be convicted
without a concurrence of two-thirds of the senators electe<l.
Section 17. The governor, and other state and judicial of ficers,
except justices of the peace, shall be liable to impeachme nt
for high crimes and misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office , b ut
judqment in such cases shall onlv extend to removal from o ffice
and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, o r pro f it
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under the laws of the state. The p arty, whether convicted
or acquitted, shall, nevertheless, be liable to prosecution,
trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.
Section 18. All officers not lia b l e to impeachment shall be
subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office,
in such manner as may be provided by law.
Section 19. No law shall be pass e d except by bill, and no
bill shall be so altered or amend e d on its passage through
either house as to change its original purpose.
Section 20.
The enacting clause of every law shall be as
follows:
"Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the
State of Montana."
Section 21. No bill for the appropriation of money, except
for the expenses of the government, shall be introduced
within ten days of the close of the session, except by
unanimous consent of the house in which it is sought to be
introduced.
Section 22. No bill shall be considered or become a law
unless referred to a committee, returned therefrom, and
printed for the use of the members.
Section 23.
No bill, except general appropriation bills,
and bills for the codification and general revision of the
laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any
subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be
expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to
so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.
Section 24. No bill shall become a law except by a vote
of a majority of all the members present in each house,
nor unless on its final passage the vote be taken by ayes
and noes, and the names of those voting be entered on the
journal.
Section 25. No law shall be revised or amended, or the
provisions thereof extended by ref e rence to its title only,
but so much thereof as is revised, amended or extended shall
be re-enacted and published at length.
Section 26. The legislative assembly shall not pass local
or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases,
that is to say: For granting divo rces; laying out, opening,
altering or working roads or highwa ys; vacating roads, town
plats, streets, alleys or public grounds; locating or changing
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county seats; regulating county or township affairs; regulating the practice in courts of justice; regulating the
jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police
magistrates or constables; changing the rules of evidence
in any trial or inquiry; providing for changes of venue in
civil or criminal cases; declaring any person of age; for
limitation of civil actions, or giving effect to informal
or invalid deeds; summoning or impaneling grand or petit
juries; providing for the m,inagement of common schools;
regulating the rate of interest on money; the opening or
conducting of any election or designating the place of
voting; the sale or mortgagl~ of real estate belonging to
minors or others under disability; chartering or licensing
ferries or bridges or toll roads; chartering banks, insurance companies and loan and trust companies; remitting
fines, _penalties or forfeitures; creatinq, increasing or
decreasing fees, percentages or allowances of public
officers; changing the law of descent; granting to any
corporation, association or individual the right to lay
down railroad tracks, or any special or exclusive privilege,
immunity or franchise whatever; for the punishment of crimes;
changing the names of persons or places; for the assessment
or collection of taxes; affecting estates of deceased per sons, minors or others under legal disabilities; extending
the time for the collection of taxes; refunding money pa i d
into the state treasury; relinquishing or extinguishing in
whole or in part the indebtedness, liability or obligation
of any corporation or person to this state, or to any
municipal corporation therein; exempting property from
taxation; restoring to citizenship persons convicted of
infamous crimes; authorizing the creation, extension or
impairing of liens; creating offices, or prescribing the
powers or duties of officers in counties, cities, township or school districts; or authorizing the adoption or
legitimation of children.
In all other cases where a
general law can be made applicable, no special law shall
be enacted.
Section 27.
The presiding officer of each house shall, in
the presence of the house over which he presides, sign all
bills and joint resolutions passed by the legislative
assembly immediately after their titles have been publicly
read, and the fact of signing shall be at once entered upon
the journal.
Section 28.
The legislative assembly shall prescribe by
law the number, duties and compensation of the officers and
employees of each house; and no payment shall be made from
the state treasury, or be in any way authorized to any such
person, except to an acting officer or employee elected or
appointed in pursuance of L1w.
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Section 29. No bill shall be pass e d giving any extra compensation to any public officer, se rvant or employee, agent
or contractor, after services sha l l have been rendered or
contract made, nor providing for t he payment of any claim
made against the state without pr e vious authority of law,
except as may be otherwise provid e d herein.
Section 30. All stationery, printing, paper, fuel and lights
used in the legislative and other departments of government,
shall be furnished, and the printing, and binding and distribution of the laws, journals and department reports and
other printing and binding, and the repairing and furnishing
the halls and rooms used for the meeting of the legislative
assembly, and its committees shall be performed under contract, to be given to the lowest responsible bidder below
such maximum price and under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law. No member or officer of any department
of the government shall be in any way interested in any such
contract; and all such contracts shall be subject to the
approval of the governor and state treasurer.
Section 31. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution,
no law shall extend the term of any public officer, or in crease or diminish his salary or emolument after his election
or appointment: provided, that this shall not be construed
to forbid the legislative assembly from fixing the salaries
or emoluments of those officers first elected or appointed
under this constitution, where such salaries or emoluments
are not fixed by this constitution.
Section 32. All bills for raising revenue shall originate
in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose
amendments, as in the case of other bills.
Section 33. The general appropriation bills shall embrace
nothing but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the state,
interest on the public debt and for public schools. All other
appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.
Section 34. No money shall be paid out of the treasury
except upon appropriations made by law, and on warrant drawn
by the proper officer in pursuance thereof, except interest
on the public debt.
Section 35. No appropriation shall be made for charitable,
industrial, educational or benevolent purposes to any person,
corporation or community not under the absolute control of
the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution
or association.
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Section 36. The legislative assembly shall not delegate to
any special commission, private corporation or association,
any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal
improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes, or to perform any
municipal functions whatever.
Section 37.
No act of the legislative assembly shall authorize the investment of trust funds by executors, administra t ors ,
guardians or trustees in the bonds or stock of any private
corporation.
Section 38. The legislative assembly shall have no power to
pass any law authorizing th8 state, or any county in the state ,
to contract any debt or obligation in the construction of any
railroad, nor give or loan its credit to or in aid of the
construction of the same.
Section 39.
Except as hereinafter provided, no obligation
or liability of any person, association or corporation, held
or owned by the state, or any municipal corporation therein ,
shall ever be exchanged, transferred, remitted, released or
postponed, or in any way diminished by the legislative
assembly; nor shall such liability or obligation be extinguished, except by the payment thereof into the proper
treasury.
It shall however be lawful for the legislative
such manner as it may direct, to authorize the
of any personal property taxes which are not a
estate and which have been delinquent for ten
or more.

assembly, in
cancellation
lien on rea l
(10) years

It shall also be lawful for the legislative assembly, in such
manner as it may direct, to authorize the cancellation of a n y
contractual obligation owed to or held by a county, for seed
grain, feed or other relief, the collection of which obligatio n
is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 40.
Every order, resolution or vote, in which the
concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on the
question of adjournment, or relating solely to the trans action of the business of the two houses, shall be presented
to the governor, and before it shall take effect be approved
by him, or, being disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of
both houses, as prescribed in the case of a bill.
Section 41.
If any person elected to either house of the
legislative assembly shall offer or promise to give his
vote or influence in favor of or against any measure or
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proposition, pending or proposed to be introduced into the
legislative assembly, in consider ation or upon condition that
any other person elected to the same legislative assembly
will give, or will promise or ass ent to give, his vote or influence, in favor of or against any other measure or proposition pending or proposed to be introduced into such
legislative assembly, the person making such offer or promise
shall be deemed guilty of solicitati on of bribery.
If any
member of the legislative assembly shall give his vote or
influence for or against any measure or proposition pending
or proposed to be introduced in such legislative assembly,
or offer, promise or assent so to do, upon condition that
any other member will give, or will promise or assent to
give his vote or influence in favor of or against any other
measure or proposition pending or proposed to be introduced
in such legislative assembly, or in consideration that any
other member hath given his vote or influence for or against
any other measure or proposition in such legislative assembly,
he shall be deemed guilty of bribery; and any member of the
legislative assembly, or person elected thereto, who shall
be guilty of either such offenses, shall be expelled and
shall not ther ea fter be eligible to the legislative assembly,
and on the conviction thereof in the civil courts, shall be
liable to such further penalty as may be prescribed by law.
Section 42. Any person who shall directly or indirectly
offer, give or promise any money or thing of value, testimonial, privilege or personal advantage, to any executive
or judicial officer or member of the legislative assembly,
to influence him in the performance of any of his official
or public duties, shall be deemed guilty of bribery, and
be punished in such manner as shall be provided by law.
Section 43.
The offense of corrupt solicitation of members
of the legisla tive assembly, or o f public officers of the
state, or of any municipal division thereof, and the
occupation or practice of solicitati on of such members or
officers, to influence their offi ci al action, shall be defined by law, and shall be punishab le by fine and imprisonment.
Section 44.
A member who has a p er sonal or private interest
in any measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislative assembly, shall disclose the fact to the house of which
he is a member, and shall not vote thereon.
Section 45. This section, as amended by chapter 137, Laws
of 1931, was repealed by chapter 273, Laws of 1965, adopted
at the general election of November 8, 1966, effective under
governor' s proclamation, December 6, 1966.
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Section 46. The legislative assembly in order to insure continuity of state and local governmental operations in a period
of emergency resulting from a disaster caused by enemy attack
may enact laws:
(1) To provide for prompt and temporary succession to
the powers and duties of elected and appointed public officers
who are killed or incapacitated.
(2)
To adopt other measures that may be necessary to
insure the continuity of governmental operations.
Such laws shall be effective only during the emergency that
affects a particular office or governmental operation, and
such laws may deviate from other provisions of the Montana
constitution, including but not limited to the following
sections:
(1)

Section 3, Article X, seat of state government.

(2)

Section 2, Article XVI, seat of county governments.

(3)

Section 16, Article VII, succession to governor.

(4)
Section 4, Article XVI, vacancy on board of coun t y
commissioners.
(5) Section 6, Article XVI, other vacancies in county
government.
(6)
Section 45, Article V, vacancies in legislative
assembly.
(7)
Section 11, Article VII, special legislative
sessions.
(8)
session.

Section 5, Article V, length of legislative

(9)
Section 10, Article V, quorum to do business in
each house.
(10)
(11)
of state.
(12)

Section 6, Article XIX, location of county offices.
Section 1, Article VII, duties of executive officers
Section 7, Article VII, appointments by governor.
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ARTICLE VI
APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATION
Sect ion 1 . One representative in the congress of the United
States shall be elected from the state at large, the first
Tuesday in October, 1889, and thereafter at such times and
places, and in such manner as may be prescribed by law. When
a new apportionment shall be made by congress the legislative
assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts
accordingly.
Section 2.
(1)
The senate and house of representatives of
the legislative assembly each shall be apportioned on the
basis of population.
(2)
The legislative assembly following each census made
by the authority of the United States, shall revise and adjust
the apportionment for representatives and senators on the basi s
of such census.
(3) At such time as the constitution of the United States
is amended or interpreted to permit apportionment of one house
of a state legislative assembly on factors other than population ,
the senate of the legislative assembly shall be apportioned
on the basis of one senator for each county.
Section 3.
Senatorial and representative districts may be
altered from time to time as public convenience may requir e.
When a senatorial or representative district shall be compos ed
of two or more counties, they shall be contiguous, and the
districts as compact as may be.
Sections 4 to 6.
These sections were repealed by chapter 273,
Laws of 1965, adopted at the general election of November 8,
1966, effective under governor's proclamation, December 6, 1966.
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APPENDI X B
REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS

Years in
which
held

Month

Alaska ..
Arizona
Arkansas
California

Odd
Annual
Annual
Odd
Annual

May
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

I st Tues. (a)
2nd Mon.
2nd Mon.
2nd Mon.
Mon. after Jan. I

36L
None(bY
None
60 C(c)
None(d)

Colondo
Connecticut

Annual(e)
Annual(e)
Annual
Annual
Annual

Wed. after 1st Tues.
Odd-Wed. after 1st Mon.
Even-Wed. after 1st Mon.
2nd Tues.
Tues. after 1st Mon.
Odd-2nd Mon.(h)
Even-2nd Mon.

None(b)

Delaware
Florida
Georgia

Jan.
Jan.
Feb.
Jan.
Apr.
Jan.
Jan.

60 C(c)
45 C
40C

Hawaii
Idaho
IUlnob
Indiana

Annual
Annual
Annual(j)
Annual

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

Iowa

Annual

Jan.

3rd Wed.
2nd Mon.
2nd Wed. in Jan.(j)
Odd-Tues. after 2nd Mon.
Even-Tues. after 2nd Mon.(k)
2nd Mon.

60 L(i)
60 C(b)
None
61 C
J0C
None

Kansas

Annual

Kentucky
Loubiana

Even
Annual(e)

Maine
Maryland

Odd
Annual

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
May
May
Jan.
Jan.

Odd-2nd Tues.
Even-2nd Tues.
Tues. after 1st Mon.
Even-2nd Mon.
Odd-2nd Mon.
1st Wed.
2nd Wed.

None(bY'
60 C(c)
60 L
60C
J0C
None
90 C(c)

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missimppi
Missouri .

Annual
Annual
Odd
Annual
Annual

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

1st Wed.
2nd Wed.
Tues. after l st Mon.
Tues. after 1st Mon.
Wed. after 1st Mon.

Montana
Nebrulta

Odd
Annual

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jeney

Odd
Odd
Annual

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

1st Mon.
Odd-1st Tues.
Even-I st Tues.
3rd Mon.
ht Wed.
2nd Tues.

60C
90 L(c)
60 L(c)
None(b) ·
July l(b)
None

New Mexico ..

Annual(e)

New York . . .
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Annual
Odd
Odd
Odd(n)

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

Odd-3rd Tues.
Even-3rd Tues.
Wed. after 1st Mon.
Wed. after 2nd Mon!
Tues. after 1st Mon.
1st Mon.

60C
J0C
None
None
60 L
None

Oklahoma ..
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

Annual
Odd
Annual
Annual
Annual

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

Tues. after 1st Mon.
2nd Mon.
1st Tues.
1st Tues.
2nd Tues..

90 L
None
None
60 L(b)
None

South Dakota

Annual

Tennessee
Texu

Odd(n)
Odd
Annual(e)

Jan.
Jan.
Feb.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

Odd-Tues. after 3rd Mon.
Even-Tues. after 1st Mon.
4th Tues.(h)
2nd Tues.
Odd-2nd Mon.
Even-2nd Mon.

Statt
Alabama

Utah

Sessions convene
Day
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Limitations
on length

(f)
(f)
(g)

None
None
120 L

0)

(m)

45 L
30 L
90 L(b)
140 C
60C
20C

APP ENDIX B (Con t inued )

Yuzn In

Sessions convene

which
held

Month

Vtm10nt

Odd(n)

Jan.

Wed. after I st Mon.

None!b,ef

Vqinia

AnniulG)

Wuhin~on .
West Vuginia

Odd
An nual

Wisconsin
Wyoming

Annual
Odd

Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.
Jan.

Even-2nd Wed.
Odd-2nd Wed.
2nd Mon.
Odd-2nd Wed.
Even-2nd Wed.
1st Tues. after Jan. 1 S(p)
2nd Tues.

60 Ctj)
30C(j)
60C
60 C(c,o)
60 C<c,o)
None
40C

Stott

I.Imitations
on ltnith

Day

Abbrniatio,u: L - l,piubve dayw; C - calend.r day L
(a) Convmea quodn,nnially on ,econd Tuesday In Juli.WY aftet election to o,pnhe.
(b) lndlr<ct n,strii:tion &ince l,pJUton" pay, pu diem o, d.aily allow111Ce llop, but ,cssioa may continue. Alub: ru1>1tory

limit oC 90 day1 pa dicm; Colondo: IIU l>ltory I.unit o C ISO day1 for thooe SeNtort elected pno, to 1970; Kuuu: 1utu1ory
lmit o( 90 d1 ya pay in odd awnbered yean; Nevada coruatullorw hmtt oC 60 daya, ao limtt.tion on &llowanca; Rhode
llla.od: c;onstltu tioiw limlt oC 60 day1; Tenncuoc: con11J1>1tlonal !unit oC 90 day, on npcl\lCO only; Vermont: 1Ul>ltory
11ml ta ti0f1.
(c) Sftllon may be eitcnded by "'"" o Cmemben In both hou,es. Arbnsu: 2/3 .,,,,e Co, lndeOrtitc llm1; FlONU: 3/5 vote;
l'.anDJ: 2/3 vote; Maryb nd: 3/5 vote for 30 additional daya; Ncbruu: 4/5 vote; Wnt v-.rprtil: 2/3 vote.
(di Recon.,na Cor lunlt oC 5 day, on the Monday aCter a 30 day recua to recorwder
mcuure..
(e) EYWD-ycat ICUIOn (odd yur in Louuiana) IS buically limited to bud1et Uld lbuJ mitten.
(f) Odd ycat, not b tcr th&n lint WtdDUday aJter the fu,t Monday In Ju.ne; even year, not bta than Cini lt,'odnnd.ly aJtn
6nt Monday In May.
(I) Lui day o( June.
(b)
fo r 12 day , to oqanlte; rece ... and conveneo on -and Monday In FebNUY Cor limit oC 33 dayL In
y..,,,..,... the L<iWa t,i n, eonvcncs o n lint Tucad1y In January for 15 dayt to orpnlze Uld Introduce bWa.
(I) Extenlion oC 15 day, ,ranted by p"'11dln1 offlcen of both bOWCI at the wdtten miuest oC 2/3 oC the membcnhip or
sru,ted by the Go,,emo,.
July I. I 97 I.
~~nven,. on the Cini Tucaday anei c!ie C\nt Monday In Deoember In naH1umbered ye&n to orp.nlu Uld to doct

.,,oed

eon..,,,.

~' 1/fecli.,

(I) R,culu ,-Io ns In 1972 Uld enry fowth you theruftcr an limited to 125 alondu day1; other ,-.an 90 calendar dayt.
ly concum,nt n,solulloa and b y 2/3 vo te oC th- pruent and voan, In .. c11 bouoc, IClllOO may be ea tended for 30 day1 with

ao Umh: on number of n.tentionL
(m) Odd yca, - by Ju.ne 30th, the even you - by May 15th. IC the Governor n,tuma any bill with hla objcctiom aJter
tdjoumment oC th e ~slarurc In <"ffl-ft llfflbett<I y.. n. the Lcpslature sllall automaucally n,con...,ne on the llnt V.ednad1y
Collowtn1 the r1111 Monday in September for a period not to e•oood ten day1 Cor the 10l1 pUfJ>01C of corwdtttn, bilb fttotd
by the Governor.
(o) Lqis.J.atl.lre may dtvkie tnafon by n,c.cu to moct ln CYCn ye&J &h.o.
(o) Co.,mor must e xtcnd un til general tpproprullOn u puaed.
(p) Unlus othenrisc provided by the Joint Commlttcc on LcJisbll"" Orpnlz.otion. u.rly In each biennlol aeulon, the Joint
CIDmmlttcc on LeJi,bll., OrpniuUon slul.l me,,t and develop a wort ,chedule Cor the lepslatlve oeulon, which lhall Include
at last one mec1tn1 in January oC uch year, to be 1ubmitted to the Lqlsl.ature 11 • joint n,solution.

Source:
Council of State Gove r nme nt s , Am erican State
Legislatures (Lexington , Ky. , 19 7 1) , p p. 4-5.
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APPEND IX C
SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS

State
Alabama

limitations
on length
36 L
30 C
None
15 C(c)
None

Al:uu
Arizona

Arkansas
C~ifornia
Colorado
Connecticut

Delaware
Florida

~rgia
luwaii
Idaho
Illinois

Indiana
Iowa

legislature may
determine rubject

No
2/3 of membership
Pet ition 2/3 members
No
No

2/3 vote those present
Yes(a)
Yes(b)
(c)
No

None(d)
None(e)
None
20 C(g)
(h)

Yes(f)
Yes(f)
Petition 3/5 members(h)

Yes
Yes
Yes(b)

30 L(i)
20 C
None
40C
None

Petition 2/3 membersG)
No
Yes(k)
No
No

YesG)

None(d)
None
30 C

KansaJ

legislature
may call

No

No

Yes

Yes

Maryland

None
30C

Petition 2/3 members
No
Petition 2/3 elected members
of each house
Majority of each party
Petition by majority of members

Massachusetts
Michigan .
Minnesota .
Missi.ui1_>pi
Missoun .

None
None
None
None
60C

Yes
No
No
No
No

Montana
Nebn.su
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jeney

60 C
None
None(d)
None(d)
None

No
Petition 2/3 members
No

New Mexico
New York . .
North Carolina
Nor th Dakota
Ohio

30 C(n)
None
None
None
None

Yes(n)
No
Petition 3/5 members(o)
No
No

Oklahoma ..

None
None
None
None
None

Kentucky
Louisiana

Maine

Oregon

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

Texas

..

Utah
Vermont

Virginia . . .
Washin$1on .
West Vu-ginia
Wisconsin . .
Wyoming

..

No

Yes
No
No(l)

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
No

Yes

Yes

No
Yes

(ml

Yes

No
No
Petition of majority of members
No
No

None
None(d)
30C
30C
None(d)

No
Petition 2/3 members
No
No
No

30 C(pl
None
None
None
None

Petition 2/3 members
No
Petition 3/5 members
Petition of majority of members
No
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.

Yes(k)
Yes 1
Yes

Yes(n)
No

Yes
Yes
No
No

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Ye,
No
No

Yes
Yes
Ye1
Yes(q)
Yes
Yes

APPENDIX C (Continued)

Abbrcvialions: L - kguladvc d1y1; C - alendar days.
(1) Unleu Governor calls and hmlh.
{b) If LqW11ure convene, 11se1r.

(c) Governor may convene Gencnl Auembly for sp«1nc purpose. Afler tha t bu.s1nes1 b. completed.• 2/3 vote of manben

In bolh howes may exlcnd scuion up 10 IS days.
(d) Indirect restriction :uncc lcgnl.11ors• pay 1 per diem or d3.lly aJ lowancc stops but special ies.sion may continue. Colondo:
1ta lulory lunila11on or 20 days ror !hose Senalors ckcled pnor 10 1970; Karu.u: slalulory limll or 30 day,; Ncv,da:
conrtitutional limn of 20 days, no hmllation on aJlowanccs: New lbmp1;h uc: con:uit ullonal limit of 15 d,ys; Tcnnuseic :
con1tltutional hmit o( 30 dcy, on cxpcn:sn only~ Vermonl: ,1.atutory llmll o( 40 day,.
(c) Speaal session for rcconsiderauon of bLlls vct0<-J by lhc Governor aflcr close of rqulu icss1on. limited to three day,.
(() Lqi.slaturc may be called mlo spcoal icnion in l>~lawarc by mutuaJ call of bo lh presiding o Cficcn and m Florida by
joinl proclarnalion by lhc Pre>1Jcn1 or lhc Sen11e anJ lhc Speaker or lhc Hou,c, which ts dul y filed wi lh lhc Secrelary or
Stale.
(J) Unlcfl c,1endcd beyond such limll by 1 3/S vole or each house.
(h) Umi1ed 10 70 day, ,r called by Governor and 30 day, lf called by Governor at pclilion or lcsiJlalurc, e,ccpl fot
lmpcachmcnl procccdmp.
(I) E.icnsion or IS d•Y• granlcd by prc,id1ng officers or bolh hou1e1 11 lhe wrlllcn rcque11 or 2/3 or lhc membenhlp or
s;nnle<I by lhe Governor.
OJ If Governor notifies Lcgnhlure he plans 10 relurn bill, wh ich wuc submllled 10 him Ins than ten day, before
adjournment (with ob,cc11ons). a special scuaon to reconsJder such bills may be convened without e&U on 45th d,,y d1er
adjournment.
(le) Errecdvc July I, 1971, special sessions or lhc Leiisl sl ure ma y be convened by joint proclamadon or lhe preddins
office.rs or bolh houses.
0) Unle>s Lcgislalure pclilion, for special session. However, no speclal onslon may be called during lhc 30 days before or
30 dsy, 1r1er lhc regular fi<cal sessions in lhe odd yc an wilhoul the conscnl or 3/4 or lhe elccled mcmben or each house.
LqisJatwe may convene m special ~ss1on on 3 1st day after sine die adjournment to act on aU bills vetoed by the Gonmor if
.a dmple majorily of each house de~11cs to r«on,ider at lust one vetoed bill. Such a session h limited to ten days.
(m) Petllion by majonly of memben of each house lo Governor, wh o then .. sh.Un call special sc.u1on.
(n) UmlUlion docs nol apply 1r impeachment trial i, pending or in proce ss. LegisJ.u ure may call 30-day "e•tnordlnuy"
session If Governor rcruscs In call session ~hen requested by 3/S of Le&islatwe.
(o) Errcc1ive July I, I 97 I.
(p) Effcclivc July I, 1971, may be «lcndcd for 30 day, by 2/3 vote In both hou ses.
(qJ No, ;r called by Governor alone; quc.lion,blc iC caUod a., rc,ull or pelilion or members.

Source: Council of State Governments , Amer ican State
Legislatures (Lexington, Ky. , 19 7 1) , pp . 6 ~ 7 •
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APPENDIX D

RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS
ALASKA: Unlimited annual sessions; special sessions called by
two-thirds of the legislators.
Article II, Section 8. The legislature shall convene each year on
the fourth Monday in January, but the month and day may be changed
by law.
Article II, Section 9.
Special sessions may be called by the
governor or by vote of two-thirds of the legislators. The
vote may be conducted by the legislative council or as prescribed
by law. At special sessions called by the governor, legislation
shall be limited to subjects designated in his proclamation calling
the session or to subjects presented by him.
Special sessions
are limited to thirty days.
CALIFORNIA: Annual sessions with odd-year split sessions and
even-year budget sessions. This provision has since been
replaced by unlimited annual sessions.
Article IV, Section 2(a). The sessions of the Legislature
shall be annual, but the Governor may, at any time, convene
the Legislature, by proclamation, in extraordinary session.
All regular sessions in odd-numbered years shall be known as
general sessions and no general session shall exceed 120
calendar days, exclusive of the recess required to be taken
in pursuance of this section, in duration.
All regular sessions in even-numbered years shall be known as
budget sessions, at which the Legislature shall consider only
the Budget Bill for the succeeding fiscal year, revenue acts
necessary therefor, the approval or rejection of charters and
charter amendments of cities, counties, and cities and
counties, and acts necessary to provide for the expenses of
the session.
All general sessions shall commence at 12 o'clock m., on the
first Monday after the first day of January, and shall continue
for a period not exceeding 30 calendar days thereafter;
whereupon a recess of both houses must be taken for not less
than 30 calendar days. On the reassembling of the Legislature,
no bill shall be introduced in either house without the consent
of three-fourths of the members thereof, nor shall more than
two bills be introduced by any one member after such reassembling.
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RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS

All budget sessions shall commence at 12 m. on the first Mond ay
in March and no budget session shall exceed 30 calendar days in
duration.
CONNECTICUT: Annual sessions with budget sessions in evennumbered years.
Article III, Section 2. There shall be a regular session of
the general assembly on the Wednesday following the first
Monday of January in the odd-numbered years and on the Wednesday
following the first Monday of February in the even-numbered
years, and at such other times as the general assembly shal l
judge necessary; but the person administering the office of
governor may, on special emergencies, convene the general
assembly at any other time. All regular and special sessions
of the general assembly shall be held at Hartford, but the
person administering the office of governor may,
in case of
special emergency, convene the assembly at any other place in
the state. The general assembly shall adjourn each regular
session in the odd-numbered years not later than the first
Wednesday after the first Monday in June and in the evennumbered years not later than the first Wednesday after the
first Monday in May and shall adjourn each special session
upon completion of its business.
If any bill passed by any
regular or special session or any appropriation item described
in Section 16 of Article Fourth has been disapproved by the
governor prior to its adjournment, and has not been reconsidere d
by the assembly, or is so disapproved after such adjournment, the
secretary of the state shall reconvene the general assemb l y on
the second Monday after the last day on which the governor is
authorized to transmit or has transmitted every bill to the
secretary with his objections pursuant to Section 15 of Arti cle
Fourth of this constitution, whichever occurs first; provided
if such Monday falls on a legal holiday the general assembly
shall be reconvened on the next following day. The reconvened
session shall be for the sole purpose of reconsidering and, if
the assembly so desires, repassing such bills. The general
assembly shall adjourn sine die not later than three days following
its reconvening.
In the even year session the general assem bly
shall consider no business other than budgetary, revenue and
financial matters, bills and resolutions raised by committees
of the general assembly and those matters certified in writing
by the speaker of the house of representatives and president
pro tempore of the senate to be of an emergency nature.
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RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS

HAWAII:
Sixty-day annual session s which can be extended by twothirds of the legislators.
Article III , Section 11. The legislature shall convene annually
in regular session at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on the third Wednesday
in January.
At the written request of two-thirds of the members to which each
house is entitled, the presiding officers of both houses shall
convene the legislature in special session. The governor may
convene both houses or the senate alone in special session.
Regular sessions shall be limited to a period of sixty day s, and
special sessions shall be limited to a period of thirty days.
Any session may be extended a total of not more than fifteen
days.
Such extension shall be granted by the presiding
officers of both houses at the written request of two-thirds
of the members to which each house is entitled or may be
granted by the governor.
Any session may be recessed by concurrent resolution adopted
by a majority of the members to which each house is entitled.
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays and any days in recess pursuant to
a concurrent resolution shall be excluded in computing the
number of days of any session.
All sessions shall be held in the capital of the State.
In
case the capital shall be unsafe, the governor may direct that
any session be held at some other place.
IDAHO (Proposed Constitution of 1970):
unlimited annual sessions.

Continuous body with

Article III, Section 11.
Sessions of the legislature. The
legislature shall be a continuous body during the term for
which the Members of the House of Representatives are elected.
The legislature shall meet in regu lar session annually.
Special
sessions of the legislature may be called by the governor and
shall b e called by him when a majority of the members of the
Senate and a majori ty of the members of the House reques t him
to do so.
Neither house shall adjourn for more than three days
without the permission of the other house except when the
Senate is in session for the sole and separate purpose of
considering confirmation of appointments.
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RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS

ILLINOIS: Continuous body ,ith unlimited a nn ual sess ions; special
sessions called by qovernor or th e pr e sid i ng officers of both
houses .
Ar t i c le IV, Section 5 (a).
The General Ass emb l y s hall convene
each year on the second Wednesday of Ja n uar y.
The Gen e ral
Assembly shall be a continuous body du ring the term for which
members of the House of Representatives ar e elec te d.
(b) The Governor may convene t h e Ge n e ral Assembly or the
Senate alone in special session by a proclama tion stating
the p u rpo se of the sess i on ;
a nd onl y business encompassed
by s u ch purpose, together wi th a ny i mpeachments or confirmation o f appointments shall be transacted.
Special sessions
of t he General Assembly may also be convened by joint
proc lamation of the presid i ng officers of both houses, issued
as provided by law .
MARYLAND (Prop osed Con stitu t ion of 1968): Ninety-day annual
sessions; majority vote of the legislators may extend the
sessi o ns b y t hi r ty day s.
Secti on 3 .15. The General Assembl y may provide by law for
an organizational session prior to t he co nvening of the
regu l ar session.
The General Assembly shall conv e ne in
regu l a r session on the t hird Wedn e sday of January of e ach
year , un l ess otherwise prescribed by l aw, and may continue
in s ess i on for a period not longer tha n nine t y da y s; provided
that by the affirmative vote of a majo r i t y o f the members of
each house a regular session may be ex tend e d for a period
not longer than thirty days, and t h at b y the affirmative
vote of three-fifths of the membe rs of each house a regular
session may be extended a second time for a period not longer
than thirty days.
The governor may c o nve ne a s pecia l session
of the General Assembly at any time and shall convene a special
session upon the written reouest of three-fifths of all the
members of each house.
The governor may, on extrao r d inary
occasions, convene the Senate by proclamation, stat ing the
purpose for which he has convened it.
The presiding officer
of the Senate and the presiding officer of the House of
Delegates, 3cting concurrently, may convene a specia l s e ssion
of the General Assembly at uny time.

-164 -

APPENDIX E
SIZE OF STATE LEGISLATURES

1943

Swte

..........

I

1971

House

Senate

House

Senate

House

Senate

35
20
28
35
40

106
40
60
100
80

35
20
30
35
40

106

35

106

35

...........

..........

58
100
80

19
35
40

80
100
80

19
35
40

106
40
80
100
80

..........
........
..........
...........
...........

65
272
35
95
205

35
36
17
38
52

65
279
35
205

35
36
17
38
54

65
294
35
124
205

35
36
17
45
54

65
177
39
119
195

35
36
19
48
56

............
Illinois . • . . • • • • . . • .
Indiana ...........

49
153
100
108

44

51
50

so

59
153
100
108

44
51
50
50

51
63
177
100
108

25
44
58
50
50

51
70
177
100
100

25
35
58
50
50

lun~ . . . . . . . . . . . .

125
100
100
151
123

40
38
39
33
29

125
100
100
151
123

40
38
39
33
29

125
100
105
151
142

40
38
39
34
29

125
100
105
i51
142

40
38
39
32
43

240
100
131
140
150

40
32
67
49
34

240
100
131
140
157

40
32
67
49
34

240
110
135
122
163

40
34
67
52
34

240
110
135
122
163

40
38
67
52
34

Florida
Georgi.a

I
I-'

Senate

1963

Ahb:ama
Ab.ska . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arizona
Asbnsas
Califom ia . • • • • • • • . .
Colorado
Connecticut
Del.aware

0\
I.J1

House

1953

Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . .
Idaho

Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kentucky . . . . . . . . . .

..........
............
..........
MassachUKtts .......

Louisiana
Maine
Maryl.Ind

Michiga.a . . . . . . . . . .
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . .

.........

Mwissippi
Miaouri ... · · · · · · · ·

95
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195]

194]

State

Montan.a ..........
Nebrulu (Unicamcnl) ..

I

°'°'
I

House

Se1111tt

House

Senate

House

Se11111t

90

56
43
17
24
21

94

56
43
17
24
21

94

56
43
17
24
21

104
40
400
80

55
49
20
24
40

70
150
120
98
99

42
51
50
49
33
48
30

NewMe:cico ........
New York . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina ..•...•
North Dakota
Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . •

49
150
120
113
136

Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . .
Oregon ......•...•
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . .
Rhode Island . . . . . . . .

120
60
208
100
124

44
JO

.......
............
Uuh . • . . . . • • . • • • .

.......

~

Senate

40
399
60

0

24
56

so

49
33

47
400
60

55
150
120
113
136

31
56

so

49
33

44
JO
46
46

so

1S
99
ISO
60
246

JS
33
31
23
JO

1S
99
ISO
64
246

JS
33
JI
2S
JO

75
99
150
69
150

JS
33
31
28
JO

40
46

33
27

100
99
100
100
S6

33
27

100
99
100
100
56

40
49
32
33
27

100
99
100
100
61

40
49
34
33
JO

1820

S702

1829

S913

1913

S622

1981

..........

1S
99
ISO
60
246

JS
33
31
23
JO

Virginia . . . . . . . . • . .
Wuhin~n . . . . . . . . .
~~ V~nia ....•...
\liisconsm .......••.
Wyoming ..........

100
99
94
100
S6

40
46

..........

5634

Totals

so

49
33

so

so

Vermont

32
58

44
46

44
46

South Dakota

77

150
120
113
137

99
60
203
100
124

44
30

Tennessee . . . . . . . . . .
Texas

37
400
60

121
60
210
100
124

118
60
208
100
124

South Carolina . . . . . . .

l9U

House

New Ham ~..hk · : : : : : :
New Jersey •..••••••

NeYada

1963

32

32

Source: Council of State Governments, American State Legislatures
(Lexington, Ky., 1971), pp. 42-43.

so

50
46

APPENDI X F
SALARY AND DAILY PAY

-------------Salary
and daily pay------- - -- -----..
----------Regular utsion-------,
Special session
Lim/ton no.
of dqy1ofpay
Stille
Ahbama

... . . .

Aluk.a ... . .. .
Arizona .•••.•.
Arbnm . . . . . .
Califom ■ . . . . . .
C.olondo . ••• .•
C.on necticut . . . •
Debware .. . .. .

Florida . . . . . . .
I

Georgia •. .• ..•

O'\

Hawaii . . . . . . . .

....
....J

I

Idaho . . . . . . . .
IDinoiJ •••• • •••

Indiana ... . .. .
Iowa . . . . . . . . .

Kansas • • ..•. •.
Kentucky . •• • • •
Louisiana ••• .••
Maine ••. •••••
Muyland •••• • •
Musachwetta •• •
Michigan • • • •••
Minne,ota . . •.. •

M~i~pl • • • • •
MiMoun •• •• . ••
Montana

. .... .

Nebruk.a . ... . .

Amount

Annual

pudgy

tession

Const.
Stat.
C.orut.{a)
C.onst.
Stat.

Sl0

Biennial
utsion
36L

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
C.omp. C.omm.(a)
Stat.
C.omp. C.omm.(a)
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
C.orutJSUt.

Bimnlal
,a1ary

Amount
~relay

S10

Limit on
no. of days
of pay
36 L

S9,000
6,000
60C{b)

20

S2,400

6

19,200

Stat.
Stat.
C.orut.
Stat.
Stat .
C.onst./SUt.{a)
C.onst . .t Comp. C.omrn.{a)
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

Annual
salary

7,600
2,000
6,000
12,000
4,200
12,000
10

20C

60C
17,500
4,000
5,500

10
25
50

40

90C(c)

60L(d)
60C{c)
2,500

10
25
50
20

JOC
30C

11,000
l l ,400(g)
17,000

(e )

9,600
22.50

5,000

30

16,800
20

20

60C

4,800

60C

APPENDIX F (Continued)

Salary a11d daily pay
Rl'gular session

Spl'cia/ union

limit on no.
of days of pay
Campen,
sation
set by•

State

.......
..
.....

Stat.
Const.
Const./Stat.

40

New Hampshire
New Jeney

New ~exico
New York ..•••.
North Carolina . .
North Dakota
Ohio . . . . .

Const./Stat.
Const./Stat.
Stat .
Const.
Stat.

20

Okhhoma . . . • . .
Oregon . . .
.
Pen nsylvanil
Rhode hland
South Carolina

Const. Dd.(a)
Stat .
Stat.
Const.
Const./Stat.

South Dakota
Tenneuce
TeUJ
..
Uuh
Vermont

Stat.
Const./Stat.
Const.
Const./Sut.
Stat.

Virginia
Washin~on .•••.
West Virginia .•..
Wisconsin •.•••.
Wyoming . . . . .

Stat.
Stat.
Comp. Comm.(a)
Jt, Finance Comm.
Stat.

Nevada

.

...

....

I

.....

°'
CD
I

Amount
per clay

......

.. . . . .
......
......

.

Annual
session

Biennial
session

t.,maon
Annual
salary

Biennial
salary

Amount
pn clay

no. of clays
of pay

40
3

20C
ISL

. 20

30C

60C
200
10,000
60C(c)
15,000
2,400

s

s

60L
I 2,750
9,000
6,000

s

7,200
60L
4,000

100

3,000(f)
3,600
4,800
25

20
30

60C(c)
IS0(g)

35

60C

30L

25
30

30C

35

30C

40

7,200
3,300

35
17,800

IS

• Sawy, duly pay, ua..,. and 11penae1 lllow&neff.
(I) for lnformaUon on companutJon commluion1 N'C pap
.
(b) Oa~y pay cont!nun If ocnlon ulendod by 2/) ¥Oto In both h.,.,..._

(c) um1u11on on fint l<IUOIL Second reulon llmJUUon: 1u .... 60 C dayo, Lowblana JO C dayo,
N<w Mtuco 30 C dayo, Utah 20 C days.
{dl Lqtslalon .,. pud ror Sundoy1 and holiday, durlna ....ion. Thuo, tho com_..tlon period

40C
usu.ally b ann,ty...,o to -nty,lour dayL
(•) l«>~ed In conrtltutlon and may be fixed by ap«W IC1

IS

o( tlM l..,putara.
(f) Sl,
for 4Uay ..u1on In odd-num~ yan, Sl,000 ror thlny-day -..1111 _..aabcnd
ycan.
(J) ht work duriJII arulon. Swry and pn diem limited to S4,500 t o r - ·

Source: Council of State Governments, American State Legislatures
(Lexington, Ky., 1971), pp. 20-21.

APPENDIX G
TRAVEL AND EXPENSE ALLOWANCES

Between sessions
During session
For expenu1

Pu
State

mile

Round trip,
home ro
capital

Ahbama . . . . . . 10¢
15

One
One

Arizona ...... 10
Arkansas . . . . . . 5
(f)
California
Colorado
10
Connecticut ••.. 10
Dclawue . . . . . 15
Florida . . . . . . . 10
Georgis . . . . . . 10

Unlimited
One
(f)

.......

Awk.a

.....

Expenses
per day f
$20; 300(1)
35(b ):
4,000(c)
20(d)

Indiana
8
Iowa
10
Kan111 . . . . . . . 9
Kentucky
15
Louisiana . . . . . . 10
Maine
10
Maryland ..... 10

30
l0(h)
Daily
l,500(j)
25(c)
Unlimited
Weekly
25
Weekly
25
Unlimited(m) 750(n); 20(0)
One
35
Weekly
50(c);
3,600(r)
Weekly
25
Weekly
15(s)
Weekly(u)
25(v)
25; 50(c)
One
500(a)
(x)
7; 9(y)
Weekly
Unlimitcd(z) 25(z)

Musachusetu ...

Daily

(aa)

Weekly
One
Weekly
Semi-monthly

l,200(r)
20(ab)
24; 16(ac)
12.S0(af)
10

Hawaii

.........

Idaho . . . . . . . 10
Illinois • . • . . . • 15

......
........
.......

Michigan .•.. •.
Minnesota . . . . .
Misswippi . . . . .
Missouri
Montana . . . . . .
Nebraska . • . . .
NC'Vlda . . . . . ..

10
15
(ae)
10
9
10
10

New Hampshire ..
New Jersey . . . .
New Mexico . . . .
New York .••.•
North Cuolina
North Dakota . . .
Ohio . • . . . . . •
Oklahoma . . . . .
Oregon . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania . . .
Rhode Island ...
South Cuolina ..
South Dakota ...
Tennessee .....
Texu

25(aj)
(ak)
10
(q)
8
10
10
10
•.
10
8
9

......

s

10
10

...... .
........ 10

Utah
Vermont . . . . . .

8
V~nla . • • . . . 7
W ln~n . . . . 10
West V 'nla . . . 10(at)

(g)

One
One
(ag)

25
200(c)
25; 60(c);
250(ah)

Daily

Pu

on committu

business
per day

mile

Other
per month

s
104

(e)

(f)

30
35(i)
25(k)

10

300(1)

300(1)

(q)

25
25
(p)
25

8
10

25
40(t)

100

8
10

25

l00(w)
300
500(a)

ii>

25(z)

10
10

so

200
3,600(r)

2,000(z);
4,700(z)
1,200(r)

(q)
(ad)
100
9

20(q)
(ai)

25(aj) (q)

(al)

One
Weekly
Weekly
Three
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly
Unlimited
Weekly
One
Weekly
One
Weekly
Weekly
One
One
Weekly

(ad)
3,000(r)
25; S0(a)
35;35(a)
(c) (an)
20
4,S0O(r)

10
9

20
(q)
30(am)

9(ao) 25(ao)
(a<!)
8

3,000(r)
50(a)
35(a)
100
4,S00(r)

25(ap); l5(c)
30(af)
12(aq)
15
8; 12.S0(as)
3,900(r)
40
1S,l0(au)
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9
10

16
30

20
875(u);
1,700(11)

8

8; l 2.50(as)
3,900(r)

10
25
l0(at) 15,10(au);35(av)

so

APPENDIX G (Continued)

Between sessions
Durint ussion

State

Per
mUe

\lt1SCOnsin

IO(aw)

Wyoming

10

Round tripi
home to
capital
(aw)

Expenses
per dayt
1S(ax)

Per
mile
(q)

For expenur
on committee
businers
Other
puday
pum011th
2.5;

(q)

◄ O(ay)

One

26

Abbr,,uaon, L - Lqiwme dty1, C - c.,Jend;u day a.
Unlc:s.s olhcf""'1Jr noled.

t

(1) Addu.orw mon1n.ly ctpense a.Do·.va.ncr.

(b) Limucd 10 !he fin I 90 da>·• or a ,nuon.
(c) local office .a.JJo,.,"J.na. Aluk.1 &Mu.a.l a.1Jo,.,.1ncc for posurc. 111donuy. umoenphk IC:IYica and other upcoset,
Delawueo: suppUn per yur; Kcn1u .. ky· .11..pphti pcz bttnn1um~ NmJa· posug,c, r1p~ nie•~per and stauonuy;
Okl&honu: pronJcd by rrsolutton or each houM", ncces~ r,pen~ such u 1utionuy 1 office u.ippbes. sum~ telephone.
tie.

(d) SI ODO (01 lepsbton from "aricop& Count).
(e) Legui.alon allrnd ng legulatnc blWllcu outs>de lhru a>unty o( rrndence rttei•c l\lb<istmcc pay o( S20.00 pet dty.
l..q;is.laton Uttndmg IC'gul.1u ... c busmen ouu,je
the Stile ttttn,: S30.00.
(f) E.adl lq:sl1101 u illlo,.eJ the u,e o( a cu pwchued and r=ntaincd by the State fo1 "" oc lq,!.IJIJY< bv.llncu. Ex11
qi,l.lto, i.J abo mmbumd for tJ-.e actllll «pcn1< or any pub~ tunsporu1,on -4.
(J) One trip 11 IOf per mde. Th01< k-gislalon h>llll over i--·enty-f1vc mi.lea from Dcnva recd>e 104 pet mile for a bip
tyt:ry•·eetend.
(b) 1..tsis!aton hvtng over twenty-five milu from Denvn rece,vc llmll or S 10.00 per nicht !or lodJin&. l)aj)y trnd upm,e
10 S JO.CO In lieu or loJgu,J for ntihu not rpm! in Den=.
(l) SJS.00 per day for a>nuninee 11tencance up 10 S l.0S0 mulmum. Joa,1 Buc!Jet Conunirtee mcnben have a S),.500
m.u.imum (01 bu~sct rommJnce 1ncnd.a.nct in 1dd1Uon to Sl,0$0 (or othu comm1Ucr antn<Una.
Q) Total bttnrua.l upcnte a.llo•ancc. h)·ablr III one- or f'Wo lumip surn.1.
(\) Or amount sptC\fied in act au tins comm.ll1ec, •hiche"",n is morz. plus ncccuary rar,crues..
0) Pay,bk upcn vouchu for rcunbun<mcnl.
(m) Tn..,I allow,n<c lepl111on from Oihu ••·•) from Oihu, Sl0.00 pet dty ; ltr;blaton from ndJhbor bands a. .y from
1w.nd o( rcadcnc< S20 ~Opet day.
(n) Total a.nnuJ aDo,.-.na r r incidental cip,nJ<S a>nnc,;tcd ,.,lh l,gul.lavc dulles.
(o) Appbes ooly lo leg:uluon ouulde ol O.hu.
(p) On om,-ul buw,cas on 1wnJ of ruldcnc,, S 10.00 per day, aw,y from island or raidcna Sl0.00 pet doy; outa.ide the
Slit. µ5_00 per d1r.
(q) ActuU and ne.;;rua.ry c,pcn,es. Milne· milea,rc ts pud 11 11.fflr ntc recrived by statr rmployec.1
(r) M.itimum &Mu.al e:tpcnte allo•"'ll"!ce.
(s) For days actually in t<SJJon, Polk Co~ $1.50.
(I) Plu1 mcm.
(u) MJlclft payable for one round tnp for oacb full "eek ortepslatrve 1emon.
(T) Limlled to ntnett· d1y1 regul.u JCSD<>n, llurty day, specuJ
('w) Monthly nccpt hnUIJ)·, Februuy a.nd MaKh in odd ycan and Ja.ni,uy and Februuy L~ nen ycan.
(X) Eis/II dunni renenl "'1SJOn in nm-numbueJ t·au; lour dunn, fiscal ,e,.uon a, odd-numbertd yun.
(y) S7.00 per d,y for meal,. S9.00 pa day for lodginp or in beu or 1<unb1mrn1cn1 for 1e1U&I io4Jlll expense. , ddy
mle>e< allo•a.na up 10 S9.00 pet day, plw a small allo,.·,nce for po1ure. telephooe, etc.
(•) hid by voucher only. ADo .. -.ncc, for omc,, ,e.:rc1a.rul a.nd lnYCIJns upaues. Ho..,. S2,000; Senate H,700.
(u) E.ach mcm~r dcp<ndU"III on "h<r< he hYC1 re.:enc, a per dJ<m allo.-.nc, (or mil<a&<, meals a.nd looiu,i from Sl.00 lo
pet day.
(ab) A maximum of S20.00 I?"' day may be CUJm<d. Total a.nnual a.mount may not e1Cftld S2,7SO.
(ac) S16.00 for kps!Jton bv,n! 11 bome d!UUI{ the sesst0n.
(ad) Amount not sllJ>ubted. )(,nneiou· (or tnnsporu1.,n, mew a.nd bole!; New Metjco: for stationery, postac-e.
tr.lephon< a.nd leleinph ctpcn1<s, Orqon. for (cod a.ad lodg-~
(ae) ADo,n.,a !or one month: 104 pu mile up 10 1000 mde,, St per mile neat 500 miles. 7t pet mile OTU ISOO a,iJ«.
(a.fl Umited 10 oine'y le,;ubb>e d1y1. Mwus,pp, pud !or each dty o( anenda.nc,:.
(&&) I°' pc. mil• Lf'J Si0.00 per dJ<m aDo,.-ince !or one round tnp. In add11io11., supplemenUI trnd a1Jo,.,anc,c not to
exceed S700 for a r,gui;u sn..son a.nd net lo nceed S250 for a special sewon II pr!Mdcd.
(ah) Total telephone allo..-.~ S 100 for sp<cul 1<uions.
(Ii) S60 pnn11111 lllo,.-.nce for period o( ,emon through lhlld lliednesd1y in July ot the (oDo,o·Ini yur.
(IJ)
for ru,1 H mile .. s, per aule (or nut 25 mdu. 6t fo1 ova 70 mil'1..
(•kl Stale railroad pu, u onl) ryp, o( tnvel a!Jo" 2nce.
(al) Free 1:.tl.lor.eri·, po,uge ind teler;nm pnvtlcres.
(am) Adc!,uor.al •Uo ..-.nee. s I 5.00 pcz day for mub ,nd lodcmg and other 1<1ual a.nd necnsa,y eaperues.
(a.n) For tn•cl oulJIJe the Sure, t.m0un1 o( r.111 clu, w trnel a.nd SlS.00 pcz d>cm.
(IO) LL-ruled to l\'cnly d•t• 1n IJeu of opens,, fur tMerim State Lqul.11,.-. Council meeuni, or 11, a>rnmln« wort in
the ~Ute. plus travel and other c,rcn,es for i.:-ouncd or 1l1 romm1llcc ..-ork outsadc the Sutc.
(ap) rud eace;,t •hen luC.!l uncontcued rruncu &Je constderc-d.
(oq) For run 120 d,y, ,! rer;ulu s<>s,on a.nd lhllty doy1 or each ipecial ,....,n plw pos1.&1e, rtatlone,y, lllppliet.
tekfhonc and s«rtllnal usnlanc,.
(Lf) Allowance for ,upphu, lclcphonc ind 1«rcl&JLI.I hdp. not 10 c,ettd Sl.700 in Sfflltc. S87$ in House.
(u) $8.0-J for mew. S12.50 per dat or S50.00 pet .....,,, ..-tucheYCr is Ins. (01 room, or tnYd etpcn,e.
(al) lot pu mllc. 1f by pnwate fil. a<:tual con 1( tJ.1YTIC"d by common c.&rncr.
<••l S15.00 pet day or Sl05.00 pa "eek p11d upon voucher for lodr;,ns; SJ0.00 pet day or S70.00 pet week (or mesh.
SH .00 F" day oul ol Stile.
(aT) Comperwuon payable only 10 memben or the Joa,t Commntoc on Govcmmenr a.nd Finance a.nd th• Coauamioa oa
lntmtatr Cocpen1t0n not 10 c.ceed S1.050 per yeu.
(aw) For rint rolffld U1p, thcreaftc1 7t per nu.Jc for one round tnp pct w,:,ck dunn,; KU1on. tr milu,r caceed.1 l.C)X) min
pet month. compenYUon n f>l per rrulc:.
t,h
0
0
~.'=~1;1m~ n" ~ ~o.t)(,mr.,c:n~.::1~:r: : ..~::~, one county or ltu. plw
,nd $20.00
rt,pcc tJ.vc!y for cKh 1dJ1t10'\.ol..l counly or re.rt of county 1n the datncl.

or

"'"°"·

sn.oo

is,

:~;: ~~-~"'i:,:

m.oo

Source:
Council of State Governmen ts, American
State Legislatures (Lexington, Ky., 1971), pp. 22-23
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